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ABSTRACT 
This thesis seeks to explain why current attempts to expand the reach of the 
Afghan government in Kabul are met with heavy resistance.  It examines the historical 
dichotomy between state capacity and the prevalence of solidarity groups’ opposition to 
central rule in four Afghan regimes: the monarchy of Amir Abdur Rahman, the 
communist regime of the Peoples Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the Soviet 
occupation, the Taliban's Islamist theocracy, and President Hamid Karzai's democratic 
Islamic Republic.  Charles Tilly’s Four State Activities model is used to subjectively 
determine each regime's relative degree of state capacity in four areas: war making, state-
making, protection and extraction.  The basis and composition of major resistance groups 
during each regime are then analyzed.  This thesis concludes with a comparative analysis 
of state capacity and resistance in each of the four regimes in order to draw implications 
for how the current government of Afghanistan can best expand its reach without creating 
further revolt and insurgency.  These findings are not only important for the Government 
of Afghanistan, but also hold serious implications for prosecution of the Taliban 
insurgency, as well as future international state building and post-conflict reconstruction 
efforts. 
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The U.S.-led effort to topple the Islamist1 Taliban regime in the wake of the 11 
September 2001 terrorist attacks sparked an initial wave of optimism toward the creation 
of a new and stable Afghan regime.  The Bonn Agreement2 set a broad agenda for the 
establishment of a transitional Afghan government and was the central document that 
directed the international post-conflict state-building effort.  Since then, the Government 
of Afghanistan (GoA) has completed the successful transition from an appointed 
Transitional Authority to a more inclusive and representative governing body following 
2004's parliamentary elections and 2005's presidential and provincial elections.3  Yet, 
despite these advances, international optimism has steadily waned, only to be replaced 
with pessimism, as coalition forces and the fledgling Afghan government, led by 
President Hamid Karzai, struggle to combat a growing insurgency within Afghanistan’s 
borders.  Meanwhile, core Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership, including Osama bin Laden 
and Mullah Omar, have remained elusive, operating from Pakistan’s tribal regions that lie 
along Afghanistan’s wild eastern periphery.  This fact has reinforced the view of many 
that Afghanistan remains a failed state,4 with at least one prominent scholar even 
suggesting that Afghanistan has never constituted a modern nation-state.5   
                                                 
1 For the purpose of this thesis, the term ‘Islamists’ refers to any party that advocates the 
implementation of the Shari’a  (Islamic law) as state law.  All Islamists, whether radical or moderate, share 
this common ideological goal. They differ, however, on how they intend to achieve this goal.  Radical 
Islamists call for (often violent) revolution to overthrow the incumbent regime, while moderate Islamists 
rely on more traditional power structures and relationships as a means of affecting regime change.  These 
definitional distinctions are adapted from Olivier Roy.  The Lessons of the Soviet/Afghan War.  The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 259.  (London: Brassey’s, 1991), 56-57.  The 
ideology of the Islamists will be studied further in Chapters IV and V. 
2 Brokered between 27 November and 5 December 2001, the Agreement is officially entitled the 
“Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent 
Government Institutions.” See: United Nations Security Council.  “Agreement on Provisional 
Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions.”  
S/2001/1154.  5 December 2001. 
3 District-level elections have not been held. 
4 Afghanistan has been ranked progressively worse on the Failed State Index since holding national 
parliamentary and presidential elections.  Afghanistan slid from 11th place in 2005, to 10th in 2006, 8th in 
2007 and 7th place in 2008.  See: Failed State Index 2008.  The Fund for Peace.  On the web: http://www. 
fundforpeace.org/web/index. php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=323 (accessed 19 
February 2009). 
5 Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century  (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2004), 101. 
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A. PURPOSE 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to explain why current attempts to expand 
the rule of the central government beyond Kabul have met with heavy resistance. 
One explanation is the historical role of solidarity groups in opposing central 
government rule at the local level.  As this thesis will show, previous Afghan regimes 
have each been confronted with this very problem: how to expand one’s capacity and 
authority over the people and country you purport to rule. 
In this paper, I will examine the origins and structures of Afghanistan’s tribal 
relationships and ‘solidarity groups’6 in limiting state capacity7 spanning four Afghan 
regimes. Specific research questions I intend to answer are how did each regime attempt 
to expand state capacity and confront tribal and ethnic solidarity that has historically been 
resistant to central rule?  My central hypothesis is that solidarity groups have been 
present throughout Afghanistan’s history and represent the primary obstacle to state-
making and governing capacity in Afghanistan.  
While previous theses have similarly sought to explain the dichotomy between 
Afghan society and the central state, none has taken an approach that examines state 
activities, structures and organization, or examined the same cases presented here.8  
Shahid A. Afsar and Christopher A. Samples’ thesis seeks to describe the Taliban’s 
structure; however, it does so from a largely operational standpoint, intended to draw 
                                                 
6 See: Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations.  (New York: New York 
University Press, 2005).  Roy defined ‘solidarity groups,’ as those groups that lay outside, in opposition to-, 
or even undermined the central government. He contends that the traditional institutions and structure of 
ethnic and tribal solidarity groups in Central Asia played a vital role in state formation of the region. I have 
applied Roy’s thesis to Afghanistan. 
7 State capacity is defined in terms of Charles Tilly’s Four State Activities Model.  See: Charles Tilly, 
“War Making and State-making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans, D. 
Reischemeyer and Theda Skocpol.  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); or Karen A. Rasler 
and William R. Thompson, for a simplified examination of Tilly’s proposition.  War and State-making: The 
Shaping of the Global Powers  (Winchester, MA: Unwin Hymann Inc., 1989). 
8 Ty L. Groh used behavioral and normative models to explain Pashtun resistance to state authority 
under British, Pakistani and Soviet rule.  See: Ungoverned Spaces: The Challenges of Governing Tribal 
Societies (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006).  
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explicit lessons for COIN, without analysis on how these structures affected the Taliban’s 
ability to govern, as explained herein.9  
I undertake this historical analysis in order to draw lessons of state-making and 
governance applicable to the ongoing state-building process in Afghanistan, particularly 
in light of current failed attempts to extend central government capacity beyond Kabul.   
B. IMPORTANCE 
This thesis holds important policy implications for the United States, international 
reconstruction effort, and the Afghan Government for how to best govern this largely 
rural and tribal society without risking further instability.   
U.S. policy in Afghanistan has sought to extend the reach and authority of the 
central government in Kabul as a means of combating the insurgency.10  So too, the 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) top priority has been to 
strengthen the Afghan government’s capacity by requiring the administration to take 
charge whenever possible.  This strategy was complemented by the UN’s ‘light footprint’ 
approach that connoted a minimal staff presence in Afghanistan.  Finally, coalition 
counter-terrorism (CT) operations that overshadowed and even negated early 
reconstruction efforts ultimately contributed to the inability to expand the fledgling 
government’s capacity beyond Kabul.   
Whatever the initial cause(s), it is clear that current attempts to extend the reach 
of the central government are not working.  This fact has led some scholars to charge that 
“the backbone of the international effort since 2003—extending the reach of the central 
government—is precisely the wrong strategy,”11 while others suggest that, “the ‘one-size 
 
 
                                                 
9 Shahid A. Afsar and Christopher A. Samples, “The Evolution of the Taliban”  (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2008). 
10 Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance [RS21922]  
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 14 October 2008), 1.   
11 Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “All Counterinsurgency is Local,”  The Atlantic Monthly, 
302, No. 3 (2008): 38. 
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fits all’ prescriptions…[that] strip the state of its historical context and assume that 
institutions, state capacity and governance are purely technical, depoliticized entities,” 
are fantasies. 12  
Moreover, limited and conditional donor resources constrain the U.S. and UN 
mandate, which put in place a process (through the Bonn Agreement), but not the 
necessary institutions for developing state capacity.13  Finally, expanding state capacity 
cannot be achieved without the successful dismantling of regional networks and 
strongmen that compete with the state’s monopoly on violence and resources.14 
Ultimately, the task of managing Afghanistan’s post-Taliban reconstruction is necessarily 
the story of nation building: the attempt to create lasting institutional and state capacity 
that will ultimately transform this war-weary country.   
It is imperative that these efforts do not fail.  The consequences of failure would 
allow Afghanistan to fall into another civil war, or worse still, a period of statelessness in 
which a resurgent Taliban could reclaim governance.  Expanding state capacity in 
Afghanistan is also imperative for the campaign against violent Islamic extremism and 
terrorism.  A strong Afghan government would be able to deny such groups safe haven in 
previously “ungoverned spaces.”  Finally, a strong Afghan government would finally 
bring the Afghan people peace and an end to three decades of war and civil conflict. 
C. METHODOLOGY  
The central methodology I will use to test my hypothesis will be a systematic case 
study of four Afghan regimes.  This design seeks to expel any methodological ‘fantasies’ 
by restoring the historical context in which each case is examined. 
In each of the selected cases, I will examine the state’s capacity to govern in four 
primary areas. Charles Tilly’s Four State Activities Model (see Figure 1) provides a 
                                                 
12 Christopher Cramer and Jonathan Goodhand, “Try Again, Fail Again, Fail Better? War, the State, 
and the ‘Post-Conflict’ Challenge in Afghanistan,”  Development and Change, 33, No. 5 (2002): 904. 
13 Simon Chesterman, “Walking Softly in Afghanistan: the Future of UN State-Building,”  Survival, 
44, No. 3 (2002): 37-39. 
14 Barnett Rubin, “Peace Building and State-Building in Afghanistan: Constructing Sovereignty for 
Whose Security?”  Third World Quarterly, 27, No. 1 (2006): 179. 
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concise and utilitarian means by which to qualify and assess the state’s capacity to 
govern.15  According to Tilly, effective state administration need be concerned with only 
four primary tasks: war making, state-making, extraction of resources and protection.16     
1.    War making: Eliminating or neutralizing their own rivals outside the territories in which they have  
clear and continuous priority as wielders of force
2.    State making: Eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside those territories
3.    Protection: Eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients
4.    Extraction: Acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities—war making, state making, 
and protection
 
Figure 1.   Tilly’s Four State Activities Model17 
A key methodological purpose of this work, and one that is central to my 
hypothesis, is to develop Olivier Roy’s proposition further through the identification and 
examination of ‘solidarity groups’ in opposition to the central power of the state in each 
of the cases presented. In this endeavor, Tilly’s Four State Activities Model also provides 
a means by which I can subjectively measure the capacity of the central state, thereby 
providing an indirect means of further examining the relative strength and propensity of 
solidarity groups that oppose and resist central rule.  I expect to find a direct correlation 
between the central state’s capacity to govern and the propensity and strength of 
‘solidarity groups.’  Key analysis findings derived from this study will endeavor to 
discern structural and organizational patterns of governance that can either be replicated 
or avoided in the current regime, thereby, decreasing the likelihood of local resistance 
and increasing the efficacy of central government rule. 
As mentioned above, a critical component of this analysis will be the award of a 
relative ‘grade’ to each regime studied, as an indicator of its state capacity.  While there 
is general consensus on the need to adopt effective units of measurement in the study of 
‘governance,’ a great matter of debate still surrounds the areas of government to be 
studied and the actual units of measurement employed.  Fortunately, the preeminent 
architects of governance indicators, Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay, tell us that no 
matter how governance is defined, analyzed, ranked and compared, the final ‘indicator’ is 
                                                 
15 Tilly, War Making, 181. 
16 Rasler and Thompson, War and State, 7. 
17 After Tilly, War Making, 181; Rasler and Thompson, War and State, 7. 
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ultimately the result of a great deal of subjectivity on the part of the expert who compiled 
the data.18 The author’s criticisms of the indicators themselves stem from the different 
definitional views and biases of the experts themselves to the “ideological orientation” of 
the organization commissioning and presenting the analyses.19 Although Kaufman and 
Kray’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), created for and adopted by The World 
Bank and incorporated into the Millennium Development Goals that guide the current 
state-building endeavor in Afghanistan are arguably the most comprehensive and 
extensively employed aggregate indicators of governance,20 their own composition is 
fundamentally flawed.  The WGI itself is a weighted ‘score’ compiled from 30 other 
independent but subjective governance indices.  In other words, the WGI is merely an 
aggregate of other indicators, each subject to its own bias and the availability of data.  
Moreover, as current governance indicators are largely based on local experts and survey 
data that cannot be replicated for previous Afghan regimes and rarely even exists for the 
current government in Kabul, the adoption of scores and indicators based on 
contemporary means is impossible.  Consequently, the analysis of state capacity and 
resistance presented in this thesis is based on my own subjective analysis and grading 
system.   
Using qualitative data for each case, I will explore how the state sought to 
breakdown and overcome traditional tribal barriers to effective central rule in each of the 
four state activities. I will then subjectively analyze the relative presence or absence of 
governing institutions to grade state capacity. To do this, I will first examine whether the 
state created structural institutions that facilitated the expansion of state capacity, and 
then whether it actually achieved a degree of state capacity, enabling the conduct of 
relations and relay of policy between the center state and the local level. 
                                                 
18 Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay, “Governance Indicators: Where Are We, Where Should We Be 
Going?”  The World Bank Research Observer, 23, No. 1 (2008).   
19 Ibid., 15. 
20 The WGI measures government effectiveness in six areas: Voice and Accountability, Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and 
Control of Corruption.  See: Millennium Development Goals in Afghanistan, United Nations Development 
Programme, On the web: http://www.undp.org.af/MDGs/index.htm (accessed 22 December 2008); and 
Worldwide Governance Indicators: Afghanistan, The World Bank, On the web: http://info.worldbank.org/ 
governance/wgi/sc_ country.asp (accessed 22 December 2008). 
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D.  CASE SELECTION 
The four cases selected for study are the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman (1880-
1901), the era of Communist rule under the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan 
(PDPA) and Soviet occupation (1978-1989), the Taliban (1994-2001), and the 
government of President Hamid Karzai (2001-present). 
These four cases are chosen primarily for their diversity in regime type, spanning 
an absolute monarchy, communist oligarchy, Islamic theocracy and democratic republic.  
Selection of these cases, therefore, offers an opportunity for comparative political 
analysis of state activities over the same society.  Moreover, Afghanistan offers a unique 
case because nowhere else has this particular spectrum of governance been attempted 
over the same people.   
Another significant factor in case selection was the timeframe.  Many scholars 
cite the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan as the origin of the modern Afghan nation-
state.21  As all subsequent cases follow Amir Rahman’s rule, all can then be said to be 
part of the period of modern rule in Afghanistan. 
1. Case One: The Reign of Amir Abdur Rahman 
While there are numerous accounts of Abdur Rahman’s consolidation of power, 
institutionalized central rule and mechanisms for overcoming tribal resistance, there has 
been no application of this historical analysis to the challenges facing the current 
government in Kabul. Credited with strengthening the army, establishing a civil 
bureaucracy, subduing the mullahs, and breaking the strength and solidarity of the tribes, 
an historical analysis of the reign of Abdur Rahman, the ‘Iron Amir,’ might provide clues 
as to how to deal with the inability of the Afghan government to extend the writ into the 
periphery. 
                                                 
21 See: Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, 3rd ed.  (Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 1997); M. 
Hasan Kakar.  Government and Society in Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan  (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1979); However, Hafizullah Emadi suggests, “the preliminary foundation for a 
nation-state was laid when Afghanistan gained its independence in 1919 under the leadership of King 
Amanullah.” [See: State, Revolution, and Superpowers in Afghanistan  (New York: Praeger, 1990), 1.] 
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2. Case Two: Communist Rule 
Although scores of sources abound on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, too few 
have attempted to explore Afghanistan’s communist era and Soviet occupation in terms 
of state-making and fewer still have one again attempted to relate this to Afghanistan’s 
current endeavor outside of the obvious comparative operational blunder by a superpower 
with regard to the ongoing counter-insurgent campaign.22  
The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was the last battlefield in the East-West 
ideological confrontation,23 directly resulted in bringing about the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, and elevated Central Asian geo-strategic politics to the forefront of post-World 
War II international affairs and U.S. foreign policy.  Moreover, the Soviet-Afghan war 
illustrates the Soviet Union’s inability to extend its communist ideology and centralized 
government administration over the Afghan people as willfully or systematically as 
Stalin’s conquest of Central Asia in the 1920s and 1930s.  The tools of administration 
that worked with relative success in the Central Asian Republics, even contributing to a 
sense of national identity and a shared national myth, were largely incompatible with—
and antithetical to—the very fabric of Afghanistan’s multi-ethnic tribal society and at 
odds with the state’s narrative of utmost hostility and rebellion toward foreign 
intervention or direct government interference. 
3. Case Three: Taliban Rule 
The Taliban regime that ruled Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001 gained 
international notoriety for its draconian laws and for its refusal to turn over Osama bin 
Laden following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. While 
there are many scholarly and journalistic accounts of the Taliban’s military rise to power, 
fundamentalist rule, and Islamist genealogy, there has been little to no analysis of the 
Taliban as a state, of its governing structure and capacity, or resistance to Taliban rule. 
                                                 
22 See for example: Bhabani Sen Gupta, Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society.  (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 1986); Milan Hauner, The Soviet War in Afghanistan: Patterns of Russian Imperialism  
(Philadelphia: University Press of America, 1991);  Thomas T. Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan: 
The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion, and the Consequences  (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984). 
23 Roy, The Soviet/Afghan War, 3. 
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4. Case Four: Democratic Rule 
Of all the cases studied, the current regime of President Hamid Karzai is the most 
important, because it is this government that currently faces the very task of creating state 
and institutional capacity while faced with fierce and often insurmountable resistance that 
threatens to once again envelope the Afghan people and topple a regime.  It is therefore 
imperative for the current regime to break with history and adapt new instruments of 
governance that are built upon, reinforced and legitimated by the Afghan people and 
traditional sources of solidarity. 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into three parts, spanning eight chapters.  Part one, 
consisting of Chapters I and II, provides the analytic foundation on which the thesis is 
based. Already having introduced the research question and methodology in Chapter I, 
Chapter II provides a preliminary literature review and relates the importance of 
solidarity in Afghan society.  Part two contains Chapters III through VI, in which each 
case is presented and analyzed in isolation.  The final section offers a comparative case 
analysis and the presentation of major findings in Chapter VII before concluding with 
some policy implications and recommendations in Chapter VIII. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THE IMPORTANCE OF 
AFGHAN SOLIDARITY 
This chapter builds upon the research question and methodological design 
introduced in Chapter I.  While there is an extensive volume of literature on state and 
society, from state-formation to comparative governance, a primary task of this chapter is 
to sort through, synthesize and present those works that bear the most relevance to the 
research question presented in this thesis in a cogent, concise and representative literature 
review.  I then conclude the chapter with an examination of the structural basis and 
importance of solidarity in Afghan society, in order to provide a comprehensive primer 
for the further presentation of individual cases presented in Chapters III through VI. 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The majority of works presented in this review of literature are of historical, 
anthropological and sociological nature, although prominent works from the fields of 
political science, comparative politics and international relations theory provide the basis 
for discussion of the historical origin of the state.  I begin the literature review by first 
drawing upon relevant works from each of these fields to provide a thorough groundwork 
in the evolution of political thought and understanding regarding the idea of a modern 
nation state and state-making as borne from the experience of seventeenth century 
Europe. Sufficiently grounded by these propositions, I will then offer differing 
explanations of the nation state and state-making, as it applies to states outside the 
European experience, particularly in the Third World. Finally, I will provide a brief 
overview of literature pertinent to Afghanistan’s emergence as an independent empire in 
the mid-eighteenth century to its birth as a modern state in the early twentieth century. I 
will also introduce the major historical and anthropological works germane to the 
discussion of ‘solidarity groups’ with which I frame the research question and 




Charles Tilly’s claim that “war makes states” has been widely accepted as a 
universal proposition of modern comparative politics and international relations theory.24 
However, Tilly’s proposition was made in reference to ‘international’ war and the 
Western European model of state-making. While his proposition may have been correct 
with regard to seventeenth century Europe, we need to search for another definition if we 
are to characterize the Afghan state-building experience. While the successive Marxist, 
Muslim theocratic and democratic regimes that rose to power in Afghanistan were either 
preceded by, or pre-empted by conflict, each has struggled with the issues of legitimacy 
and capacity. The Marxists overthrew Afghanistan’s monarchy, while the Taliban 
initially rose in opposition to the internationally recognized transitional government that 
failed to govern Afghanistan’s wild periphery. If we use Max Weber’s oft-quoted 
definition of a state, there is little doubt that no Afghan regime held “the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force,” and was faced with challengers both internal and 
external.25 Territory administered by the monarchy, communists, and Taliban or Karzai 
government rarely has extended beyond Kabul.  
Each successive regime’s rise to power is also a matter of state-building capacity 
and governing legitimacy. While able to return some degree of security and rule of law 
over formerly ‘ungoverned spaces,’26 they were ultimately unable to develop the kind of 
state capacity necessary to increase their legitimacy or whether the external intervention 
that caused their demise.  
Turning to Weber again yields three types of legitimacy necessary for domination 
of a territory or people: rational (legal), traditional (patriarchal) and charismatic (based on 
personality).27 Since both the Communists and Taliban displaced governments 
                                                 
24 Charles Tilly, War Making and State-making as Organized Crime, CRSO Working Paper No. 256 
(Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, February 1982), 3. 
25 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in Essential Readings in Comparative Politics, 2nd Ed., ed. 
Patric H. O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), 31-37.  
26 The term ‘ungoverned spaces’ is actually historically inaccurate and misleading.  Relevant literature 
on state and society often confuses non-traditional governance, such as those tribal institutions found in 
Afghanistan, as being ‘ungoverned.’  As revealed later in this literature review, Afghanistan’s tribal 
councils, or jirga’s, more closely resemble classical Greek democracy than most modern institutions.  
However, for the purpose of this thesis, the term ‘ungoverned spaces’ refers to a region “not governed by 
central authority.” See: Groh, Ungoverned Spaces, 1. 
27 Max Weber, “The Types of Legitimate Domination,” in Economy and Society, ed. Guenther Roth 
and Claus Wittich, trans. Ephrain Fischoff  (New York: Bedminster, 1968), 215.   
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recognized by the international community, there was little support for these regimes’ 
claim to legal legitimacy in the eyes of external forces. However, the Taliban enjoyed 
relative traditional and charismatic legitimacy as evidenced by general communal support 
for their rise. Thus, Tilly’s argument is useful for explaining the birth of the ‘western’ 
nation state in seventeenth century Europe, but lacks applicability to recent attempts at 
state-making in Afghanistan.  
Herman Swartz28 and Joel Migdal29 examine the relationship between 
government bureaucracy and administration at the local level. While Migdal’s analysis of 
the ‘strongman’ has utility in characterizing the role of warlords that have dominated 
Afghan society since the anti-Soviet jihad, and the inability of the central government to 
extend its rule to the local level and to the periphery, it falls short of explaining the 
particular tribal structures and state-society relationships historically prevalent in 
Afghanistan.  These theories also fail to explain how the Taliban rose to prominence in 
the non-western, multi-ethnic, tribal, Islamic and ‘ungoverned spaces’ of Afghanistan. 
One reason for this inadequacy is that academics and International Relations theorists 
have historically approached the concept of state building as Western European “top 
down phenomenon,” when there may be other factors that explain the Afghan state-
building experience.30 
Jeffrey Herbst31 attempts to differentiate between the state-building experiences 
of Europe and Africa, but his framework and standard in which to compare African state-
building failures is inevitably the European model. The extraction of taxes and 
development of a “national” identity just may not be central to the debate over state 
formation outside Western Europe. In a similar vein, James Fearon and David Laitin,32 
                                                 
28 Herman Schwartz, “The Rise of the Modern State: From Street Gangs to Mafias,” in States Versus 
Markets (New York: St. Martins, 1994), 10-42.  
29 Joe Midgal, “Strong Societies, Weak States: Power and Accommodation,” in Understanding 
Political Development, by Myron Weiner, ed. Samuel Huntington  (Chicago: Scott Foresman & Co, 1986), 
391-437.  
30 Letitia Lawson, Comments on Literature Review, in NS4328 Government and Security in the Horn 
of Africa (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 10 March 2008).   
31 Jeffrey Herbst, “War and the State in Africa,”  International Security, 14, No. 4 (1990): 117-139.  
32 James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,”  American Political Science 
Review, 97, No. 1 (2003): 75-90. 
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and Ashutosh Varshney’s33 examination of the ethnic component of state-building and 
national identity further fail to explain adequately the Afghan experience. Although rife 
with internal conflict and insurgency over the past three decades, Fearon and Laitin’s 
study of insurgency and civil war rules out ethnicity as a factor favoring insurgency, a 
characteristic repeatedly credited as driving Afghanistan’s upheaval.   
Moreover, while Afghanistan's tribal revolts under Amir Abdur Rahman were not 
insurgent in the modern sense, they were insurgent in their dissatisfaction with the 
incumbent regime. In each case, revolt was precipitated by the mobilization of a singular 
ethnic or tribal group against the state because of a specific grievance that threatened the 
group’s solidarity. The Communist and Taliban regimes are also not considered 
insurgent.  However, when framed as operational constructs of political ideological 
objectives that deposed the incumbent regime by force without first obtaining the 
organizational bureaucracy, legitimacy and capacity to govern, one may then begin to 
view them as insurgencies. Such logic illustrates the flaw inherent in Fearon and Laitin’s 
characterization and approach to ethnicity. 
Varshney’s examination of Hindu-Muslim communal violence in India and the 
prevalence of inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic ties at the civic level actually run counter to 
Afghan government and society.  While communal conflict in India historically occurred 
where civic institutions were weakest, the majority of conflict in Afghanistan has 
historically occurred at the communal level, where civic ties and communication 
networks are strongest.  Communal conflict in Afghanistan is instead perpetuated by 
ethnic and tribal mores and social codes, particularly the notions of honor, revenge, and 
blood feud prevalent in Pashtun society. 
What is missing so far from this discourse is an examination and foundation in the 
issues particular to Afghanistan’s state-making and historical narrative.  Available 
literature on the nature of state-making fails to describe sufficiently the causes of what 
appears to be a bottom-up occurrence in Afghanistan.  While each regime loosely fits the 
general definition of a state, they are generally not comparable to the western model of a 
                                                 
33 Ashutosh Varshney, “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond,”  World Politics, 53, No. 
3 (2001): 362-398.   
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nation state on which the paradigm is based. Therefore, in examining the rise of each 
successive government in Afghanistan it is worth considering abandoning our 
preconceived western and normative notions of ‘international’ legitimacy and state 
development as we now endeavor to examine Afghanistan’s particular experiences.  
Francis Fukuyama claims “Afghanistan never had a modern state.”34 He 
maintains that Afghanistan never met the definition of a nation-state and instead never 
developed beyond a “tribal confederation” during the entire duration of the monarchy 
from 1748-1973 due to the state’s inability to extend its direct administration and control 
beyond the capital in Kabul.35 Moreover, Fukuyama contends, “The subsequent years of 
communist misrule and civil war eliminated everything that was left of that already weak 
state. State-building after the ouster of the Taliban had to begin from the ground up, with 
resources and guidance provided entirely from the outside.”36 The lack of any 
institutional bureaucracy or administrative capability in post-Taliban Afghanistan 
necessarily complicates and confounds the state-building experience that must rely 
almost exclusively on foreign donors to create a modern state in its place. The fact that 
the United States has attempted to install a democratic regime in Kabul further 
complicates the task, especially if one looks to the growing literature on democratization 
and state-making.37 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder’s38 quantitative analysis of 
regime transition and democratization indicate that the very process of democratization 
increases a nation’s likelihood to go to war. Equally important is Owen’s analysis of 
Mansfield and Snyder’s 2005 book Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies go to 
                                                 
34 Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2004), 101. 
35 Ibid.  
36 Ibid. 
37 See: Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,”  American Political Science Review, 80, 
No. 4 (1986): 1151-1169; Owen, John M. IV, “Iraq and the Democratic Peace,” Foreign Affairs, 84, No. 6 
(2005): 122.  
38 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and War,”  Foreign Affairs, 74, No. 3 
(1995): 79-97. 
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War.39 Here, Owen suggests that democratizing states, “that develop democratic 
institutions in the wrong order [are] unlikely to complete the transition to democracy.”40  
A return to Fukuyama is necessary to frame Afghanistan’s way ahead and lay the 
methodological structure upon which I will draw implications for the current regime in 
Kabul in the final chapter of this thesis. Fukuyama advances “three distinct aspects or 
phases to nation-building.”41 The first phase, post conflict reconstruction, entails the 
“short-term provision of stability through infusions of security forces, police, 
humanitarian relief, and technical assistance” by outside powers to restore utilities and 
other essential forms of state infrastructure.42 The second phase can only occur if there is 
a “modicum of stability,” that allows for the creation of “self-sustaining state institutions 
that can survive the withdrawal of outside intervention.”43 The third aspect overlaps the 
second and is concerned with strengthening weak state authority to allow the provision of 
“necessary state functions like the protection of property rights or the provision of basic 
primary education.”44 In the final analysis, this thesis must aim to examine and attempt to 
reconcile Fukuyama’s aspects of nation building with the historical analysis of Roy’s 
‘solidarity groups’ as barriers to Afghan nationalism and the creation of a modern Afghan 
nation-state. This will present a significant task, since the chief architect of Afghanistan’s 
post-Taliban reconstruction and governance, the United States, was, “unlike most of the 
old societies of Europe…founded on the basis of an idea…. [That] national identity is 
civic rather than religious, cultural, racial, or ethnic.”45  
Given this thorough review of the relevant theoretical, historical and 
anthropological literature on state-making, it is now necessary to conduct a preliminary 
overview of the primary methodological sources to be used in the thesis. Olivier Roy’s 
                                                 
39 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies go to War 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005). 
40 Owen, Democratic Peace.  




45 Ibid., 113. 
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seminal work on Central Asia46 provides both a framework for the comparison of state 
development between regime types and an introduction to the concept of solidarity 
groups that oppose, undermine or directly challenge state authority.  
Roy’s examination of Soviet Russia’s subjugation of Central Asia in the 1920s 
also applies to Afghanistan’s historical context. Through what he describes as a “process 
of operating a logic of ideological empire,” Roy claims that the Soviets sought to instill in 
these new socialist republics an “adherence to socialism and respect for ‘nationalities,’ 
while at the same time keeping them on the sidelines of political power.”47 Moreover, 
Roy states that the Soviet’s systematic ethnic and linguistic anthropological 
categorization and division of Central Asia’s indigenous groups “actually established the 
conditions for the emergence of the nation-states.”48 While such may be argued for the 
emergence of the Central Asian nation state, Afghanistan has twice more been subjugated 
to the “logic of ideological empire” since the failed Marxist experiment. The idea of an 
Afghan nation state is therefore only a recently resurrected idea, attempting to replace the 
vestiges of the Taliban’s Islamic fundamentalist theology with a new western paradigm 
that has the hard task of attempting to replace the innate ‘logic of empire’ with a new 
Afghan ‘national’ identity. This proves a significant task given the need to reconcile 
Afghanistan’s ideologically and culturally diverse multi-ethnic, Islamic, and tribal society 
with western concepts of state-making that are still based on the Western European 
(Westphalian) state-making experience, nationalist ideals based on ethnic solidarity and 
infused with American idealism that government is civic. Roy claimed that Iran is the 
only case where “a logic of empire transformed seamlessly into a logic of nation-state,” 
because the 1979 Revolution affirmed Shiism, long the “ideological foundation of 
politics” in Persia, as the identity of Iranian nationalism.49 Roy’s ‘logic of empire’ versus 
the ‘logic of ideology’ finds utility in explaining Afghanistan’s political history and 
appears complementary to Fukuyama’s claim that Afghanistan never emerged as a 
modern nation state.  
                                                 
46 Roy, New Central Asia, 2005.  




Fukuyama’s argument is further strengthened if we briefly return to the definition 
of a nation-state. Roy defines the nation-state as follows:  
The nation-state is integrative: it does not accept indirect administration of 
society and a preservation of the autonomy of solidarity groups. In the 
nation state, nationalism is intrinsic: the citizen is defined by a direct 
relationship to the political community. He is above all a ‘national’. His 
identity is not a question of ethnology but a matter of political strategy.50  
While Roy’s examination of Central Asian state formation is necessarily 
determined to explain “how, under the Soviet system, solidarity groups were 
simultaneously able to subvert and bypass the system,” this methodology is extrapolated 
and applied to an analysis of Afghanistan’s political history.51 Developing Roy’s theory 
further, this thesis seeks to illustrate that the aim of solidarity groups to oppose or even 
circumvent central administration is a hallmark of Afghanistan’s political history. This 
fact has hindered the creation of Afghan nationalism and the ability of the central 
government to administer at the local level. Therefore, this thesis is intended to illustrate 
how the presence of autonomous solidarity groups within Afghanistan has prevented the 
creation of a true Afghan nation-state and instead perpetuated a loose confederation of 
ethnic and tribal groups within a shared internationally demarcated border.  
Thus, a nation state requires “vertical integration” or subordination of the people 
to “direct state administration.”52 The existence of autonomous solidarity groups, which 
lie outside or even in opposition to direct state administration, is therefore antithetical to 
the development of the nation-state, even a democratic one. Mohammed Ayoob 
recognizes the need for reconciliation of “the consolidation of state power…between 
state elites and ethnic and political opponents who would like to curb the power of the 
central state.”53  
                                                 
50 Roy, New Central Asia, 11.  
51 Ibid., 12. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State-making, Regional Conflict, and 
the International System (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 183. 
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Solidarity groupings are based on infra-ethnic identities and functions in respect 
to “one’s relationship to the state or to resources.”54 Relationship in this manner refers to 
proximity or interaction. In Afghanistan’s traditional communitarian, nomadic and tribal 
societies, social organization and identification may be based on one or a multiple of 
ethno-linguistic, tribal, regional, religious, socio-religious (holy, or descendant from the 
Prophet) or social divisions.55 However, as Roy notes, while “there exists no system of 
‘solidarity groups’… the important thing is to belong to a group,” as the basis for relating 
to the state.56 Therefore, the group, not the individual, is the level of relation and 
interaction with the state. I hypothesize that overcoming this central sociological and 
anthropological tenant was the central failure of each successive Afghan regime and must 
become the critical central task of the current state-making experiment in Afghanistan.  
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF SOLIDARITY AND AFGHANISTAN’S TRIBAL 
STRUCTURE 
Although pastoral nomads lived outside the kinds of tribal structures described in 
this section, generalizations about traditional Afghan society, tribal structures and 
communal relationships are necessary.  While specific linguistic nomenclature may 
differ, the tribal-, political-, economic- and social-structures of Afghanistan’s minority 
ethnic groups contained in historical and anthropological literature, including the Tajiks, 
Uzbeks and Hazaras, are generally described in terms of the Pashtun tribal structures 
presented here. 
Broadly defined as “a group united by a norm of solidarity within the group and 
by competition with parallel groups,”57 a qawm can refer to any communal identity based 
on ethnicity and kinship (tribe), region or occupation.58  In its simplest form, a qawm is 
                                                 
54 Roy, New Central Asia, 18-21.   
55 Ibid., 18. 
56 Ibid. (Emphasis added). 
57 Barnet R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 2nd Ed.  (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2002), 394. 
58 Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 25; See also M. Nazif Shahrani, “State Building and Social 
Fragmentation in Afghanistan: A Historical Perspective,” in The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: 
Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, ed. Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner.  (New York: Syracuse University 
Press, 1986), 24. 
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the fundamental unit of individual Afghan identification, social interaction and group 
solidarity.59  Combined with Islam, the qawm has proved the historical basis of political 
mobilization against the central Afghan government.  However, once mobilized, these 
“organizational principles, whether based on ethnicity, kinship, religion…[are applied] 
according to the specific political, economic, and historical contexts in which they find 
themselves.”60  That is to say, the qawm becomes the political tool in an attempt to 
reestablish or reshape the social and political order according to the worldview and mores 
of the qawm.  In essence, the maintenance of Afghan society is the static, and at times 
dynamic, balancing of competing qawm from the local to national level.   
Historically, the central Afghan state extended its capacity to the local level 
through the political appointment of wali (provincial governors) and uluswal (district 
officials). These appointees were the intermediary political agents between the state and 
the tribe.  The tribal structure itself had maintained administrative, judicial and military 
branches that upheld and carried out the complex socio-political code that governed tribal 
life.  In the Pashtun tribes, Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group, there is no distinct tribal 
chief, and tribal matters were decided through a jirga, or consensus-based tribal council 
composed of all adult males. As Donald Wilber notes, this “tribal tradition had been 
mostly democratic in a primitive way.”61   
The jirga is the tribes’ highest political body.  Attempts by the state to circumvent 
the jirga, or interfere with tribal society in general, historically met with fierce opposition 
and revolt that, if spread, threatened the regime’s survival.  Afghan history is replete with 
examples of tribal revolt, although the uprising that deposed King Amanullah Khan  
(r. 1919-1929), in response to his modernization reforms (antithetical to tribal custom) is 
perhaps the most cited.  Because of these revolts, two types of intermediaries were 
employed at the tribal level, a malik and khan.  Maliks are tribal leaders politically 
appointed by the state while khans are socially recognized by the tribe to speak with the 
                                                 
59 Shahrani, Social Fragmentation in Afghanistan, 24-25. 
60 Ibid., 25. 
61 Donald N. Wilber, Afghanistan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture  (New Haven: Hraf Press, 1962), 
78.  However, like ‘ungoverned spaces,’ one should not equate “primitive” forms of tribal and local 
governance with the absence of governance. 
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state on their behalf, although not recognized (within the tribe) as a chieftain per se.62  
The key political and socio-cultural finding is that the central government had structural 
institutions to conduct relations and relay policy between the state and the local level, but 
it left local government to the tribe.  The individual Afghan, therefore, never developed 
any sense of political relationship or loyalty toward the state.  Instead, individual 
solidarity was owed to the qawm or tribe, a relationship perpetuated from antiquity.  
Moreover, traditional group loyalty was paid to the watan (tribal, ancestral or cultural 
homeland), and not the state, which never figured prominently in local socio-political 
affairs.  Figure 2 illustrates the tribal unit’s relationship to the state. 
Entire structure based on relationships.
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Figure 2.   Afghanistan’s Tribal Structure and Relationship to the State 
                                                 
62 The use of maliks, predominant developed under the period of the British Raj, is still in use today, 
primarily in the (autonomous) Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.  
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As depicted in Figure 2, mullahs, or religious leaders, were traditionally apolitical 
and presided outside traditional governing institutions.  Mullahs were also locally elected, 
based on their personal piety or knowledge of Islamic texts, as formal Islamic education 
was not a necessary condition for being termed a mullah within the historically illiterate 
Afghan society.  While mullahs wielded relative authority over religious affairs, often 
acting as qazis (judges) in matters Islamic law, they might also be asked to deliberate on 
customary and tribal law if their person was held in high enough esteem by the tribe.  
Mullahs created their own “spiritual hierarchy” and “social distance” within Afghan 
society through the value placed on their Islamic education and piety, the most powerful 
of whom wielded “influence enough to be classed with the aristocracy.”63  Mullahs have 
only wielded relative political power during a jihad. 
When Abdur Rahman came to power in 1880, Afghan society was already in open 
revolt and railing against the British occupation following the conclusion of the second 
Anglo-Afghan War and subsequent tribal campaigns for succession. Until this point 
Afghan history was characterized by the rise and fall of charismatic tribal leaders who 
expanded their empire’s borders before succumbing to the pressures of combating tribal 
solidarity. Ethnic and tribal solidarity was synonymous with the identity and composition 
of Afghanistan’s political center and resistance was centered on defending the watan, or 
homeland.   
However, all of this changed under the reign of the “Iron Amir.’ By placing 
himself as the head of the Islamic community, the Amir was able to both legitimize his 
rule, enhancing “the prestige of the crown,” and limit the power of the mullahs.64 This 
dynamic remained largely in place for a century, until the confluence of several events in 
the late 1970s and 1980s.  Facing increasing oppression, many Afghan Islamist parties 
moved their operations to Pakistan in the years following Prime Minister Daoud’s 1973 
coup. The further establishment of an Islamist regime by General Zia al-Haq in Pakistan 
allowed the mullahs to rise in political prominence, while the subsequent Communist 
coup and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan saw a purge of tribal leaders.  Soviet actions, 
                                                 
63 Wilber, Afghanistan, 78. 
64 Ibid. 
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viewed as an attack against Islam, quickly invoked the call for jihad against the Soviets.  
These events created a ‘perfect storm’ for the redistribution of traditional sources of tribal 
power in the mullahs’ favor, and the pretext for a political imbalance that has been 
waging ever since. 
 24
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III. CASE 1: THE MONARCHY OF AMIR ABDUR RAHMAN: 
1880-1901 
A. BACKGROUND 
Credited with founding Afghanistan in 1747, what Ahmad Shah Durrani in fact 
carved out of the Persian Afshahid Empire was his own Afghan empire, which would 
take another 150 years of transformation to turn into a modern nation-state. Until the 
emergence of Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1880, the Afghan monarchy was constantly 
under pressure for survival from foreign encroachment as well as tribal elements who 
challenged the empire both militarily as well as through their own claims of legitimacy to 
the Afghan throne. Abdur Rahman built up the army and brought the tribes under his rule 
through repeated military campaigns to suppress and pacify the Afghans. Moreover, the 
Amir purposefully expanded means of revenue collection and bureaucratic governance to 
bring in more local elements under his direct control. He also reigned during the last 
period of foreign expansion, which saw the northern, eastern and southern borders of the 
Afghan empire morph into the international boundaries that demarcate the modern 
Afghan nation-state.  
When Abdur Rahman came to power in 1880, Afghan society was already in open 
revolt and railing against the British occupation following the conclusion of the second 
Anglo-Afghan War and subsequent tribal campaigns for succession.  Until this point 
Afghan history was characterized by the rise and fall of charismatic tribal leaders who 
expanded their empire’s borders before succumbing to the pressures of combating tribal 
solidarity.  Ethnic and tribal solidarity was synonymous with the identity and 
composition of Afghanistan’s political center and resistance was centered on defending 
the watan.  However, all of this changed under the reign of the “Iron Amir.’ By placing 
himself as the head of the Islamic community, the Amir was able to both legitimize his 
rule, enhancing “the prestige of the crown,”65 and limit the power of the mullahs. 
Figure 3 depicts Afghanistan’s borders before and after the Amir’s reign. 
                                                 
65 Wilber, Afghanistan, 78. 
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Figure 3.   Afghanistan’s borders in 1857 and after 189366 
B. WAR MAKING 
Abdur Rahman was confirmed as Amir of Afghanistan following the tumultuous 
second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880).  Almost immediately, the new Amir ceded 
Afghan sovereignty over its foreign affairs to Britain in exchange for their withdrawal 
from Afghanistan.67  He then embarked on a campaign of political consolidation and 
military pacification over the Afghan countryside.   
                                                 
66 After Asta Olesen, “Map 6. Conquest and Revolt during the Reign of Abdur Rahman,” in Islam and 
Politics in Afghanistan (Surrey, UK: Curzon Press, 1995), 76. 
67 The British supported Abdur Rahman’s claiming to the Afghan throne following the war.  The Amir 
received an annual salary from the British during his reign, and likely counted on British intervention to 
deter any challengers. 
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The creation of a large standing army firmly established the basis for the Amir’s 
power, and provided the primary vehicle for directing and executing his ambitious 
strategy.  In gaining support from the tribal elders, he initially appealed to their natural 
xenophobic tendencies, highlighting their recent loss to the British and the need to defend 
the Afghan homeland against foreign invasion.  His true intention was the establishment 
of a national army intended for the consolidation of “his own dynasty by eliminating his 
rivals and establishing an absolute government.”68   
During the initial years of his reign, military service was voluntary until all of the 
tribes had been pacified and brought under his rule.  By 1883, the ‘Iron Amir’ had 
amassed a regular army of approximately 43,000 men excluding tribal militia, which 
probably numbered an additional several thousand soldiers.69  The Amir’s army was 
instrumental in putting down numerous rebellions and subjugating the Afghan 
countryside and tribes under his absolute rule.  He conducted over forty campaigns 
during his reign, ranging from suppressing revolts to routing potential challengers to 
bringing formerly autonomous tribes under central rule.  By the time Tsarist Russia began 
encroaching on Afghanistan’s northern border in 1884, the Amir’s army was already well 
seasoned. 
Russian encroachment had begun almost a decade earlier with the conquest of the 
Khanate of Kokand, which encompassed most of modern-day Uzbekistan, southern 
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in 1876.  Having lost to the Tekke Turkomen of 
southern Central Asia in 1879, the Russians finally defeated the tribesmen in 1881, 
allowing them to complete their conquest of the Turkomen and advance as far as the 
Merv Oasis, in modern-day Turkmenistan, by 1884.  The Russian advancement 
constituted an imminent threat to territory viewed as historically within Afghanistan’s 
sphere.  Britain, fearing its Afghan buffer might be lost, threatened confrontation with 
Russia and stated that further Russian encroachment, particularly toward Herat, would be 
                                                 
68 Kakar, Government and Society, 96. 
69 Ibid., 98. 
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stipend tantamount to a declaration of war.70  However, the Russians failed to heed 
British warnings and continued to carry their Tsarist expansionism south. 
Conflict finally broke out between Russian and Afghan forces on 30 March 1885.  
Overwhelmed and outnumbered, the Afghan forces retreated, allowing the advancing 
Russians to occupy Afghan territory in the Panjdeh Oasis.  News of the conflict spread 
internationally causing many to predict the imminent clash of Russian and British forces 
in Central Asia.  The British opted to recognize Russia’s territorial gains post-facto, 
leaving the Afghans out of the Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission that demarcated 
their northern border along the Oxus River.  This move angered the Amir, who felt 
betrayed by British acquiescence and lack of military intervention, and firmly established 
Afghanistan as a buffer state between the Russian and British empires in Central and 
South Asia 
Eight years later, in 1893, Abdur Rahman ceded over half of the Pashtun 
homeland to the British through the demarcation of Afghanistan’s eastern and southern 
border, known as the Durand Line.  This boundary, still contested by the Afghans and 
Pashtuns on both sides of the border, effectively demarcated the borders of the modern 
Afghan nation-state, as it exists today. 
Thus, despite a sizeable army capable of defending Afghanistan’s frontiers 
against similar fielded tribal forces, the Amir’s national army was incapable of standing 
up to the modern western Russian and British armies of the nineteenth century.  
Moreover, without sovereignty over Afghan foreign affairs, Abdur Rahman was 
powerless to prevent the loss of territory. 
C. STATE-MAKING 
Known as the ‘Iron Amir’ for his ruthless conduct, Abdur Rahman conducted 
over forty military campaigns during his twenty-one year reign.  A summary of the 
Amir’s major battles are listed in Table 1.  Fought to eliminate potential challengers to 
the throne, conquer territories independent of his rule, and pacify tribal revolt, the Amir 
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viewed all engagements as necessary in his quest to bring all of Afghanistan under his 
absolute rule.  However, the subjugation and consolidation of the diffuse Afghan tribes 
appears the Amir’s chief priority.   
In his own words, the Amir “had to put in order all those hundreds of petty chiefs, 
plunderers, robbers, and cutthroats…this necessitated breaking down the feudal and tribal 
system and substituting one grand community under one law and one rule.”71 
 
Tribal Group, Region, or Leader Purpose Date 
Sardar Ayub Khan (son of Amir Sher Ali, r.1863-66; 1869-79) Challenger 1881 
Laghman Expansion 1881 
Taraki Ghilzai Expansion 1881-1882 
Kunar Expansion 1882 
Wali of Maimana Revolt 1882 
Mir of Shighnan and Roashan (NE Badakhshan) Revolt 1882 
Shinwari Pashtu Revolt 1882-1892 
Mangal-Surmat Pashtun Revolt 1883-84 
Wali of Maimana Revolt 1884 
Laghman Revolt 1885-86 
Ghilzai Pashtun Revolt 1886-88 
Sardar Mohd. Ishaq Khan (son of Amir Mohammad Azam Khan, r. 1867-69) Challenger 1888 
Safi Pashtun of Kunar Revolt 1888-96 
Badakhshan Expansion 1889 
Khan of Asmar Expansion, revolt 1890 
Hazarajat Expansion 1891-93 
Kafiristan (Nuristan) Expansion 1895-96 
Table 1.   Major Campaigns of Amir Abdur Rahman72 
Abdur Rahman broke Pashtun tribal strongholds in the southern provinces 
through a campaign of forced migration in the 1880s and 1890s, transplanting ten 
thousand73 mostly Ghilzai but some Durrani Pashtuns to non-Pashtun areas north of the 
Hindu-Kush mountain range. This migration from the Pashtun heartland to areas of 
mostly Uzbek, Tajik and Turkmen majority, depicted in Figure 4, eventually resulted in 
the intermarriage of Ghilzai males with some of the local Uzbek and Tajik ethnic groups 
with who they were in close proximity.   
                                                 
71 Wilber, Afghanistan, 19. 
72 After Dupree, Afghanistan, 418-419. 
73 Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics  (New York: Harper Collins, 
2002), 74. 
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Louis Dupree cites this as another instrument that directly resulted in the 
breakdown of the tribal-based clan system.  Specifically, Dupree suggests that this tribal 
migration and ethnic intermarriage resulted in the dismemberment of the Pashtun clan-
based kin-political unit and basis of identity (P’sha in Pashto; Khater in Dari) into a sub 
lineage khel, a group with a name but no residential unity.74  In some instances, inter-
village councils arose as a direct consequence of intermarriage between two groups.  
Provincial governors also forced the relocation of some extended families between 
villages.  This further eroded the basis of tribal solidarity, but more importantly, it also 
eliminated the clan-village as the elementary unit of social power and economic utility.  
Especially in these northern areas, the extended family, and not the village or clan, 
became the primary unit of social and economic dependence. No migratory pattern would 
have as fundamental an effect on the Afghan landscape, redefine social and cultural 
norms, as that which occurred under the Amir. 
 
Figure 4.   Areas of Forced Pashtun Migration under Amir Abdur Rahman75 
                                                 
74 Dupree, Afghanistan, 183-188.  Regional or geographic associations have been the historical basis 
for identity and solidarity of the non-Pashtun ethnic groups in Afghanistan, such as the Panjsheri Tajiks. 
75 After Dupree, Afghanistan, 58. 
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Consumed with the unification of Afghanistan, the ‘Iron Amir’ ordered 
campaigns into previously autonomous territories in order to bring these groups under his 
absolute rule.  His three-year campaign against the Ghilzai and Hazaras were particularly 
brutal.  Although the Amir had declared an anti-Shia jihad against the Hazaras, razed 
their lands and relegated them slave status by the end of 1893, his subjugation of the 
pagan Kafirs is what finally earned him the respect and confidence of the ulema 
(scholarly Islamic community, clergy).  The Kafirs, ‘unbelievers’ of the Islam, of the 
Hindu Kush northeast of Kabul were the last non-Muslim Afghans to convert to Islam.  
Believed to be descendants of Alexander’s Macedonian army because of the incidence of 
blond hair and blue eyes, the Amir punctuated his conquest of the Kafirs of Kafiristan by 
changing their name to Nuristanis (enlightened ones), and the region’s name to Nuristan, 
land of light.76 
While the national army was used most prominently in the pacification and 
subjugation of Afghanistan’s periphery under Abdur Rahman, its presence was later used 
to both manipulate tribal rivalries and prevent intertribal warfare that threatened to 
destabilize to the center.  In this way, the monarchy sought to keep other tribes or ethnic 
groups from obtaining a political or military vantage from which to challenge the state.  
Moreover, subsidy to tribal elders, especially along the Pakistan border, served to pacify 
these tribes and lower the risk of revolt through increased dependency on the state.  As 
Wilber notes, “the good will and cooperation of the tribal chiefs are essential to the most 
vital functions of the government: keeping order, raising revenue, and obtaining 
troops.”77  
Abdur Rahman legitimated his rule by co-opting both the ‘Classic Islamic” and 
“Tribal State” models of the Islamic transmission of power (see Figure 5).78 
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Figure 5.   The Legitimate Transmission of Power79 
In the classic Islamic model, the legitimization of power to the ruler was 
transferred from Allah to the ruler through the ulema.  As the only qualified body to 
interpret Gods' will, the ulema held ultimate religious power and authority.  Abdur 
Rahman usurped their authority and relegated it under his own by claiming that his rule 
was directly conferred by Allah.  Amir Rahman similarly reduced tribal power.  In 
Afghanistan’s tribal society, the legitimization of power from Allah to the Amir was 
confirmed through the tribal jirga.80  A Loya Jirga, composed of all of the tribal elders, 
confirmed Ahmad Shah Durrani as the first Afghan monarch and had been historically 
called to legitimate decisions of national significance.   
Abdur Rahman established a National Council and at times convened a Loya 
Jirga to legitimize his decisions.81 Composed of royal sardars (princes), khwanin-i-mulki 
                                                 
79 After Olesen, Islam and Politics, 64. 
80 Ibid., 64-72. 
81 While the National Council was a permanently-seated body composed of sardars, tribal elders and 
mullahs representing the ulema who, advised the Amir, the Loya Jirga was only convened three times 
during his reign: in 1885 prior to the Amir’s state visit to India, in 1888 during the rebellion of Sardar 
Muhammad Ishaq Khan (Abdur Rahman’s cousin and a legitimate challenger to the throne), and again after 
the Durand Boundary Commission agreement in 1893.  The Loya Jirga included all of the council 
members, including members of the royal court, some high ranking military officers and local magnates.  
Source: Kakar, Government and Society, 25. 
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(tribal elders or khans) and members of the ulema (qazis, muftis,82 and mullahs), the 
Council (darbar-i-‘aam) assumed the titular functions of a Parliament, although its role 
was purely advisory and its members wielded no real authority over their departments.  
The Council was further divided into an upper house (darbar-i-shahi) and lower house 
(khawanin-i-mulki), although the exact functional distinction between the two houses is 
not discernable.83  Although wazir (department heads) were often equated with 
Ministerial level posts, no one other than the Amir held or exercised executive power.  
The position of Prime Minister, which had previously existed under Amir Sher Ali, was 
eliminated.   
The Council and Jirga brought religious and tribal power directly under the 
center, and were strictly used as a mechanism to legitimize the Amir’s power.  Moreover, 
the council members were forced to reside in Kabul, physically removing the mullahs and 
tribal elders from their traditional power base.  Amir Rahman also instituted ghulam-
bachah, whereby he kept the son(s) of tribal and ethnic leaders in his court, presumably, 
as hostages should the tribes’ revolt.84  These policies were instrumental in breaking the 
strength and solidarity of the tribes and the ulema.  The subordination of the ulema and 
tribal elders curtailed their economic and doctrinal independence, aided in the 
Islamization of the state, and co-opted the ulema and tribes into the state apparatus.  The 
subjugation of the mullahs and Islamization of the state under central authority further 
necessitated a reorganization of the judiciary and offered another means by which to 
break traditional tribal solidarity. 
Figure 6 illustrates the government structure under Amir Abdur Rahman, 
depicting the subordination of the tribal nation (blue triangle) under the administration of 
 
 
                                                 
82 Advisers to qazis. 
83 Although M. Hasan Kakar and Louis Dupree differ in their naming conventions, Dupree preferring 
the term “court” used by Abdur Rahman himself, and Kakar employing the more widely used “council,” 
both encompass an institution composed of the royal sardars, tribal leaders and ulema.  I will use the more 
common “council,” in order to make a clear distinction between the composition and function of an 
advisory Cabinet and the royal Special Court.  See: Kakar, Government and Society, 22-25; Dupree, 
Afghanistan, 461-462. 
84 Dupree, Afghanistan, 188. 
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the central government (red triangle) as well as the subordination and direction of the 
flow of power from Abdur Rahman to the various branches of government and functional 
departments.  
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Figure 6.   Government Structure under Amir Abdur Rahman 
Historically, the qazis and muftis only presided in cities, while criminal, civil and 
religious disputes in the countryside were settled by tribal jirgas based on rawaj, 
customary law, and tribal code such as Pashtunwali, vice Islamic law.85  Local mullahs 
or other respected officials knowledgeable of Islamic law might otherwise settle local 
disputes that were a matter of Islamic law or interpretation.  Abdur Rahman’s 
realignment of the ulema under his central rule and proclamation that Sharia law was to 
be the overarching law of the land actually helped to raise the power and authority of the 
ulema while undermining tribal independence to enforce its own laws.  Although the 
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Amir created the position of Khan-i-ulum (Chief Justice), he retained for himself the 
function of supreme arbitrator in all matters of Islamic law including all judgments 
punishable by death.  The Amir appointed all judges, institutionalized the oversight of 
secular district authorities in district courts and mandated that all matters not covered in 
specified Sharia code be referred to him for guidance.  In addition, Amir Rahman 
ultimately reserved the right to preside over all criminal and political cases, relegating 
only legal and civil cases to the jurisdiction of the courts.86 
Having already relocated the subdued tribal khans and elders to the capital and 
replaced tribal customary law with the extension of Islamic law, the groundwork was 
now laid for the administrative takeover of the tribal nation.  With their leaders and time-
honored customs and structure upset by the Amir’s actions, local villagers and tribesman 
that composed the traditional basis of tribal solidarity, the khel, looked to the provincial 
government as a surrogate for the tribal nation.87  Abdur Rahman redrew territorial 
boundaries, creating fourteen provinces that divided tribal homelands (watan) across two 
or more provinces and numerous districts (see Figure 7).  This administrative redrawing 
of boundaries and the appointment of provincial governors was central to the breakdown 
of the tribal system, erosion of tribal identity and helped establish Afghan nationalism in 
the early to mid-twentieth century. 
The provincial governor was usually a military officer, as were district and local 
officials, and commanded a provincial army capable of immediately suppressing the first 
signs of opposition or unrest.  Appointed by the Amir himself, the provincial and district 
governors were responsible for the transmission and implementation of his absolute rule 
both outward to the periphery and downward to the local level.  The governors were the 
executors of the executive, administrative and military arms of government, commanding 
the provincial armies, while overseeing the provincial and district administrative 
bureaucracies such as revenue collection.  However, an elaborate system of royal spies  
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that reported directly to the Amir provided an executive check on governors and other 
officials who might overstep their authority or unjustly benefit from their position.  Such 
malfeasance was dealt with swiftly. 
 
Figure 7.   Provincial Boundaries Drawn by Abdur Rahaman88  
The primary administrative body was the diwan.  The central or supreme diwan, 
the diwan-i-a’la, was originally established as the central mechanism for economic 
activity, particularly the levying and collection of revenues from taxation and customs 
and also the regulation of government expenditures.  Over time, the expansion of 
territories and revenues necessitated the expansion of the diwan, causing its division into 
four regional departments (north, south, east, and west) in 1884 and later seeing the 
addition of new functional departments, such as an auditing office (daftar-i-sanjish) and 
land survey office (daftar-i-paimash-i-arqazi).  The officials in charge of the four 
regional diwan and heads of the financial departments in each of the provinces were 
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called daftaris, while the title of sardaftari was given to the heads of main bureaus in the 
central diwan.  Sarrishtadars were mid-level officials subordinate to the sardaftari, while 
mirzas filled out the junior administrative ranks.  In 1890, six mirzas took the initiative to 
conduct an audit of state revenue, investigating the accounts of government officials who 
had not paid their taxes.  Their findings directly led to the establishment of the auditing 
office, which “emerged as the most powerful bureau in the diwan.”89 
D. PROTECTION  
Protection and state-making were effectively synonymous during the reign of 
Abdur Rahman.  Above all, the Amir’s divide-and-rule strategy was based on tribal and 
religious lines, pitting Sunnis against the Shi’a and Pashtuns against non-Pashtuns.90  
Even amongst the Pashtuns he favored Durrani over the Ghilzai and his own 
Muhammadzai lineage of the Barakzai clan over the Sadozai lineage of the Popalzai 
clan.91   
While the Amir did not have any clients per se, even members of his own royal 
family, including his own sons, were the focus of his suspicion and subject to his 
persecution.  After hosting a dinner, Abdur Rahman’s eldest son and successor, 
Habibullah, “was chained and imprisoned for a night,” on suspicion of conspiring to 
overthrow the Amir.92  Rahman himself revealed his overwhelming suspicion to his wife, 
stating, “I suspect everyone of doing harm to me, and do not consider anyone 
trustworthy.”93  Since his rule was absolute, protection of the state was equated with 
protection of the Amir alone, and he extended that protection to no one. 
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E. EXTRACTION 
While a system of land revenue and taxation had existed previously in 
Afghanistan, it was not equally applied across the provinces and tribes.  The Durrani had 
historically been exempt from paying taxes because of their service to the state cavalry, 
whereas the Tajiks paid more revenue than the Pashtuns.94  The loss of territory to British 
India prior to the reign of Abdur Rahman, especially the loss of Kashmir, meant the loss 
of fertile and lucrative lands.  The loss of eastern ‘Pashtunistan’ and Baluchistan in 1893 
had even greater psychological and economic impact on the kingdom.  The resulting split 
of the traditional ‘Pashtun belt’ into two halves bordering Afghanistan and British India 
and loss of access to the Arabian Sea dealt a huge blow to kingdom.  The result was the 
imposition of increased taxation on peoples, particularly the Pashtuns, who had 
traditionally been either exempt or paid relatively low revenue to the center. 
Amir Rahman’s pacification campaigns and expanding bureaucracy necessitated 
increased state revenue.  As early as 1883 the Amir expanded revenue collection by 
proclaiming his divine command to collect taxes on public property, bayt al-mal, and the 
people’s duty to pay them.  Starting in Jalalabad, he ordered the transfer of the existing 
jam’bast system of land revenue to the kot system, whereby a fixed quota of revenue was 
replaced with a specific percentage of the land’s production.95  The government’s share 
of revenue was to be equal to one-third of the crop produced.  By 1891, persistent 
resistance from landowners and the government’s inability to evaluate accurately its 
share of the yield led to a system whereby crops were appraised before they were 
harvested, arbitrary appraisals, and land surveys to expand the amount of land under 
cultivation to increase government revenue.96   
While not universally applied, the land revenue system constituted the largest 
source of revenue under Abdur Rahman and led to a complex system of local 
government, reliant on zabits (tax collector, a military officer), ‘amils (registrar), and 
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hakims (district administrator) to implement.  Provincial offices (diwan, or, daftar) 
recorded the revenues and reported them to the center.  Although the practice was 
outlawed under Amir Rahman, zabits, hakims, and daftaris (financial officer at a diwan, 
or daftar) often assessed unofficial fees on taxpayers, sometimes in excess of the actual 
revenue paid.  So lucrative was this source of revenue that by 1898 the Amir had 
established three revenue departments (tahsils) in each province.  Abdur Rahman also 
increased revenue in other areas, including taxes on cattle, income and customs.  While 
these and many other common taxes predated his rule, the marked increase of taxes 
levied under the Amir’s rule increased the burden on the peasantry, caused isolated 
uprisings, as well emigration to Bukhara, Turkestan, and Peshawar. 
Military conscription of able-bodied males appeared the norm by 1887, although 
it took several years to determine an equitable basis for service and level of conscription 
on the local population.  In 1887, 15 percent of the population of Herat was ordered into 
military service. Neither the available population nor tribal elders supported this amount.  
Following negotiation a basis of conscription of one in twenty men was decided, while 
one in six men was set in Kandahar province.  Attempts to extract one male from every 
household in Logar, Ghazni and Ningrahar provinces in 1894 were so unpopular that a 
universal system of hasht nafari, one out of eight, was eventually arrived at by 1896.  
This system was also levied upon the tribes, who were additionally required to maintain 
reserve militias, although it is estimated that the regular army might have approximated 
close to 100,000 soldiers toward the end of Abdur Rahman’s reign. 
F.  RESISTANCE 
Amir Abdur Rahman’s reign was characterized by brutal suppression and 
expansionism over the formerly independent tribes of Afghanistan.  His successive 
campaigns to put down revolt and conquer rival or bordering tribes struck at the vital core 
of traditional Afghan solidarity on which resistance to the Amir’s rule was based.  The 
Amir, whose divine duty was to rule his subjects, tolerated no insurrection from the 
qawm, and allegiance to none other than himself. Amir Rahman changed the face of  
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Afghan society and state relations, recognizing, no social divisions, “whether of tribe, 
ethnicity, religion, or language,” and defining all of his subjects “by either the position 
they hold … or the tasks they perform.”97 
To be sure, the pacification of the tribes under the ‘Iron Amir” created a new 
social and governing hierarchy, in which the central state (the Writ of the Amir) was not 
merely able to penetrate local judicial, administrative and military levels of governance, 
but actually displace and eliminate them.  The result of these campaigns was the eventual 
reordering of Afghan society, and a general internal peace that lasted well after the 
Amir’s death in 1901.   
G. SUMMARY 
The reign of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan offers an invaluable historical framework 
and precedent upon which to examine current attempts to both extend the capacity of the 
government in Kabul and overcome tribal and ethnic solidarity.  Any attempt to extend 
the reach of Kabul to the local level is perceived as a direct threat to the qawm and leads 
to mobilization and revolt.  Only through the cooption or incorporation of local tribal 
structures and governance will the central government be able to extend its capacity 
while simultaneously creating a permissive environment in which to counter the rising 
Neo-Taliban insurgent threat. 
Amir Abdur Rahman effectively eliminated rivals to the state and pacified the 
tribes through not only intensive military campaigns and aggressive centralization of 
administrative and bureaucratic power and control.  His appointment of provincial 
governors weakened his opponents while the basis of a cabinet legitimized his rule.  
Though he retained absolute executive control, Abdur Rahman’s rule would not have 
been possible without the cooption and loyalty of the mullahs and tribal chiefs.  In 
addition, he effectively prioritized state activities, creating policies and institutionalizing 
structures and extracting resources that both expanded his central rule and decreased 
tribal resistance.  As noted previously, it took years of trial and adjustment to establish 
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sustainable sources of revenue through taxation and universal military conscription.  
Overall, the ‘Iron Amir’ created organizational structures and achieved a high degree of 
capacity in each of the areas examined (see Table 2). 
 
State Activity Structure Capacity Grading Criteria 
War making + + 
State-making + + 
Protection + + 
Extraction + + 
(+)  Structure present 
(-)   Structures absent 
(+)  Some capacity 
(-)   No capacity 
Table 2.   State Capacity Under Amir Abdur Rahman's Rule 
In my final analysis, it can be said that Reign of Amir Abdur Rahman achieved a 
high degree of state capacity through the establishment of effective organizational 
structures and institutions in each of the four state activities.  Although he did cede 
territory to both the Russians and British India, he raised a national army and united the 
tribes under his central rule, a feat never before achieved in Afghanistan’s history.  He 
successfully eliminated potential challengers to the regime and created lasting 
bureaucratic and administrative institutions that provided a foundation for successive 
regimes and relative stability through 1978. 
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IV. CASE 2: COMMUNISM UNDER THE PEOPLE’S 
DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN AND SOVIET RULE: 
1978-1989 
A. BACKGROUND  
Russian expansion toward Afghanistan began to first unfold more than a century 
before the 1978 communist coup and a half-century before the Bolshevik revolution as 
part of the nineteenth century “Great Game” between Russia and Great Britain.  As the 
Russian Empire expanded south into Central Asia and the British Raj pushed northwest 
into the tribal hinterlands, the two empire’s inevitable clash was averted through the 
conclusion of treaties and agreements between 1871 and 1907 that delineated 
Afghanistan’s borders, establishing the Pashtun-dominated Afghan state as a ‘buffer’ 
between the two western powers.98   
These treaties were likely reached in haste on England’s part, for Russian 
expansionism had only recently led to the conquest of Tashkent in 1865 and the 
annexation of Panjde into the Turkmen Republic in 1885.99  Bukhara, in Uzbekistan, was 
not formally annexed until 1920, under the Soviets.  Guided by the “century-old drive 
towards ‘warm waters’ and India,” the Soviets were also the first nation to recognize 
Afghanistan’s independence from Britain in 1919.100  
Although the Soviets immediately signed a friendship treaty with Afghanistan in 
1921, Stalin’s southerly advance was likely abruptly halted by the fall of King Amanullah 
in 1929.  Although “seen by the Komintern as the gateway to India” throughout the 1930s 
and 1940s, Afghanistan largely remained both neutral and unscathed through the end of 
World War Two.  However, Russian interest in Afghanistan was reinvigorated with the 
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inauguration of the Soviet Union’s Third World ‘forward policy’ and Khrushchev’s visit 
to Afghanistan in 1955.  Over the next decade, Moscow emerged as Kabul’s benefactor, 
training and equipping the Afghan National Army (ANA) and completing public works 
projects including tapping Afghanistan’s northern gas fields and the monumental 
construction of the ring highway (completed in 1964) over which Soviet Tanks would 
roll 15 years later, and the 1.7-mile-long Salang Tunnel through the Hindu Kush 
mountains which would ironically prove the principal lifeline for the mujahedeen’s 
resupply in the northeast during the anti-Soviet jihad. 
Yet, during all of this time the Russians, and later the Soviets did not found or 
foment a communist party as had arisen in Turkey, Iran and India.101  Only after 1964 
and the adoption of a liberal constitution allowing the creation of political parties in 
Afghanistan did the Soviets seize the opportunity to directly create a communist party 
with the intention “to influence an Afghan government without directly instigating a 
socialist revolution.”102  Afghanistan’s communist upheaval is therefore directly 
traceable to the formation of the Afghan People’s Democratic Party (PDPA), Hizb-i 
Democratik-i Khalq-i Afghanistan, on 1 January 1965, roughly a decade before a coup 
would end over 200 years of Afghanistan’s dynastic monarchy.103  The PDPA was not 
without its own internal squabbles however.   
Only two short years after its foundation, in 1967, the party split into two factions, 
Khalq (The People) under PDPA secretary-general Nur Muhammad Taraki (a Ghilzai 
Pashtun), and Parcham (The Banner) under the leadership of PDPA deputy secretary 
general Babrak Karmal.104 
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With their strong Soviet roots, the PDPA, along with the Afghan National Army 
(ANA), provided vehicles through which the Soviet politburo and intelligentsia 
penetrated the upper echelons of Afghan civil and military affairs.  The Khalq was 
predominantly represented among the ANA’s officer corps, many of whom had been 
trained directly in Moscow, while the Parcham faction had penetrated the upper 
administration of the Afghan government, including infiltration of the ministry of the 
Interior.  Through the end of the 1960s and into the 1970s the Soviets quietly steered the 
direction of the Afghan central government toward a more pro-Soviet relationship.  In 
fact, the Parcham faction’s leverage was instrumental in the July 17, 1973 coup by former 
Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud Khan that toppled the regime of his cousin and 
brother-in-law, Zahir Shah, the last king of Afghanistan.  However, Daoud’s turn toward 
the west (including appeals to the United States and India for military training and 
hardware) and marginalization of communist party members in his cabinet worried the 
Soviets, who reunited the two PDPA factions in 1977 despite their internal ideological 
differences.105  Daoud’s complete alienation of the communist party was demonstrated 
with arrest of the three PDPA leaders on 26 April 1978 (Taraki, Karmal and Hafizullah 
Amin, Taraki’s second in command), that sparked a pronunciamento in which members 
of the Soviet-stylized ANA stormed the capital on 27 April, killing Daoud and his family 
in the presidential palace.  On 1 May 1978, Taraki announced the establishment of the 
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) with himself as President and Amin and 
Karmal as Deputy Prime Ministers. 
It is difficult to determine exactly how the PDPA viewed state capacity, although 
examples abound on how the party sought to expand its membership and influence both 
prior to and after the 1978 coup.  Of these, the organizational structure the party adopted 
is most telling, and examination of the PDPA’s Constitution, which likely dates to the 
party’s inception in January 1965, provides insight into how the party envisioned 
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consolidating state capacity.  This assessment is important, as it largely contrasts the 
Soviet (and current) attempt to increase governing capacity by first concentrating power 
in Kabul and then attempting to extend that power outward to Afghanistan’s periphery, 
and downward to engulf the peasantry.   
 
 
Figure 8.   Soviet Control and the Kabul Regime, 1989106 
As Figure 8 illustrates, the Soviets were never able to ‘govern’ effectively more 
than ten percent of the Afghan countryside, controlling little outside of Kabul and 
securing nothing more than a few hundred yards off the side of the ring road in the 
decade prior to their 1989 departure.  This strategy is historically adopted by weak central 
powers that must rely on a strong security apparatus (both regular army and state security 
or secret police) to subjugate the will of the people to the force of the state.   
However, review of the PDPA Constitution reveals a different theoretical 
approach and organization was intended, as well as the implicit recognition of existing 
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bureaucratic and social strata.  Article 10 of the Constitution provided for party 
organizational divisions at the provincial, city, woluswali (sub province) and district 
level.107  According to the PDPA Constitution, central authority was vested in the Central 
Committee, who delegated authority to “make decisions on local problems,” to 
subordinate party organizations at the local level.  This delegation of authority to at least 
the district level is consistent with historical Afghan political and socio-cultural practice 
under previous regimes, and tacitly recognizes the need for government representation at 
that level, but on local terms.  Articles 25 through 33 further define and delineate the 
duties and authority of these local party organizations, although without greater detail and 
substance.  The central tenant however is that there was early recognition of the need to 
supplant existing levels of governance with those of the party bureaucracy.  Although 
expanding membership was a primary objective of the party, Babrak Karmal confessed in 
1985 that the party, “had ‘weak links with the inhabitants’ of the tribal areas and 
decisions taken… by the government affecting these regions ‘did not have much effect on 
the state of affairs.’”108  This statement came despite the increase of PDPA primary 
organizations from 1,656 in 1982 to 3,931 in 1985.  As Giustozzi concludes, the 
expansion, which eventually grew by 1987 to over 6,000 organizations penetrating over 
1,000 villages, was ineffective in reaching the “maybe 25,000” villages throughout 
Afghanistan.109  In this respect the PDPA was never able to revitalize the vanguard party, 
of which over half was purged between the coup and the invasion, and trigger a larger 
socialist revolution from the masses.  Instead, the communist policies (especially toward 
Islam, land reform and the role of women) and Soviet invasion actually fueled political 
opposition and open revolt. 
B. WAR MAKING  
While the Soviet invasion may have naively been intended to stabilize the 
government in Kabul and replace Amin with Karmal in an effort to prop up the Soviet 
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ally, the Soviet’s extended occupation ultimately destabilized the region, upsetting 
Afghanistan’s relations with its regional neighbors in Iran and Pakistan.  To the Soviets, 
the occupation of Shindand base in southwest Afghanistan represented an ‘unsinkable 
aircraft carrier’ from which Moscow could extend its reach, further threatening 
Afghanistan’s neighbors and the security of the Persian Gulf. Shindand’s proximity to the 
Gulf States and the bulk of the world’s proven energy resources had the (unintentional) 
effect of birthing the Carter Doctrine.  Announced on 23 January 1980, the Carter 
doctrine unambiguously linked the security of Persian Gulf oil to the national security of 
the United States.  Avoiding direct Soviet confrontation with America must have been as 
predominant an underlying factor in the Soviet domestic politics and prosecution of the 
war as the reciprocal was true of the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) funding and 
provision of arms to the mujahedeen through Pakistan’s Directorate of Inter-Services 
Intelligence.110   
However, although they quickly became embroiled in an ideological guerilla 
insurgency within Afghanistan’s borders, the Soviets still reportedly used “threats and 
even military force (bombings, aerial violations of borders)…against Pakistan and 
Iran.”111 While these incidents were likely either isolated or underreported, it is clear that 
the Soviets, regardless of what is now known about their internal state of political affairs 
or military acumen, remained intent on at least maintaining the perception that they held 
the capability to eliminate rivals outside Afghan territory.  This perception is repeatedly 
recounted in CIA dealings with ISI counterparts and through the tactical calculus and 
strategic caution in which covert U.S. assistance was used to undermine the Soviets 
without prompting direct retaliation against the U.S. or Pakistan.   
Despite their military technological and numerical superiority, Russian domestic 
support for the occupation waned as the insurgency raged on, with the decision to 
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“Afghanize” the war and withdraw forces reached as early as October 1985.112  It would 
take another two years to create fully the conditions necessary for a complete withdrawal, 
although the Soviets redeployed as many as six regiments between April 1985 and 
January 1987.113  In the end, the Afghan army was left bearing the brunt of the 
mujahedeen assault and, despite continued Soviet financial and logistical support, was 
unable to defend against the hardware, monies and tactics provided to the mujahedeen by 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and the United States. 
C. STATE-MAKING  
Overall, the PDPA and Soviets were extremely more adept at eliminating or 
neutralizing rivals inside their own party than they were at winning the war against the 
mujahedeen, who fought from Pakistan and Afghanistan’s periphery outside direct 
government control.  While the Soviets killed or wounded as many 150-180,000 
mujahedeen, Giustozzi suggests “this might amount to as little as 3% of the total 
manpower of the armed opposition groups.”114 Given the losses of the Kabul regime 
alone, totaling more than 200,000 killed, wounded or missing115 in action it is little 
wonder that many of the party’s rivals targeted for elimination were in fact members of 
the opposing PDPA faction.  State resources and attention were more easily focused 
internally, within the party apparatus, directly attributing to the elimination of one-third 
of the party’s pre-revolution cadre in the first year alone, including the Democratic 
Republic of Afghanistan’s first two Prime Ministers and the movement’s founding 
members in Taraki and Amin. 
The Khalq’s penetration of the military and the Parcham’s entrenchment within 
the Ministry of the Interior under President Daoud were not only both instrumental in 
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bringing about the coup, but also in consolidating state power and eliminating potential 
rivals immediately following Daoud’s ouster but before Soviet intervention.  
Unfortunately for the solidarity of the party, each faction was as much the subject of 
political rivalry and elimination as was the non-communist opposition.  In the year 
immediately after the coup, Parchamis claim as many as 2,000 party members were 
killed by the Khalq under Taraki and Amin.  More alarming is the suggestion that as 
many as 10,000 PDPA members “appear to have died in 1978-9,” while 6-7,000 were 
culled from the PDPA’s pre-revolution strength of 18,000.116   
While the ranks of the KhAD (Khadamat-e Etela'at-e Dawlati), Afghanistan’s 
state intelligence agency and secret police, and the Sarandoy (special police of the 
Ministry of Interior) surged in an effort to extend the State’s central authority and power 
to the local level, the party’s organizational structure was ineffectual in actually 
penetrating the countryside as prescribed in the PDPA Constitution.  Although the ranks 
of the Party, Ministry of Defense, KhAD and Sarandoy expanded during the decade of 
Soviet occupation and communist rule, the quality of recruits remained dubious and the 
final number of party members rested at probably only around two percent of the total 
population and had formed communist party organizations in only about 4 percent of the 
country’s villages.  
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Figure 9.   Nominal People’s Democratic of Afghanistan Party Structure 1980 
Like the previous Afghan regimes under King Zahir Shah (r. 1973-1973) and 
President Daoud (r. 1973-1978), state power under the PDPA was nominally vested in 
one central figure, Prime Minister (PM) Nur Muhammad Taraki.  To legitimize his 
authority and give the appearance that the PM was not above the party, Taraki 
simultaneously held membership in each of the national committees, the Political Bureau, 
Secretariat and Revolutionary Council, as well as providing executive direction to the 
sixteen ministries.  The Central Committee formed the final governing body, 
‘legitimizing’ the actions and carrying out the direction of the other committees, as well 
as providing the conduit for the promulgation of central directives to party organizations 
replicated at the lower level.  Of the sixteen ministries, only three were integral in 
establishing and building the state apparatus with which the PDPA and Soviets 
maintained their death-grip on Afghan society: the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of 
Defense, and Ministry of Justice.  Of these, the first two were largely administered the 
Soviets, while the judiciary was effectively sidestepped as punishments were typically 
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swift and carried out by the KhAD, Sarandoy or army without trial.  The war that ravaged 
the countryside created a permissive environment where banditry and marauding 
flourished and the rule of law was impenetrable. 
D. PROTECTION 
Protection and state-making were effectively synonymous during the communist 
era.  Even prior to the coup, the Khalq and Parcham factions jockeyed within the various 
branches of government for power – the Khalq gaining prominence within the military 
while the Parcham faction rose to power within the Interior Ministry and security 
apparatus.  Although the leaders of the two PDPA factions did not move against each 
other before the coup, direct confrontation and Soviet machination was tacitly behind 
Taraki’s move against Amin (although it was Amin who defeated Taraki), while the full-
scale Soviet invasion was intended as a short-term move to eliminate Amin, facilitating 
the imposition of Babrak Karmal as the communist Head of State and bringing 
Afghanistan fully within the ideological sphere of the Soviet Union.   
The Soviets also ensured political succession within their Afghan client state 
through the cultivation of Mohammad Najibullah, who replaced Karmal as President of 
the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) in 1986.  Najibullah was head of the 
KhAD, modeled after the Soviet KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti), under 
whom it became directly subordinated after 1979.  In this capacity, Najibullah was 
directly responsible for the elimination of possibly thousands of political opponents, 
thereby proving his ruthlessness to his Soviet benefactors and loyalty to the party.  
Moreover, Najibullah’s network of spies and affiliation with the KGB enabled him to 
consolidate and maintain central authoritarian power as the Soviets shifted strategy in 
preparation for their eventual withdrawal.  That Najibullah was able to survive both the 
Soviet withdrawal and ensuing civil war was testament to his survivalist acumen, 
although he was later hanged after the Taliban took Kabul in 1996. 
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E. EXTRACTION 
More than perhaps any other monolithic force, the Soviet structure and state 
apparatus was remarkably adept at extracting a multitude of resources from resource-
scarce countries such as Afghanistan.  Conducted through both the PDPA as well as by 
Soviet agencies acting directly for Moscow, Soviet extraction of resources in Afghanistan 
was largely concerned with supporting the war effort and ‘Sovietization’ of Afghanistan, 
consistent with Tilly’s state activities model.   
Conscription of Afghans into the armed forces was one of the Soviet’s top 
priorities, given the prevalence of desertion and Moscow’s desire to keep the number of 
deployed Soviet units at a manageable and sustainable level.  While many sources 
abound on the size of the Afghan army prior to the invasion, the most consistent number 
seems to be somewhere around 125,000 total personnel within the Ministry of Defense 
and security apparatus, to include the Sarandoy.  Of this, around 90,000 were in the 
army.117  The invasion took an immediate toll on the Afghan army, with sources 
suggesting as much fifty-five percent of its force deserted, leaving only 50,000 regular 
army to supplement the Soviet force.118  Although the Soviets and PDPA waged an 
aggressive recruitment campaign to refill the ranks, mostly from peasant communities 
near large urban centers such as Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-i Sharif, 119 
recruitment was only able to meet between forty to sixty percent of its goals during the 
first five years of the occupation.120  Conscription to fill the ranks of the Ministry of 
Defense (MoD) never really achieved the levels the Soviets desired, although the MoD 
did reach a high of 160,000 in 1987, largely the result of the “Afghanization” of the war 
effort.  However, once the imminent Soviet departure was realized, ranks swelled to 
165,000 in 1989 and to 220,000 in 1990, after the Soviet withdrawal was complete.121   
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One way the Soviets bolstered the numbers of the regular army and Ministry of Defense 
was through recruitment into the Sarandoy, the heavily armed special policy of the 
Ministry of the Interior, supplement by the KhAD. 
Recruitment into the Sarandoy almost doubled in the first two years of the 
campaign, reaching 54,000 by 1982; 74,800 by 1983; 79,500 by 1984; 90,200 by 1985; 
and surpassing 100,000 by 1988, reaching 155,000 by the Soviet withdrawal.  Through 
the Sarandoy, the Soviets and PDPA increased total recruitment into the security sector 
from approximately 70,000 after the invasion to 329,000 in 1989 and 400,000 in 1990.122  
Although the extraction of human capital for the war effort was a large component of 
Soviet strategy, the PDPA also set about to expand party membership and spread the 
revolution.  To this end, it failed miserably, enlisting on average only 35,000 Afghans a 
year to the party.123  Of this, a third or more was recruited after 1987, once again after 
Moscow had well begun the transition of the war effort and governance back onto Kabul 
in preparation for the extrication of its forces in 1989.  This fact proves salient; 
suggesting that foreign intervention alone was enough to limit army conscription and 
party membership, as the PDPA fared better in all manner of recruitment after the Soviet 
presence was reduced.  This reasoning is certainly consistent with the Afghan’s 
xenophobic history and suggests the PDPA may have had greater success without 
Moscow’s intervention. 
The Soviets also began the extraction of natural gas from Afghanistan, opening a 
second gas field in 1980, increasing “the value of gas exported to the Soviet Union… by 
400 percent over the 1978 figure.”124  While little data is available about the exact 
amount and nature of revenue and resources the Soviets extracted from Afghanistan,125 it 
must have surely paled compared to Soviet military expenditure in Afghanistan, or to the 
devastating toll the war caused on the Afghan civilian populace, livestock and 
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countryside upon which the average Afghan depended for livelihood.  In this last respect 
the occupation was an ecological disaster and the Soviet extraction of resources from the 
land never strayed much beyond the recruitment of human capital needed to prosecute the 
war. 
F. RESISTANCE 
When the Communists came to power in 1978, elements of Afghan society were 
already in open revolt and the Islamist parties that formed the mujahedeen were already 
well established and operating out of Peshawar, Pakistan.  As the anti-Soviet jihad waged 
on, ethnic fissures widened among the major mujahedeen forces, causing the groups to be 
as largely identifiable by their ethno-linguistic composition as their political ideology.  
Despite their common struggle against the Soviets, the mujahedeen groups fought as 
ethnic and regional units more than as a coordinated or ideologically united opposition 
front.  While a loosely held common Islamist ideology was the only factor that kept them 
from fighting each other during the anti-Soviet jihad, ethnic hatred supplanted this 
common bond immediately after the Soviet departure and the parties turned on each 
other.  As a result of this division, ethnic solidarity became nearly synonymous with the 
identity and ethnic composition of Afghanistan’s political parties and resistance groups, 
the majority of which had been founded prior to the 1978 communist party coup.  As 
Barnet Rubin notes, the former King, Zahir Shah, was the only recognized national leader 
of Afghanistan and no leader emerged after the Soviet departure that “could validate a 
claim to represent a national constituency.”126  Such was the landscape in which the 
mujahedeen parties emerged to resist the communists, fight the Soviets and later vie for 
national political control.   
In Afghanistan, the Soviets failed to replicate the ethnographic studies that aided 
Stalin’s division and conquest of Central Asia a half century earlier.  Had they done so, or 
even reflected upon Russia’s own interventionist history in Afghanistan, the Soviets 
might have been able to recognize the basis of Afghan solidarity and mujahedeen 
resistance, thereby adjusting its political and military strategy to exploit, or at least 
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suppress, dissention between the mujahedeen parties through co-option of solidarity 
groups at the local level.  That the Soviets never viewed the mujahedeen in other than 
military terms is evidenced by this depiction of mujahedeen ‘structure, armaments and 
personnel,’ produced by the Russian General Staff. 
 
 
Figure 10.    Soviet View of Mujahedeen Organization127 
Soviet shortsightedness and failure to capitalize on Afghan social structure is only 
made more poignant by the realization that the mujahedeen “lacked a common platform,” 
besides “their anti-Soviet feelings and irreconcilable enmity to the government.”128  Had 
the Soviets capitalized on these divisions and exploited Afghan social structure and 
cultural norms, the outcome might have been different.  In the end, the Communist 
ideology and atheist beliefs were antithetical to Afghanistan’s tribal traditions and 
conservative Islamic mores. 
 The mujahedeen’s inability (or unwillingness) to reconcile their (negligible) 
ideological differences and fight from a united front (as five groups later did against the 
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Taliban), is likely attributable to the qawm’s replacement of Islam as the primary source 
of solidarity and mobilization within the mujahedeen parties.  The inter-factional fighting 
became one of inter-ethnic conflict and division rather than bridging their common 
Islamic ideology.  After all, the three major Islamist mujahedeen parties were all 
originally members of the Jamiat-i Islami prior to the party’s split into various factions.  
Table 3 depicts the major resistance groups during the Communist regime. 
 
Name Leader Ideology Qawm 
Jamiat-i Islami Burhanuddin Rabbani Islamist (Moderate) Tajiks; Northeast, Panjshir 
valley 
Hizb-i Ilsami (Gulbaddin) Gulbaddin Hekmatyar Islamist 
(Fundamentalist) 
Ghilzai Pashtuns; Eastern 
Provinces 
Hizb-i Ilsami (Khalis) Maulvi Younis Khalis Islamist (Moderate) Ghilzai Pashtuns; Kandahar 




Ghilzai Pashtun; Kandahar 
Jahbha-i Najat Milli Sibghatullah Mujaddedi Islamist (Moderate)  Nagshbandiyah Sufi Order; 
Pashtun royalists 
Mahaz-i Milli Islami Pir Sayed Amhad Gailani Islamist (Moderate) Qaderiyah Sufi Order; 
Pashtun royalists 
Itthad-i Islami bara-yi Azadi Abd al-Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf Islamist (Wahhabi) Pashtun; foreign Arab 
fighters 
Ismaili’s Religious: Karim Al Husseini, Āgā  
    Khān IV 
Militia: Sayyid Mansor 
Regional Warlord: Ismail Khan  
     (member of Jamiat-i Islami) 
Shi’a (Islmaili) Ismaili Shi’a; Northeast, 
Herat & Pakistan NWFP; 
Tajiks; Pashtuns; Heratis 
Hisb-i Wahdat Abdul Ali Mazari / Kariim Khalili Shi’a (Iranian proxy) Hazara Shi’a 
Harakat-i Islami-yi Ayatollah Muhammad Asif Muhsini Shi’a Non-Hazara Shi’a 
Royalists - Restoration monarchy Durrani Pashtuns; ethnic 
minorities; expatriates 
Table 3.   Basis of Solidarity of Resistance Groups during the anti-Soviet Jihad129 
In order to understand the basis for individual identity, group solidarity, social 
mobilization and political resistance of each of the parties presented, I will now provide a 
brief explanation of the genealogy of each of the groups listed in Table 3. 
Headed by Burhanuddin Rabbani, Jamiat-i Islami (Islamic Party) is the oldest 
Islamic party in Afghanistan.  Like its namesake, Pakistan’s Jamiat-e-Islami, Rabanni 
drew his ideology from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, of which he had earlier 
founded the Afghan chapter.  Although Jamiat-i Islami later drew its support mostly from 
ethnic Tajiks in the northeast, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Younis Khalis were among the 
party’s founding members before forming their own Islamist factions.  An intellectual 
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and Tajik, Rabbani advocated the creation of an Islamic state based on reinterpretation of 
the Koran.  Islamist but not fundamentalist, Rabbani borrowed western political concepts 
in his political ideology, rather than the more pervasive fundamentalist views shared by 
most ethnic Pashtuns, which relied more heavily on the tradition of the ulema, mullahs 
and tribal leaders.  Early Islamists, including Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmed Shah 
Massoud attempted an uprising and coup against Afghan President Mohammed Daoud 
Kahn in 1975.  Unsuccessful, they fled to Pakistan where they were premier among the 
seven Islamist mujahedeen parties that received CIA and ISI monies after the 1979 Soviet 
Invasion of Afghanistan, although Massoud later split with Pakistan intelligence.  
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar founded Hisb-i Islami (Party of Islam) in 1977 after an 
ideological split with Burhanuddin Rabbani and Jamiat-e-Islami.  Hekmatyar is a 
fundamentalist, who also seeks the establishment of an Islamic state, but who rejects 
tribal and other Islamic traditions that have muddied pure Islam and strict adherence to 
Koran.  Hekmatyar received the majority of ISI, CIA, and Saudi funding & support 
during the anti-Soviet jihad.  Hekmatyar never reconciled with the other mujahedeen 
groups, even fighting against them following the Soviet withdrawal and during the 
Taliban rule.  He was not a part of the northern alliance and Hisb-i Islami Gulbuddin 
remains in opposition to both the current Karzai regime and Neo-Taliban movements.  
Maulvi Younis Khalis also left Jamiat-e-Islami with Hekmatyar in 1977, but later split 
with Gulbuddin and founded his own faction of Hisb-i Islami (known as Hisb-i Islami 
Khalis) in 1979.  Popular in southern Afghanistan, particularly near Kandahar where he 
has tribal ties, Khalis departs with Hekmatyar in his view of the role of the ulema in 
creating an Islamic state.  The Taliban’s leader, Mullah Omar, was originally a member 
of Hisb-i Islami Khalis during the Soviet occupation. 
 The Jahbha-I Najat Milli Afghanistan (National Liberation Front of Afghanistan) 
was headed by Sibghatullah Mujaddedi, who was the head of the prominent 
Naqshbandiyah Sufi order.  Based in Peshawar Pakistan during the anti-Soviet war, 
Mujaddedi was a fierce critic of the radical Islamic parties and enjoyed a small following 
of Sunni Afghans loyal to his Sufi order.  Mujaddedi became president of the first post-
Soviet interim government in 1989 and President of Afghanistan in 1992 before turning 
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over the office to Rabbani in an agreed transitional administration before the Taliban rose 
to power.  Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani headed the other prominent Sufi order, Qaderiyah, 
and was related to ex-king Zahir Shah.  Also based in Peshawr, his party, Mahaz-i Milli 
Islami (National Islamic Front of Afghanistan) was most closely associated with 
royalists, who advocated the return of the former King.  Mujaddedi and Gailani were the 
most moderate of the mujahedeen, sidelined by the CIA, ISI, Hekmatyar and later the 
Taliban.  Although politically active, they were not as militant as the other resistance 
groups against the Taliban.  Together, Mujaddedi and Gailani established the Peace and 
National Unity Party in 1999.130  Gailani was a strong supporter of Hamid Karzai’s 
election as Afghan President. 
Headed by Maulana Mohhamed Nabi Mihammedi, Harakat Inquilabi-Islami 
(Movement of the Islamic Revolution) was also popular in southern Afghanistan where 
they had tribal ties, particularly in the vicinity of Kandahar.  Harakat Inquilabi-Islami 
generally shared Hekmatyar’s more radical and fundamentalist ideology, splitting the 
Kandahari Pashtuns into two camps; the moderates belonging to Khalis’ Hisb-i Islami 
faction. Through shared fundamentalist ideologies and Ghilzai Pashtun ethnicity, 
Hekmatyar was essentially able to spread his base from the eastern provinces where he 
had his base to the southern provinces, especially Kandahar.  Mullah Hassan, former 
Governor of Kandahar, member of the Taliban’s Supreme Shura and Military Chief of 
Staff, was originally a member of Harakat Inquilabi-Islami during the Soviet occupation.  
Like Mullah Hassan, many members of Harakat Inquilabi-Islami and Hisb-i Islami Khalis 
based in Kandahar likely defected, swelling the ranks of the early Taliban, grounded in 
regional, ethnic, tribal and kin-based relationships of solidarity. 
Abdul Rasul Sayyaf was an original member of Hekmatyar & Rabbani’s Muslim 
Brotherhood in the late 1960s and plotted w/ Hekmatyar & Massoud in the failed coup 
against President Daoud in 1975.  Caught and imprisoned after returning to Afghanistan 
from Pakistan in 1978, he was later freed by the second president of the People’s 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), Hazifullah Amin, in 1979.  Sayyaf founded 
                                                 
130 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia  (New Haven: 
Yale Nota Bene, 2000), 85. 
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Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi (Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan) as a 
Saudi proxy in 1980, after the Soviet invasion, and returned to Pakistan.  Sayyaf’s group 
was the primary conduit for foreign fighters entry into Afghanistan for the anti-Soviet 
jihad and was composed primarily of Arabs although Sayyaf himself was a Ghilzai 
Pashtun.  Sayyaf formed a close personal relationship with Osama bin Laden in the 1980s 
and founded a training camp attended by Ramzi Yousef, the first World Trade Center 
bomber. Although Sayyaf committed egregious atrocities against Afghan minorities, 
especially the Shi’a Hazara, and espoused a radical fundamentalist doctrine that shared 
many ideological similarities with the Taliban, Sayyaf joined the anti-Taliban Northern 
Alliance in 1995.  Perhaps one of the most dangerous men inside Afghanistan during the 
Taliban because of his association with bin Laden and private establishment of terrorist 
training (refugee) camps, including Dawa'a al-Jihad, his Wahhabist agenda was never 
seconded by any real affinity with the Northern Alliance.  Moreover, Sayyaf is alleged to 
have been complicit in Ahmed Shah Massoud’s assassination on 9 September 2001.131  
Shi’a solidarity groups that were also prevalent during Taliban rule were also 
historically rooted in the anti-Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.  Although predominantly 
ethnically Hazara, there are a few Shi’a Pashtun tribes, and Tajik clans, especially in the 
western provinces near Herat.  Afghanistan’s Ismailis were historically followers of the 
Agha Khan and lived in northeast Afghanistan near Tajikistan and in Pakistan’s North 
West Frontier’s Provinces (NWFP).  Due to their geographic distance from the Hazarajat, 
many Islmaili’s remained independent of Hisb-i Wahdat and were instead loyal to Ismail 
Khan, who controlled the three western provinces in Herat.  The Hisb-i Wahdat (Islamic 
Unity Party of Afghanistan) consolidated nine Shi’a factions into one party.  The groups' 
initial leader, Abdul Ali Mazari, died in Taliban custody after appealing to them to end 
Hazara persecution by other mujahedeen groups, especially Sayyaf’s Ittihad-i Islami 
Bara-yi Azadi and Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i Islami, although even the more ideologically 
moderate Tajiks from Rabbani’s Jamiat-i Islami joined in the ethnic atrocities.    Karim 
Khalili assumed leadership of Hisb-i Wahdat, and remained instrumental in opposing the 
Taliban, largely with strong Iranian support, including shipments of arms flown into the 
                                                 
131 John Lee Anderson, The Lion's Grave: Dispatches from Afghanistan  (New York: Grove Press, 
2003). 
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Hazarajat.  The Shi’a Hazara of the Hisb-i Wahdat were also ideologically aligned with 
Iran, and the establishment of a Shi’ite Islamic regime in Hazarajat based on the Iranian 
Revolutionary model (rooted in the teachings of Ayatollah Khomeini) remained a 
primary ideological objective, if never a political or military reality. 
Afghanistan’s Tajik Shi’a minority was largely represented by Ayatollah 
Muhammad Asif Muhsini’s group Harakat-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan (Islamic Movement of 
Afghanistan).  An Ayatollah who studied at the illustrious center of Shi’i Islam 
scholarship in Najaf, Iraq, Muhsini’s group was ideologically aligned with Iran.  
However, Harakat-i-Islami also found ethnic solidarity with its fellow Tajiks, 
momentarily aligning with Jamiat-i Islami after the Soviet departure from 1993-1995, 
before joining the Northern Alliance against the Taliban.132   
Although originally founded on differences in Islamists ideology, the mujahedeen 
groups, representative of Afghan society as a whole, grew increasingly identified with 
qawm-based social divisions and political aspirations as the war progressed.  Over time, 
former mujahedeen groups such as Hizb-i Ilsami (Gulbuddin) and Jamiat-i Ilsami had 
largely moderated their Islamist rhetoric and were more illustrative of an ethno-centric 
struggle for political dominance between Ghilzai Pashtuns and ethnic minorities (Tajiks, 
Uzbeks and Hazaras).  Moreover, Islamist ideology was no longer a primary factor for 
solidarity for all but the group’s core leadership or the Sufi orders that were more 
moderate in their views.  In general, Islamists parties were ideologically split over the 
role of the ulema in governing society and over the degree to which tribal social or 
modern governing institutions were adopted.   
As the mujahedeen parties were well established prior to the PDPA coup and 
Soviet invasion they had essentially formed parallel governments in exile, developing the 
military command and control necessary to fight an effective insurgency as well as the 
political hierarchy and administrative structures required to recruit and finance their 
operations.  Yet, despite their demonstrated tenacity, political will, and call to jihad 
against the foreign invaders, it took the mujahedeen parties another three years to wrest 
                                                 
132 Military Assistance to the Afghan Opposition, Human Rights Watch.  (October 2001).  On the web:  
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/afghan-bck1005.htm (accessed 19 February 2009). 
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control of Kabul from the communist party (who had the backing of the Afghan National 
Army) after the Soviets departed in 1989.  That the communist government under 
President Najibullah was able to hold out for so long against the mujahedeen is not solely 
testament to former’s infrastructure, but rather owed largely to the ethnically based inter-
factional rivalry and civil war that characterized the period between 1989 and 1992.   
G. SUMMARY 
In summation, while it is difficult to differentiate between the machinations of the 
PDPA in Kabul and the Soviet Politburo seated in Moscow, both were ostensibly 
intertwined and must be evaluated as a single political agent, although differences in 
strategy certainly existed.  My final evaluation of the Communist regime’s capacity to 
accomplish Tilly’s Four State Activities is presented in Table 4. 
 
State Activity Structure Capacity Grading Criteria 
War making + + 
State-making + - 
Protection + + 
Extraction + - 
(+)  Structure present 
(-)   Structures absent 
(+)  Some capacity 
(-)   No capacity 
Table 4.   State Capacity Under Communists Rule 
The Afghan National Army, buttressed by the strength of the Soviet Army, 
certainly provided both the structure and maintained the capacity between 1979 and 1989 
to conduct military operations, if not a limited conventional war, beyond Afghanistan’s 
borders.  In addition, the Afghan military officer corps was a significant source of party 
membership, played a prominent role in the revolutionary coup and was historically 
closely aligned with Soviet doctrine and tactics. Overall, the communist regime under the 
PDPA had both the structure and capacity for war making.  However, while the PDPA 
implemented an organizational structure that was successful in maintaining power at the 
national level, its failure to duplicate en masse, or sustain these organizations at the 
district and village level, ultimately proved failure of the regime to extend its state 
capacity to the capital and a few major cities.  The state did prove more effective at 
protection, using various state security and intelligence apparatus to eliminate or 
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neutralize its clients, the majority of whom were party members of the opposing faction.  
By the time of the Soviet departure, the force strength of the KhAD and Sarandoy rivaled 
that of the Ministry of Defense, with a combined force of approximately 155,000.133   
However, while demonstrating the capacity to eliminate potential political rivals, I must 
conclude that the attention placed on eliminating internal dissention, while a hallmark of 
communist party doctrine, was ill-conceived and misplaced, draining state resources that 
could have better been served targeting mujahedeen commanders or their foreign 
benefactors.  In addition, while perhaps a relatively resource-poor nation, the PDPA’s 
reforms and Soviet’s ‘scorched earth’ policy undermined any real effort, however small, 
to maintain Afghanistan’s economic vitality. Instead, the focus of Soviet extraction was 
focused initially on gas and human capital needed to fight the war, and when the former 
waned, it widened conscription requirements on an ad-hoc basis in order to satisfy 
Moscow’s recruitment quota.  In the end, the state had no real organizational mechanism 
and developed no real capacity for the extraction of human or mineral resources. 
 
                                                 
133 Giustozzi, War, Politics and Society, 266.  “Table 27.  Strength of the Afghan Armed Forces.” 
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V. CASE 3: THE TALIBAN’S ISLAMIST THEOCRATIC RULE: 
1994-2001 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Taliban rose to power between 1994 and 1996 following a period in which 
Afghan society had been ‘fractured’ by a decade of war against the Soviet occupation and 
five years of bloody civil strife.  Ethno-linguistic cleavages permeated society and had 
replaced Islam, the traditional unifying force, as the dominant basis for the division of 
Afghan society.  Although they ascribed to radical Islamist ideals, the Taliban’s initial 
mass appeal and widespread legitimacy was predicated on the restoration of basic public 
security and social justice long abandoned by the mujahedeen’s internecine civil war. 
However, once in power, the Taliban essentially equated governing capacity with 
territorial expansion.  This view is consistent with Islamic fundamentalist ideology of 
conversion/conquest and the establishment of the Islamic state ruled under shari’a law.  
While the Taliban’s particular creed was not pan-Islamic, their “official goal was the 
reunification of all Afghans under an Islamic government.”134  Never abandoning this 
aim, the Taliban’s military campaign continued until its ouster in 2001.  As a result, the 
Taliban never truly developed the administrative structure and bureaucracy necessary to 
effectively implement policy at the local level.  Mullah Omar’s decrees, especially 
governing social conduct such as dress and appearance or the status of women, were 
enforced at the local level, but with great regional disparity.  Although Dorronsoro 
suggests that the Taliban “established their authority with no reference to tribal 
institutions,” there does appear to be regional disparity between offenses and 
punishments.135  This suggests that such punishments were based on pre-Islamic 
regional, ethnic or tribal customs rather than acts directed by the central state or explicitly 
codified in the Koran. 
                                                 
134 Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 267.  Alternatively, Kamal Matinuddin suggests the Taliban 
had more immediate and tactical objectives such as disarming rival militias and enforcing Islamic law in 
captured areas.  See: The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994-1997.  (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999), 26. 
135 Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 267. 
 66
Direct Taliban administration grew increasingly diffuse in rural areas where 
peasants were generally left alone.  Harsh Taliban rule was felt most in the large cities 
and urban centers such as Kabul, Kandahar and Herat, where decadence (the product of 
modernity) was perceived to be more prevalent.  However, even in places like Herat and 
Mazir-i Sharif, (the latter which underwent intense military fighting until the Taliban 
finally won control in August 1998) Taliban rule was not as strict or pervasive as in the 
capital, or in the east and south, where the Pashtun ethnic majority is centered.136 
B. WAR MAKING 
The unification of Afghanistan remained the Taliban’s primary military and 
political objective.  While the Taliban did not take up arms directed at forces outside 
Afghanistan’s territory, they did capture significant quantities of arms during their 
military campaigns.137  By the end of 1997 they had a sizeable conventional military 
force, consisting of 23 fighter jets and 32 helicopters, as well as personnel strength of 
approximately 50,000.138  Despite these acquisitions, the Taliban’s favored means of 
armament remained Toyota pickup trucks mounted with Degtyarov-Shpagin (DShK) 
12.7mm Anti-Aircraft heavy machine guns and AK-47 Kalashnikov automatic rifles.  
Ideal for swift movement across rugged terrain, as well as negotiating the roads and 
alleyways within the larger towns and cities, these tools provided tactical utility in 
suppressing Afghanistan’s peasant population, but were insufficient to conduct any 
operation against an external threat. 
The Taliban’s initial success fueled regional concerns that the movement would 
‘spill’ over into the neighboring Central Asian Republics, prompting General Boris 
Gromov, the last Soviet commander in Afghanistan, to reassure the Russian Duma that 
“the Taliban do not have the strength to carry military operations over to the territory of 
                                                 
136 While the ethnic composition of the Taliban’s foot soldiers is rather ethnically diverse, the core 
leadership is predominantly from the Hotaki Ghilzai Pashtun tribe. See: Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris 
Mason.  “Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan.”  Orbis, 51, No. 1 (2007): 71-89. 
137 By April 1995, the Taliban had reportedly captured 200 tanks, 12 Fighter jets and helicopters.  See: 
Matinuddin, Taliban Phenomenon, 49. 
138 Matinuddin, Taliban Phenomenon, 55.  
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Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.”139  In fact, the threat of external intervention against the 
Taliban was more likely than the export of the Taliban’s ideological campaign to Central 
Asia.  Iran almost went to war with Afghanistan in the fall of 1998 after the Taliban 
killed nine Iranian diplomats and slaughtered thousands of Shi’a Hazaras during the 
capture of Mazar-i Sharif in August 1998.  Threatening invasion, Iran deployed 
approximately 200,000 soldiers to its Afghan border over the next two months while the 
UN appealed for restraint. The Taliban was reportedly only able to muster 30,000 
fighters.140  Only through direct negotiations between Lakhdar Brahimi, Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary General, and Mullah Omar was the situation diffused. 
C. STATE-MAKING 
Upon examination, the Taliban were remarkably more adept at state-making than 
their communist predecessors or the Tajik-dominated interim government that sat in 
Kabul between 1992 and 1996.  Whether aware of this strategy or not, the Taliban 
employed a two-tiered campaign to eliminate or neutralize their rivals.  The first strategy 
was the military campaign with the fervent mission of carrying out their fundamentalist 
agenda of uniting all of Afghanistan under their Islamist ideology.  The second was the 
archetypal Afghan strategy, to neutralize their rivals either through temporary alliances or 
through assimilation.  The administrative structure adopted by the Taliban was effective 
in carrying out both strategies. 
The proposition that the Taliban “lacked a state structure” during its initial rise 
and conquest of the countryside between 1994-1996 proves false.141  This assessment 
may be especially salient given the origins of rival groups, rooted in the establishment of 
Islamist and mujahedeen parties with well-established political mechanisms, a politico-
military hierarchy and well-developed organizational structures that allowed them to 
                                                 
139 Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid  (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 2002), 189. 
140 Rashid, Taliban, 231-232. 
141 Kamal Matinnudin suggests that the Taliban initially lacked “ministries, departments, bureaucratic 
machinery, and an organized army or police force.”  (See: Matinnudin, Taliban Phenomenon, 42).  This 
statement appears shortsighted given the two-year military campaign from the start of the movement in 
Kandahar to the conquest of Kabul.  Mullah Omar, the Military Shura and the Supreme Shura provided 
political, judicial and military direction while ministries existed in similar or greater capacity than during 
the preceding civil war. 
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operate in a degree of parallel governance to the central authority.  The fact that the 
Taliban did not originate as a political party may be inconsequential, as they rapidly 
emulated the structures of other systems and elevated the role of the ulema (Islamic 
scholars) in the political order.  Kamal Matinnudin suggests that mujahedeen training 
camps in Pakistan never closed after the Soviets departed, remaining open for training 
during the ensuing civil war between 1989-1994.  In addition to basic instruction in 
military tactics and the operation of battlefield equipment, the training camps would have 
maintained some degree of military organization that facilitated the means for political 
indoctrination and mobilization.  
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Figure 11.   Nominal Taliban Structure 1994-2001 
As Figure 11 depicts, the central government was embodied in Mullah Omar and 
decisions were ‘ratified’ and carried out through the administrative mechanisms of the 
Supreme and Military Shuras, whose senior-most leadership held positions in both 
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advisory councils and as the regimes first cabinet ministers.  The qadis, or judiciary, 
operated at all levels and took its direction directly from Mullah Omar. 
In theory, the Taliban operated as a theocratic oligarchy, but in reality, operated as 
an Islamist totalitarian autocracy.  As noted above, absolute authority was centralized in 
one charismatic leader, Mullah Omar.  The hierarchical state structure facilitated Omar’s 
personal direction of authority to the regional and local levels, bypassing the weaker and 
largely symbolic administrative cabal in Kabul.  The Taliban was able to expand state 
capacity to the local level through the patronage of Afghanistan’s traditional kin, tribe, 
ethnicity or regionally based solidarity groups or alternatively through ideological and 
military bribery and intimidation.  
Mullah Mohammad Omar was the Head of State and the military Commander in 
Chief, as well as the movement’s supreme spiritual leader.  His authority was absolute 
and his consultation with the supreme or national shura (council of Islamic scholars), 
who interpreted the shariat as the source of all law and governance, was purely 
advisory.142  The shura was composed of ulema chosen primarily for their theological or 
tribal affiliation with Mullah Omar, and replaced the jirga (tribal council) as the advisory 
body.143  After the capture of Kabul, the ministries administered by the Supreme Shura 
were centralized under the Kabul Shura in 1997 in an effort to re-create the 
administrative structure that had existed under President Daoud (r. 1973-1978).144  
Moreover, with the exception of the military shura, which directed the ongoing military 
operations of the Taliban movement, the ministries held by members of the Supreme and 
Kabul Shuras were largely hollow, with the exception of the ministries of Foreign Affairs 
and Justice.  
The capacity of the shura to govern gradually expanded as the Taliban seized 
more territory.  After 1997, the Kabul shura re-instituted bureaucrats and Kabulis who 
had not fled Afghanistan and extended its own administration directly to the regional 
level.  At its height, the Taliban controlled approximately 90 percent of Afghan territory. 
                                                 
142 Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 279. 
143 Many of the ulema had either close personal or kinship ties to Mullah Omar or had trained at 
madrassas in Kandahar or in Quetta, Pakistan.  See: Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending; Rashid, Taliban. 
144 Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 281. 
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(see Figure 12). By way of comparison, the Marxist regime in Kabul during the Soviet 
occupation (1979-1989) never controlled much more territory than a few hundred meters 
off the side of the road. 
 
Figure 12.   Taliban control of Afghanistan 1996 and 2000145 
Gilles Dorronsoro suggests that the Taliban extended its authority to the local 
level by “exploiting its alliances with local solidarity networks.” 146  While this strategy 
prevented political mobilization based on local ethnic identity, it must have also surely 
relied on foot soldiers of the same regional or ethno-linguistic identity.  Afghan society 
was so ethnically fragmented after the decade of anti-Soviet jihad and years of civil war 
that little other than common ethnic or regional affinity would have been able to bridge 
this divide.  The Taliban’s fundamentalist ideology, too extreme for even the likes of 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and other Islamists, could certainly not have been a uniting factor 
that bound Afghanistan’s historically conservative, Sufi-influenced peasantry to the 
government.  The Taliban thus exploited historical relations between ethnic groups, such 
as aligning with local Tajiks in Bamiyan, in the persecution of Shi’a Hazaras. 
D. PROTECTION 
While the Taliban did not have any clients per se, they gained international 
notoriety and classification as a pariah state by harboring Osama bin Laden, and allowing 
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146 Ibid., 270. 
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his Al Qaida terrorist training camps to operate in Afghanistan.  However, Taliban 
protection of bin Laden is most likely attributed to two factors.  The first is rooted in the 
Pashtun tribal code (Pashtunwali) and the second to bin Laden’s connection to Pakistan’s 
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate.147  
Upon arriving in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden first stayed with the Eastern 
Pashtun tribes near Jalalabad, outside Taliban-controlled territory, with whom he had 
established relations in the 1980s and 1990s.  Building upon these past relationships, bin 
Laden may also have appealed to, or played upon, Pashtun hospitality and honor for 
protection.  However, tribal leaders such as Younis Khalis and Haji Qadir, who had 
contact with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate, may have extended 
protection to bin Laden based on their own client relationship with ISI.148  The latter is 
directly implied by Steve Coll, who suggests that the Taliban later protected bin Laden 
because the Taliban themselves were in fact clients of Pakistan’s Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI) directorate.149  Finally, Taliban protection of Osama bin Laden was 
likely secured with his direct personal financial assistance.  After taking Jalalabad, bin 
Laden reportedly provided the Taliban approximately $3 million.  Used to bribe local 
commanders, the money helped secure the Taliban’s entry into Kabul.150 
While such monetary assistance may have waned as the U.S. moved to freeze bin 
Laden’s assets and the CIA covertly plotted his capture, Taliban intransigence in turning 
in bin Laden did not.  Even long after the August 1998 attacks on the U.S. Embassies in 
Tanzania and Kenya were attributed to bin Laden and his Al Qaida terrorist organization, 
the Taliban continued to provide him a permissive environment from which to operate.  
Such protection came at the cost of the international recognition that the Taliban 
desperately sought, and from a western point of view, a blurring of the lines between 
Taliban and Al Qaida leadership.  The fact that the Taliban did not give up Osama bin 
Laden, despite the potential international political gains to be had from it, speaks to the 
strength of the Pashtun tribal code. 
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E. EXTRACTION 
As previously stated, the Taliban’s major aim was the consolidation of all of 
Afghanistan under Islamic rule.  To this end, the extraction of state resources largely 
consisted of human capital.  There was no attempt to establish an economy or levy 
additional taxes.  Most of the Taliban’s money was likely derived from zakat, or religious 
charitable taxes (alms), from madrassas in Pakistan or Muslim sympathizers throughout 
the Muslim world.  It is also unknown how much Osama bin Laden financed Taliban 
operations, but any such monies were likely to have paled compared to those received 
through zakat or direct financial support from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.   
Taliban recruitment hit a snag soon after the capture of Kandahar in 1994 as the 
movement spread toward Herat and Kabul, encountering non-Pashtun structural 
organizations and ethnic groups.151  The Afghan civil war and collapse of the state 
following the anti-Soviet jihad “undermined the informal ethnic hierarchy” upon which 
group relations were organized.152  With Rabbani and Massoud’s Tajik government in 
Kabul, General Dostum’s Uzbeks in Mazar-i Sharif to the North, and Ismail Khan (a 
Tajik) in Herat in the West, the Pashtuns had “lost the leverage of the state.”153  Initial 
recruitment was therefore almost solely conducted from among the Pashtuns in the south 
as well as Pashtun minorities in the north.154  The movement was also initially heavily 
reliant on the students, or Taliban,155 from madrassas in neighboring Pakistan, and would 
call for an emptying of these madrassas whenever recruitment was low.  However, 
because the movement was founded on an Islamic fundamentalist ideology rather than 
Pashtun nationalist appeal, the Taliban’s ranks eventually grew to be more representative 
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movement itself therefore derives its name from the religious students from the Deobandi and Wahhabi 
madrassas in Pakistan that initially swelled the movements’ ranks as foot soldiers.  
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of Afghanistan’s ethnic composition, a significant achievement given the ‘social 
fragmentation’ that occurred during the preceding decade.156 
F. RESISTANCE 
The factions that fought in opposition to the Taliban’s fundamentalist rule were 
largely the same major mujahedeen leaders and groups that emerged in opposition to the 
communist regime and Soviet occupation presented in the previous chapter, with two 
notable additions: former communist party and military officials, and a small and largely 
quietist group of royalist who were predominantly represented by expatriates living 
outside of Afghanistan.  
Before analyzing these two groups, it is interesting to note that the commanders of 
the seven major mujahedeen parties, many of whom had held prominent roles in the 
Interim Islamic Government of Afghanistan following the fall of Najibullah in 1992 and 
the rise of the Taliban in 1996, were, like the Taliban, Islamists.   Each of these Sunni 
Islamist groups (the first seven presented in Table 5) should have theoretically supported 
the overarching ideological goal and achievement of the Taliban’s Islamist regime: the 
implementation of the shari’a.  Yet, despite this shared ambition, the Taliban’s 
fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, equated with the uncompromising public 
observation of radical Deobandism, proved too harsh and radical compared to the 








                                                 
156 Although the Taliban’s core leadership still remained almost exclusively from the Hotaki Ghilzai 
Pashtun tribe. (See: Johnson and Mason, Understanding the Taliban).  However, debate remains within the 
academic community about the extent of Pashtun composition of the Taliban.  For an argument why the 
Taliban was not a Pashtun solidarity movement, see: Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 267. 
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Name Leader Ideology Qawm 
Jamiat-i Islami* Burhanuddin Rabbani Islamist (Radical); 
Anti-Taliban 
Tajiks; Northeast, Panjshir 
valley 
Hizb-i Ilsami (Gulbaddin) Gulbuddin Hekmatyar Islamist (Radical) Ghilzai Pashtuns; Eastern 
Provinces 
Hizb-i Ilsami (Khalis) Maulvi Younis Khalis Islamist (Radical) Ghilzai Pashtuns; Kandahar 
Harakat Inquilabi-Islami Maulana Mohhamed Nabi 
Mihammedi 
Islamist (Moderate) Ghilzai Pashtun; Kandahar 
Jahbha-i Najat Milli Sibghatullah Mujaddedi Islamist (Moderate)  Nagshbandiyah Sufi Order; 
Pashtun royalists 
Mahaz-i Milli Islami Pir Sayed Amhad Gailani Islamist (Moderate) Qaderiyah Sufi Order; 
Pashtun royalists 
Itthad-i Islami bara-yi Azadi* Abd al-Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf Islamist (Wahhabi 
fundamentalist) 
Pashtun; foreign Arab 
fighters 
Ismaili’s Religious: Karim Al Husseini, Āgā  
    Khān IV 
Militia: Sayyid Mansor 
Regional Warlord: Ismail Khan  
     (member of Jamiat-i Islami) 
Shi’a (Islmaili) Ismaili Shi’a; Northeast, 
Herat & Pakistan NWFP; 
Tajiks; Pashtuns; Heratis 
Hisb-i Wahdat* Abdul Ali Mazari / Kariim Khalili Shi’a (Iranian proxy); 
Anti-Taliban 
Hazara Shi’a 
Harakat-i Islami-yi* Ayatollah Muhammad Asif Muhsini Shi’a; Anti-Taliban Non-Hazara Shi’a 
Jumbishi-i-Milli Islami* General Rashid Dostum Anti-Taliban Uzbeks; former 
communists 
Royalists - Anti-Taliban; restore 
monarchy 
Durrani Pashtuns; ethnic 
minorities; expatriates 
Jabha-yi Muttahid-i Islami-yi 
Milli bara-yi Nijat-i 
Afghanistan (United Front) 
Burhanuddin Rabbani Anti-Taliban Umbrella group bridging 5 
mujahedeen parties 
* denotes members of the United Islamic Front, also known as the Northern Alliance. 
 
Table 5.   Ideology and Basis of Solidarity of Resistance Groups during Taliban Rule157 
The fact was that by 1994, the Islamist groups that had originally formed and split 
on matters of operational and ideological principles, had largely become monolithic 
armies organized on the basis of ethnic, regional and tribal solidarity of which the qawm 
represents the primary basis of group identification, social interaction and mobilization.  
Ethno-linguistic and regional distinctions increasingly defined and replaced ideology as 
the source of group solidarity.  Like the Taliban, Islamist ideology was not a primary 
factor for solidarity for all but the group’s core leadership or the Sufi orders that were 
more moderate in their views.  In general, Islamists parties were ideologically split over 
the role of the ulema in governing society and over the degree to which tribal social or 
modern governing institutions were adopted.  Taliban leader Mullah Omar himself was 
originally a member of Hisb-i Islami Khalis during the anti-Soviet jihad, although he did 
not occupy a prominent position within the party.  As noted in the previous chapter, even 
                                                 
157 After Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 192-193. 
 75
the communist factions split mainly along ethnic and tribal lines, with the largest group 
emerging among the northern Uzbek’s loyal to General Rashid Dostum. 
General Dostum entered the Soviet-stylized Afghan National Army in 1978 and 
fought alongside the Soviets against the mujahedeen during the decade-long military 
occupation.  Although only a regional commander during the war, his predominantly 
Uzbek Jowjani militia was extremely loyal, and effectively employed by the Soviets in 
Kandahar in 1988.  Dostum continued to support the Najibullah regime and fight against 
the mujahedeen long after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989.  Between 1989 and 1992 
General Dostum had largely consolidated control of all of northern Afghanistan under his 
own regional command.  However, Dostum dispensed with any former loyalties he may 
have had for Najibullah following the latter’s resignation on 16 April 1992.  Only two 
days later, the former communist General turned allegiances and aligned with 
Burhanuddin Rabbani’s Jamiat-I Islami and his chief military commander, Ahmad Shah 
Massoud.  Dostum switched sides again, aligning with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in 1994 
before realigning with Rabbani and Massoud in 1996.  Although General Dostum played 
a prominent role in opening a vital western front against the Taliban as part of the United 
Front (Jabha-yi Muttahid-i Islami-yi Milli bara-yi Nijat-i) against the Taliban in 2001, he 
spent much of the intervening years in Turkey, following the fall of Mazar-e Sharif to the 
Taliban in 1996 and the betrayal of one of his commanders in 1997. 
Created in 1996, the United Islamic Front (UIF), or Jabha-yi Muttahid-i Islami-yi 
Milli bara-yi Nijat-i, (also known as The Northern Alliance) represented the political-
military consolidation of four former mujahedeen groups with Dostum’s Jumbishi-i-Milli 
Islami (National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan).  Politically presided over by 
Rabbani, Ahmad Shah Massoud was the alliance’s Minister of Defense, personally 
commanding almost one quarter of the UIF’s 40,000-strong army.   Other prominent 
military commanders included the aforementioned General Dostum, but also General 
Mohammed Fahim and Ismail Khan.   
Although reduced to controlling probably no more than ten percent of the country 
(Figure 12), the UIF continued to receive arms, funding and logistical support from 
Russia, Iran, India and the bordering Central Asian States.  In addition, although there 
 76
were other Ghilzai Pashtun groups, such as Hizb-i Ilsami (Gulbaddin) and Hizb-i Ilsami 
(Khalis), who fought the Taliban, the United Front was largely a coalition representative 
of Afghanistan’s ethnic and religious minorities, giving political and military teeth to the 
nation’s Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, Turkmen and Shi’a populations.  This last point is 
especially salient, given Afghanistan’s Pashtun-centric history.  After years of neglect by 
the United States following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, it was the Northern 
Alliance who facilitated the U.S. routing of the Taliban regime, and a cadre of prominent 
UIF leaders who took lead in shaping the direction, structure and Ministerial posts in the 
Interim Authority established as the post-Taliban government in December 2001. 
G. SUMMARY 
As summarized in Table 6, the Taliban achieved a relatively high degree of state 
capacity during their brief reign.   
 
State Activity Structure Capacity Grading Criteria 
War making + - 
State-making + + 
Protection + + 
Extraction + - 
(+)  Structure present 
(-)   Structures absent 
(+)  Some capacity 
(-)   No capacity 
Table 6.   State Capacity Under Taliban Rule 
Three major factors contributed to this success.  The first was their internal 
military campaign, the second was the forced public observation of their fundamentalist 
decrees, and the third was their use of existing local, primarily Pashtun, socio-political 
structures and identities as a means of control. 
Although the Taliban built a marginal conventional military capability, they were 
none-the-less militarily inferior to the armies of its regional neighbors, especially Iran 
and Pakistan.  Thus, the Taliban amassed no real capacity to wage war beyond its 
external borders.  However, the military capability and organization it employed were 
adequate to the task of internal pacification and civil warfare required of state-making.   
Military resources were directed toward the expansion of territory and consolidation of 
power.  While the Taliban’s initial military thrusts were relatively small compared to the 
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scale of warfare conducted against the Soviets and during the subsequent civil war, the 
Taliban eventually achieved relative parity in military hardware, organization and tactics 
as their opposition, employing fighter aircraft and artillery against major targets of 
resistance such as urban centers in the north. 
The enforced public observation of their dogmatic radical interpretation of Islam 
is what first brought international attention and condemnation.  Despite imposing what 
they viewed as Allah’s will, their swift, harsh and near universal enforcement of Mullah 
Omar’s decrees aided in the creation of a totalitarian theocracy that facilitated state 
control and authority through the prevention of any potential resistance in areas under 
their direct control. 
Thirdly, as a mostly Pashtun phenomenon,158 the Taliban’s use of existing local 
socio-political structures and identities allowed them to establish legitimacy based on 
tribal solidarity and religious piety.  As the mullah’s had risen in political importance 
since the Soviet era (prior to which the mullah was apolitical in traditional tribal political 
hierarchy), they now occupied the top rung on the Pashtun socio-political ladder.  This 
position allowed them to spread, convey and enforce their strict Islamist interpretation 
through tribal, ethnic and regional solidarity networks rather than through Islam alone.  
This not only reinforced the basis of traditional Afghan solidarity groups, but also 
resulted in the alienation of non-Pashtun and Shi’a minorities, even other Islamist, based 
on group identification alone.  That the Taliban often upheld Pashtun tribal customary 
laws that were antithetical to their fundamentalist views is testament to the paramount 
importance of the qawm as the fundamental source of Afghan solidarity and 
mobilization.  It would appear that Islam alone is not as sufficient a mobilizing factor 
against an internal threat as an external threat viewed as an attack on Islam.  Although a 
more simple explanation might be that the Taliban’s strict fundamentalist interpretation 
of Islam was too hostile for the majority conservative Muslim population. 
That the Taliban provided a great deal of protection toward their Al Qaeda guests, 
especially after U.S. demands for bin Laden’s surrender, speaks to the strength of the 
                                                 
158 Again reference Johnson and Mason, Understanding the Taliban, for an account of the Taliban’s 
predominant Ghilzai Pashtun composition. 
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Pashtun tribal code, Pashtunwali,.159  Yet, the ethnic solidarity of the Taliban perpetuated 
anti-Taliban antagonism, making the regime more insular and less representative.  The 
protection of internal patrons such as Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda were the ultimate 
cause of the regime’s downfall. 
With the exception of opening and securing the major roads and routes to 
facilitate the lucrative smuggling trade, the Taliban did little else to develop the economy 
and extract resources.  They even banned poppy cultivation, paralyzing Afghanistan’s 
illicit drug trade.  The resurgence of the drug trade after the fall of the Taliban has 
resulted in a drug trade worth several billion dollars and in 2006 was estimated to 
produce over 90 percent of the world’s opium.160  The fact that the Taliban did not 
capitalize on this potentially lucrative trade speaks to their ideological rather than 
political motivation and the volume of money that must have been available from other 
sources. 
                                                 
159 See for example Raja G. Hussein, Badal: A Culture of Revenge: The Impact of Collateral Damage 
on Taliban Insurgency  (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 7.  A more comprehensive 
analysis of Pashtunwali is presented in Groh, Ungoverned Spaces.  The author advances Pashtunwali as a 
normative structure in which the Pashtuns historically resist state authority. 
160 United Nations Development Program Center for Policy and Human Development, Kabul 
University.  Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007.  (Islamabad: Army Press, 2007), 29. On the 
web:  http://www.undp.org.af/Publications/KeyDocuments/nhdr07_complete.pdf (accessed 15 May 2008).  
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VI. CASE 4: THE DEMOCRATIC ISLAMIC REPUBLIC: 2001-
PRESENT 
A. BACKGROUND 
The history of the current regime is unavoidably the direct continuation of events 
from the preceding chapter.  Of the other regimes examined so far, there was a period of 
instability and chaos that preceded that regimes’ rise to power.  The period prior to Abdur 
Rahman and the Taliban was marked by an absence of central authority, while the 
Communist Party’s coup replaced a weak central government already in decline.  Yet, 
prior to the events of September 11, 2001, no analyst could have foreseen such a swift 
end to Taliban rule or the establishment of a more representative central government in 
Kabul, dominated by ethnic minorities from the Northern Alliance. 
Less than two months after the U.S.-led invasion that toppled the Taliban regime, 
the Bonn Agreement established a new interim Afghan government and provided the 
mechanism toward the adoption of  a new constitution and presidential elections in 2004, 
and parliamentary elections in 2005.  While there is great debate about the Bonn 




                                                 
161 Literature relevant to the discourse on state-building in Afghanistan and the Bonn-Agreement is 
roughly divisible into one of three categories: those that champion the success of the Bonn-Agreement, 
those that highlight the shortcomings of the Bonn Agreement, and those that focus on other state-building 
issues, such as judicial or security sector reform, not addressed to their satisfaction by the Bonn-
Agreement. Of the first group, most cite the establishment of the Transitional Afghan Government, 
Constitutional Loya Jirga, and 2005 parliamentary elections as the sole criteria for the Agreement’s 
success, while ignoring many of its shortcomings.  The Agreement’s critics cite its hasty  and exclusionary 
process, unrealistic timelines, and failure to develop and prioritize more sweeping and specific state-
building institutions and reforms.  Others still point to Bonn as the failure to establish a peace settlement 
with the Taliban and highlight the dichotomy between the UN’s grand state-building vision and its ‘light 
footprint’ approach.  See for example: Sven Gunnar Simonsen, “Ethicizing Afghanistan? Inclusion and 
Exclusion in Post-Bonn Institution Building,”  Third World Quarterly, 25, No. 4 (2004): 707-729; Thomas 
H. Johnson, “Afghanistan’s Post-Taliban Transition: the State of State-building After War,”  Central Asian 
Survey, 25, No.1-2 (2006), 1-26; Rubin, Peace Building and State-Building, 175-185; Fatima Ayub and 
Sari Kouvo, “Righting the Course? Humanitarian Intervention, the War on Terror and the Future of 
Afghanistan,”  International Affairs, 84, No. 4 (2008): 649-650; Simon Chesterman.  “Walking Softly in 
Afghanistan: the Future of UN State-Building,”  Survival, 44, No. 3 (2002): 37-46. 
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chapter is primarily based an analysis of the Karzai government and resistance groups 
since 2005.  The main reason for this is first and foremost to remain relevant to the 
current situation on the ground.  
Although the beginnings of the insurgency can be traced back to 2003, the scale 
and momentum of the insurgency were not as readily identified or acknowledged as 
during the radical upswing in violence, especially suicide bombings, noted in 2005-
2006.162  Moreover, having held presidential, parliamentary and provincial elections by 
2005,163 the structure and institutions, if not the personalities, have generally remained 
constant after 2006. 
B. WAR MAKING 
Rebuilding the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) 
has been a top priority of the international post-conflict reconstruction and state-building 
effort. Although the Taliban controlled much of the ANA’s former armaments, including 
MiG-21 fighter aircraft and tanks, the vast majority of such equipment was obsolete, 
having been acquired from the Former Soviet Union in the 1960’s and 1970’s.  Following 
decades of strife, the former Soviet-oriented ANA has long since been decimated by 
factional and ethnic civil warfare.  Therefore, the current task of rebuilding Afghanistan’s 
army and police force has necessarily been a bottom-up approach, cobbling together a 
‘modern’ infantry force composed of former Islamist mujahedeen, Soviet-era 
professional soldiers, Taliban and tribal militia; the latter provided the majority and the 
former three groups provided the leadership. 
According to the Office of President, the role of the ANA is primarily to secure 
Afghanistan’s borders and to deter external threats.164  As the threat or likelihood of 
interstate war between Afghanistan and any of its regional neighbors such as Iran or 
                                                 
162 Thomas H. Johnson provides a thorough analysis of the “exponential increase” in the use of 
suicide bombings and scale of the Afghan insurgency since 2005 in “On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The 
Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 5, No. 2 (2007): 97-99. 
163 District-level elections have yet to be held. 
164 “Five-Year Strategic Benchmarks Program 1: National Defense.”  (Kabul: Office of the President, 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan).  On the web: http://www.president.gov.af/english/np/security.mspx# 
NatDef.  (accessed 12 November 2008).  Despite this appointed role, the historic task of fighting external 
armed forces along Afghanistan’s periphery has historically befallen local tribal armies (lashkar).   
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Pakistan is highly unlikely, the task of building, training and equipping Afghanistan’s 
Army has necessarily been concerned with the historic imperative of internal state-
making.  Thus the three remaining stated roles of the ANA to (2) defeat terrorists, (3) 
disband, reintegrate, or imprison Illegal Armed Groups, and (4) manage internal security 
threats with the assistance of the Afghan National Police (ANP), are historically 
analogous to the task of internal subjugation and pacification conducted required since 
the reign of Abdur Rahman (r. 1880-1901).   
Given these tasks, short-term (1-2 years) and longer-term (5-10 years) GoA 
Ministry of Defense strategies are likely to continue to pursue a force structure capable of 
conducting internal pacification and providing stability vice fielding any credible force 
aimed at deterring regional aggression.165  In the short-term, ANA capabilities are 
structured to counter internal threats and extend the reach of the central government, 
while priorities for the Air Corps are to provide Presidential and military airlift.166  
American and coalition forces expect to have trained approximately 86,000 Afghan 
soldiers by the end of 2008 as the ANA takes an increasing operational leadership.167  
However, despite its presence in most provinces and the success of joint ANA and ANP 
operations such as Operation Maiwand,168 many officials, including NATO/ISAF 
commander General McNeill, suggest that the ANA will not reach sufficient capability to 
allow a drawdown of coalition forces until around 2011.169 
                                                 
165 Cheryl Benard et. al., eds, Afghanistan: State and Society, Great Power Politics, and the Way 
Ahead: Findings from an International Conference, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2007  (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Center for Middle East Public Policy, 2008). 
166 Draft Defense Strategy for the Afghanistan National Development Strategy  (Kabul, Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan: Ministry of National Defense, 2007), 1. 
167 Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [RL30588] 
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 15 October 2008), 34. 
168 Operation Maiwand was the first major operation planned and led by Afghan National Security 
Forces (ANA and ANP).  The Operation’s objective was to separate and remove Taliban insurgents from 
the local populace and re-establish local governance through massive humanitarian aid and reconstruction 
projects.  The Operation resulted in the opening of ten schools, the delivery of 260 tons of humanitarian aid 
and the re-establishment of local governance and shuras.  Operation Maiwand is illustrative of the success 
of a combined security, government and humanitarian operation.  See: “Afghan-led Operation Maiwand 
Model for Future.”  International Security Assistance Force, Press Release 2007-471, 25 June 2007.  On 
the web: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2007/06-june/pr070625-471.html (accessed 12 
November 2008), and George B. Graff., Lt. Col., USA.  “Operation Maiwand – The ANA 203rd Effects 
Cell is Born,” Fires, (2008), 38-39.  On the web: http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/2008/jan_feb_ 
2008/ Jan_Feb_2008_pages_38_39.pdf (accessed 22 December 2008). 
169 Katzman, Post-War Governance [RL30588], 34-35. 
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C. STATE-MAKING 
State-making is the central critical challenge that lies before the GoA and the 
international community.  Above all other state activities throughout Afghan history, no 
other has proven more crucial and more difficult than the task of extending the writ of 
government and the rule of law throughout Afghanistan. Many suggest that President 
Hamid Karzai is not up to the task and cite weak leadership as the “common denominator 
in the repetitive failures of governance,” in Afghanistan.170  Although many non-Pashtun 
challengers wait in the wings for a potential presidential bid in 2009, there currently 
appears to be no viable Pashtun alternative to Karzai.171  Even during the initial days of 
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in October 2001 many Northern Alliance172 
leaders, such as Dr. Abdullah Abdullah173 confided that a Pashtun was not only required 
to lead Afghanistan, but that Karzai was the logical choice.174 
Most of the criticism from external parties directed at Karzai and his government 
cite his inability or unwillingness to stand up to strong regional and ethnic interest groups 
and root out corruption.175  The majority of political and military leaders that dominate 
current Afghan politics are the same personalities that dominated both sides of the 
mujahedeen jihad against the Soviets and from all factional participants in the Afghan 
                                                 
170 Charles Norchi, “From Real Estate to Nation-State: Who Will Lead Afghanistan.”  Dissent, 53, 
Issue 1 (2006), 24. 
171 Another prominent Pashtun leader, Abdul Haq, was initially supported by the United States as a 
likely post-Taliban Afghan leader.  The murder of Haq’s family in 1999 by Taliban agents helped foment 
Pashtun opposition to the Taliban and solidified Haq’s position as a staunch anti-Taliban leader.  Abdul 
Haq was one of two prominent Pashtun leaders (Hamid Karzai was the other) who led Pashtun resistance to 
the Taliban.  Abdul Haq was executed by the Taliban on 26 October 2001 following his capture in the early 
stages of OEF.  See: Seth Jones.  “How to Save Karzai.”  Foreign Policy, online.  On the web: http://www. 
foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?storyid=4392 (accessed 21 July 2008); and, Coll. Ghost Wars, 459, 534, 
557-558. 
172 The official name of the Northern Alliance is the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of 
Afghanistan.   
173 Dr. Abdullah is an ethnic Tajik and Pashtun who served as Foreign Minister of the Northern 
Alliance during its brief rein over the Islamic State of Afghanistan in 1993.  Dr. Abdullah continued to 
serve in opposition to the Taliban as the Northern Alliance’s “Foreign Minister in exile” under the 
leadership of Burhanuddin Rabbani and General Ahmed Shah Masud.  After Masud’s assassination on 9 
October 2001, Dr. Abdullah became one of three prominent leaders of the Northern Alliance, (the other two 
are General Mohammad Qasim Fahim and Dr. Younis Qanooni), representing the group at the historic 
Bonn Conference in November 2001.  See: “Profile: Abdullah Abdullah.”  BBC News, 22 March 2006.  On 
the web: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1672882.stm (accessed 19 August 2008). 
174 James F. Dobbins, After the Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan  (Washington, D.C.: Potomac 
Books, 2008), 4.   
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civil war prior to the rise of the Taliban.176  The only group conspicuously absent from 
the current political spectrum are prominent Ghilzai Pashtuns, who compose the core 
Taliban and insurgent leaders, including Mullah Omar and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar of 
Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), one of the main armed insurgent and terrorist groups 
opposed to the current Afghan regime. 
It is generally agreed that President Karzai needs to do more to marginalize and 
eliminate regional factionalism and warlordism, weed out corruption within the 
government, particularly as it pertains to the country’s illicit drug trade, and bridge the 
historic dichotomy between Kabul and Afghanistan’s tribal periphery.177  The task is not 
easy, especially because the beneficiaries of decentralized war economies, such as those 
who trade in narcotics or levy tolls, have historically resisted the state’s central authority 
and mobilization of resources.178  This has left Christopher Cramer and Jonathan 
Goodhand to hypothesize that only the central government can acquire the legitimacy and 
authority required to, “break up violent primitive accumulation…and bring about 
structural transformation.”179  However, while most Western approaches view such 
“structural transformation” as the technical task of extending Kabul’s reach outward and 
downward, the approach of the GoA has been much more in keeping with prominent 
Afghan and Islamic scholar Olivier Roy’s requirement to “root democracy into the local 
political culture.”180 
                                                 
175 See: Seth Jones, How to Save Karzai. 
176 Such as Uzbek warlord and former Communist-era General, Rashid Dostum and numerous 
Northern Alliance notables including Ismail Khan and the aforementioned Burhanuddin Rabbani, Younis 
Qanooni, General Fahim and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah.   
177 See: Seth Jones, How to Save Karzai; Simon Chesterman, Walking Softly, 38.   For a concise 
examination of the historical conditions favoring warlordism and the role of warlordism in Afghanistan, 
see: Kimberly Marten. “Warlordism in Comparative Perspective.” International Security, 31, No. 3 (Winter 
2006/07), 41–73.  Her conclusion that warlords displaced traditional clan and tribal structures to become 
de-facto governors is particularly salient to arguments supporting the ouster of regional warlord such as 
General Rashid Dostum and Ismail Khan in effort to rebuild local and district-level governance. 
178 Cramer and Goodhand, Try Again, Fail Again, 889. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Prominent Afghan and Islamic scholar Olivier Roy as quoted in Norchi, Real Estate to Nation-
State, 26.   
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Figure 13.   Government Structure of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
Although the overall structural appearance of the current Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan bares spatial and institutional similarity to the government structure of the 
monarchy, several key distinctions must be made. (See Figure 1).  First and foremost is 
the separation of the executive, judicial and legislative branches of government.  Judicial 
and legislative independence from executive direction is a cornerstone of Afghanistan’s 
democratic process.  While members of the Supreme Court, Provincial Governors and 
one-third of the Meshrano Jirga (Upper House) are Presidential appointees, formal 
opposition blocs within the government have placed increasing pressure on the executive 
to represent popular opinion and force reform. 
Of the 29 Interim Administration ministries originally created during the Bonn 
process in 2001, 25 remain in the present government. Gone are the Ministries of Small 
Industries, Planning, Irrigation and Air transport and Tourism.  Separate Labor and Social 
Affairs, and Martyrs and Disabled Ministries are now combined in one monolithic 
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Ministry.  Most of the ministries closely resemble those created under the monarchy and 
replicated by the Communist and Islamist governments.   
The Ministries of National Defense, Justice, Interior, Foreign Affairs and Finance 
remain the most prominent cabinet positions, controlling the majority of the central 
government’s traditional sources of power, prestige, wealth and legitimacy: the Army, the 
courts, the police, foreign influence and revenue. 
Government, security sector and judicial reforms lie at the root of the Karzai 
regime’s post-conflict reconstruction and state-making effort, aimed at restoring the basic 
security and rule of law that have been markedly absent for over 30 years.  
1. Government Reform 
The task of government reform has necessarily been an uphill battle considering 
the monumental mandate laid out at Bonn in December 2001.  Given the historical 
animosity between the various factions represented at the Bonn negotiations, the 
timelines for the creation of a constitution and national presidential and parliamentary 
elections seemed unachievable. Although district-level elections have yet to be held, the 
signing of a modern constitution and transition to a more representative elected 
government have been generally heralded as a success.  However, the task of eliminating 
corruption and cronyism, of creating a institutional capacity, and of restoring confidence 
in government to rural Afghanistan is an even more historically relevant endeavor. 
In 2002, the Interim Authority agreed to meet with international donors on an 
annual basis to coordinate and prioritize developmental objectives.  These Afghanistan 
Development Forums (ADFs), as they became known, have been instrumental in 
imparting international technical competency toward the achievement of GoA national 
development goals.  In 2006, the newly elected Cabinets began work on their own 
respective developmental strategies to compliment the overarching Afghan National 
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Development Strategy (ANDS)181 presented in January 2006 at the London Conference 
of donors by President Karzai. The ANDS goals were adopted and incorporated into the 
Afghanistan Compact.182  A final version of the ANDS was finalized and approved by 
the GoA in April-May 2008 and implementation begun in July 2008.  The ANDS is 
significant for two reasons.  First, it explicitly outlines Afghanistan’s development goals 
and priorities.  Second, it represents a centralized plan and framework for the efficient 
cooperation and coordination between government agencies, international donors and 
non-governmental agencies.183  Monumental in scope, the ANDS (in addition to the 300-
page core document) spans 22 Sector Strategies, 37 Annexes and 35 Provincial 
Development Plans (Kabul province has both an Urban and a Rural Development 
Plan).184 
Although each Sector Strategy details how the government intends to realize its 
development goals, the Provincial Development Plans (PDPs) are really the key 
components of the ANDS.  The PDPs represent the first step in Kabul’s attempt to extend 
the presence of government to Afghanistan’s periphery.  More importantly, the PDPs 
prioritize development goals specifically suited for that province, tailoring developmental 
assistance and reform to the needs of the province, not donor interests.  Another 
document provided as an annex to the ANDS goes even further. 
The Strategy Paper On Launching Of The Independent Directorate For Local 
Governance (IDLG),  reads like a confession of all the government’s inadequacies and 
                                                 
181 The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) began as an initiative of the Office of 
President Karzai as a means of formulating and integrating Government of Afghanistan development goals 
with the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals over a five-year period.  See: Saurabh Naithani. 
ACBAR’S Guide to the ANDS: A Comprehensive Guide to the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. 
(Kabul: Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief, 2007), 3, 5.  On the web: http://www.ands.gov.af 
/ands/ands_guide/ ands_guide/The%20Ands%20Guide%20Eng.pdf (accessed 19 August 2008). 
182 The Afghanistan Compact, co-chaired by the Government of Afghanistan, the United Kingdom 
and the United Nations, provided a forum for international donors to both pledge financial support as well 
as establish priorities and benchmarks for Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development.  Held in London 
between 31 January and 1 February 2006, the Compact was attended by 51 countries, ten organizations 
(including the IMF, European Union, NATO and the UN.  Thirteen observing countries and one observing 
organization (the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) also attended.  See: “The 
Afghanistan Compact.”  The London Conference on Afghanistan: London, England, 31 January – 1 
February 2006.  On the web: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/afghanistan_ compact.pdf. (accessed 
November 11, 2008). 
183 Naithani, ACBAR's Guide, 3. 
184 Afghan National Development Strategy Documents.  On the web: http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/ 
ands_docs/index.asp (accessed 19 August 2008). 
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past transgressions, acknowledging its failure as the “biggest source of corruption and 
insecurity in major parts of the country.”185  Elsewhere, the document cites that the “lack 
of coordination between… ministries as well as PRTs’ independent activity on the 
ground has prevented the government from being efficient in provision of services to the 
people,” allowing “anti government forces” to fill the political vacuum.186  The self-
deprecation continues, citing “poor governance capacity” as the root cause for inadequate 
resources, failure to offer alternatives to poppy agriculture and the overall decrease in the 
security environment.187  Finally, the paper lays out its plan of action, calling for the 
following sub-national (Provincial, District, Municipal and Village) developmental and 
capacity-building goals to be realized:  
By 20 March 2010: 
• Laws to create District Councils, Municipal Councils and Village Councils, 
and to establish their powers, responsibilities and fiscal resources. 
• Laws to clarify the rules, procedures, functions, relationships and resources of 
sub-national governments. 
• Formulate and implement sub-national government policy. 
• Mayoral and District, Municipal and Village Council elections (subsequently 
to be held every three years).  
By the end 2010: 
• An affirmative action law reserving a percentage of sub-national government 
seats for women.  
By 20 March 2011: 
• Ensure representation and participation in sub-national governance. 
• Build sub-national administrative capabilities to manage basic services. 
• Provide a means for youth participation in government. 
• Create Provincial Plans and Budgets tied to national plans and budgets 
 
                                                 
185 Strategy Paper On Launching Of The Independent Directorate For Local Governance (IDLG).  
(Kabul: Independent Directorate for Local Governance, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2008), 1.  On the 




By the end 2013: 
• Municipal governments will have developed the capacity to manage their own 
development and deliver services.188 
Another GoA initiative that has already been implemented and that has shown a 
relative degree of success is the National Solidarity Program (NSP).  Created in 2003 by 
the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development in cooperation with the World 
Bank, the NSP has established local governance in over 20,000 villages in all 34 
provinces, providing a vital and previously absent link between local and district 
governance, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and Kabul.189  A bold, resourceful 
and seemingly successful initiative of the GoA, the NSP has received only a meager $315 
million (USD) commitment from the international community. Yet, without U.S., UN or 
other substantial sources of international donor aid and interference, the NSP and other 
national programs have been cited as exemplary initiatives that should be replicated 
elsewhere.190   
While it is opined that such national programs should be combined with other 
developmental initiatives such as healthcare and education,191 it is imperative to 
coordinate these programs with the provision of security, restoration of justice, and 
national reconciliation programs. In order to create a stable environment for these 
programs to take hold without fear of competition for resources or sabotage in areas 
where hostilities have not ceased, these initiatives need to stop being implemented in 
isolation and start being coordinated as part of a national strategy for state-building. (See 
Appendix 1 for NSP Coverage as of March 2008).  This initiative is crucial, because  
 
 
                                                 
188 Strategy Paper On Launching Of The Independent Directorate For Local Governance, 4-7. 
189 See: National Solidarity Programme.  Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan.  On the web: http://www.nspafghanistan.org/ (accessed 19 August 2008).  See 
also:  The World Bank.  Afghanistan National Solidarity Program.  On the web: http://web.worldbank.org/ 
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21166174~pagePK:146736~piP
K:146830~theSitePK:223547,00.html (accessed 19 February 2009). 
190 Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured 
World  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 202-220. 
191 Ibid., 202. 
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district and local levels of governance encompass the core unit of Afghan tribal and clan-
based identity, the woleswali, and comprise the basis of Afghan political solidarity and 
mobilization.192   
2. Security Sector Reform  
Although Security Sector Reform (SSR) receives the overwhelming 
preponderance of international assistance, accounting for 70 percent of U.S. spending in 
Afghanistan193 between 2002-2008 and over 60 percent of the current 2008 budget,194 it 
is apparent that the current approach to security is not working, or at least working too 
slowly.195  Of an authorized end-strength of 82,000 national police, approximately 
80,000 have already been trained and assigned.196  Subordinate to the Ministry of the 
Interior, the ANP are intended to extend the rule of law and maintain a permanent 
security and government presence at the district level.  In addition to ‘routine’ policing 
duties, the ANP have occasionally supplemented ANA operations and are the primary 
agency responsible for border security and counter-narcotics.   
Of the ANP total force, approximately 22 percent (18,000) are assigned as border 
police and another five percent (3,800) are tasked with counter-narcotics operations. 
Although considered less professional and more corrupt than the ANA, the ANP are 
nevertheless a core component of the government’s SSR strategy.  Because of its control 
of the police, responsibility for securing the borders and combating Afghanistan’s $3.4 
                                                 
192 Johnson and Mason, All Counterinsurgency is Local, 36. 
193 Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight  
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional 
Committees, May 2007).  GAO-07-801SP.  On the web: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07801sp.pdf 
(accessed 19 February 2009). 
194 Mid Term Budget Framework - English.  (Kabul: General Budget Directorate, Ministry of Finance, 
Government of Afghanistan, 13 May 2008).  On the web: http://www.budgetmof.gov.af/units/ 
Budget_Policy_Coord_Reporting/Prioritization/English/MTBF_English_May_13th.xls (accessed 19 
August 2008). 
195 See: William Maley.  “Stabilizing Afghanistan: Threats and Challenges.”  Policy Brief No. 68:  
Foreign Policy for the Next President.  (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
2008), 5.  On the web: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/stabilizing_afghanistan.pdf (accessed 19 
February 2009).  Maley is referring to the “inkspot” security strategy applied in Afghanistan, whereby 
coalition forces secure a regional center such as a city or town before working outward from that point.  As 
most of Afghanistan’s rural population lives in small villages outside larger centers, the current approach 
has yet to reach the lives of most Afghans. 
196 Katzman. Post-War Governance [RL30588], 40. 
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billion-a-year illicit drug trade, the Interior Minister is viewed as one of the government’s 
most important cabinet appointments and has been the target of many reforms.  Yielding 
to external U.S. pressure, President Karzai recently reshuffled his cabinet, appointing 
Muhammad Hanif Atmar, former Education Minister and one-time member of the 
Soviet-era KhAD (secret police) to the position of Interior Minister in October 2008.197  
This move follows an attempt to curb corruption amongst the police force by raising 
salaries from $70 to $100 in mid-2007.198  Although the most visible, the ANA and ANP 
are not the only aspects of SSR.  Rehabilitation programs, legal codes and Afghanistan’s 
prison system are also in need of substantial reform and have largely been subordinated 
under the task of judicial reform. 
3. Judicial Reform 
The establishment of an independent judiciary consisting of a Supreme Court and 
a legal code consistent with “Islamic principles, international standards, the rule of law 
and Afghan legal traditions,” was one of the main goals envisioned in the Bonn 
Agreement.199  However, the task of reconciling modern criminal, civil and family law 
with Afghanistan’s traditionally conservative tribal customary law and the state’s official 
observation of Islamic shari’a law remains one of the most complex and challenging of 
needed government reforms.   
Draft Ministry of Justice and Supreme Court strategies, developed under the 
direction of the ANDS, established specific development goals and an implementation 
strategy based on a comprehensive analysis of judicial sector capacity and resource 
constraints.200  Besides capital, the training of judges in modern jurisprudence and 
integration of the legal code remain prominent obstacles to rapid judicial sector reform.  
                                                 
197 John F. Burns, “Afghan President, Pressured, Reshuffles Cabinet,”  New York Times, October 11, 
2008.  On the web: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/12/world/asia/12afghan.html. (accessed 12 October 
2008). 
198 Katzman.  Post-War Governance [RL30588], 40. 
199 Bonn Agreement, 4. 
200 See: Professor Abdul Salaam Azimi.  Draft Strategy of the Supreme Court.  (Kabul: Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 15 April 2007);  H.E. Sawar Danish.  Strategy of 
Ministry of Justice for the Afghan National Development Strategy.  (Kabul: Minister of Justice, Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan, April 2007). 
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At the beginning of 2007, 20 percent of the population of judges had no formal education 
beyond high school and another 16 percent had received their judicial qualifications and 
education outside university settings such as through private education and Madrassas.201  
Moreover, another 40 percent had not completed Judicial Stage training, required to train 
a pool of qualified judge candidates.202 A shortfall identified in 2007, the judicial system 
has created a formal system intended to “train, educate, monitor, and discipline judges 
and court staff.”203  The 52-week long program combines a 36-week education program 
with a 16-week practicum.  The education program, taught by qualified judges and 
prominent scholars, attempts to provide a uniform education in judicial matters ranging 
from civil and commercial law to taxation to counter narcotics law and administration.204 
Although the Ministry of Justice plans to construct offices in each of 
Afghanistan’s 364 districts, financial constraints remain the largest barrier to the 
Ministry’s goals.  In 2006 the Ministry’s budget was approximately $12.8 million USD, 
of which more than 70 percent (almost $9 million) went toward operating Afghanistan’s 
prisons.205  According to the 2008 Budget, $341.4 million USD (2.6 percent of the Total 
Budget) was prioritized for ‘good governance and rule of law.’  Of that, only $69 million 
or 0.5 percent of the budget is directed toward ‘justice and rule of law,’ while the 
majority is earmarked for ‘Public Administration,’ including $21 million for the Election 
Commission and $154 million for the Civil Service Commission.  Of the $60 million for 
justice and rule of law, the Ministry of Justice received $50 million, the Supreme Court 
$10 million, and the Attorney General $9 million.  There was no budgetary provision for 
the Commission of Anti Corruption.206  Thus, even with a substantially enlarged 2008 
budget, it is difficult to envision how the Ministry of Justice and Supreme Court will 
achieve their targeted development goals by 2010.  Like other domestic government and 
                                                 
201 Azimi, Strategy of the Supreme Court, 2. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Ibid., 3. 
204 Ibid., 4. 
205 Danish, Strategy of Ministry of Justice, 6. 
206 Total Budget (Core & External). (Kabul: General Budget Directorate, Ministry of Finance, 
Government of Afghanistan).  On the web: http://www.budgetmof.gov.af/units/Budget_Policy_Coord 
_Reporting/Prioritization/English/MTBF_ English_May_13th.xls (accessed 19 February 2009).  
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security sector reforms, budgetary constraints appear to be a critical factor in 
guaranteeing the availability of resources which in turn define the pace and scope of 
needed reforms.  
While no GoA, foreign government or NGO has provided a cogent framework for 
how to reconcile Afghanistan’s competing tribal, Islamic and civil legal codes, the best 
concept for an integrated approach comes from an academic, Dr. Ali Wardak.  (See 
Figure 14, an Integrated Model for a District Level Justice System).   
Dr. Wardak’s construct best approaches the integrated solution envisioned in the 
Bonn Agreement and Afghan National Development Strategies.  His approach combines 
the standards of international human rights with traditional tribal customary law, state 
civil and criminal law with shari’a law as historically practiced in Afghanistan.  Civil 
incidents and minor criminal can still be referred to jirga or shura (councils), the 
traditional vehicle for conflict resolution at the village and tribal level.207  Civil incidents 
or serious crimes are tried under civil criminal state and Islamic law in a Court of Justice, 
while reports of human rights violations would be referred to a special Human Rights 
Unit (H.R. Unit) for investigation and resolution.  Any unsatisfactory resolution from 
either a tribal jirga or H.R. Unit could be referred to a state Court of Justice.208  
Whatever form judicial reform takes, a key measure of its success will be how this 
balance is struck, adheres to international standards of human rights, and maintains its 
independence from the executive branch. 
                                                 
207 Ali Wardak, “Building a Post-War Justice System in Afghanistan,”  Crime, Law & Social Change, 
41 (2004): 326-327. 
208 Ibid., 335-338. 
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Figure 14.   An Integrated Model for a District Level Justice System209 
The delicate balance of shari’a law, international standards of justice, and judicial 
independence was tested as recently as January 2008 following the award of the death 
sentence to a 23-year-old journalist.  Accused of blasphemy for allegedly circulating 
literature on women’s rights under Islam, journalist Perwiz Kambakhsh was sentenced to 
death under Islamic law by a regional court in the northern city of Mazar-i Sharif.  
President Karzai, facing mounting international pressure and condemnation from the 
United Nations, the European Union, the United States and human rights groups, voiced 
                                                 
209 From Ali Wardak, “Diagram 2. An Integrated Model of a Post-War Justice System (District Level) 
in Afghanistan,” in “Building a Post-War Justice System in Afghanistan,”  Crime, Law & Social Change, 
41 (2004): 336.   
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initial caution about executive intervention in the case, but stated that justice would be 
done, despite some support among religious and tribal conservatives for the sentence to 
be upheld.210 
D. PROTECTION 
Corruption and nepotism are akin to protection in the Afghan government, and 
factional politics threaten to slow any substantial development and reform.  Although 
President Karzai used his 2004 Presidential (re-) election as a mandate to strengthen 
Pashtun representation in Parliament and decrease the influence of the Tajik-dominated 
Northern Alliance bloc,211 he has been incapable of marginalizing other national political 
figures such as General Rashid Dostum and Ismail Khan, who still command significant 
regional political, social, economic and military power.212  Credited with reducing the 
influence of minor partisan politicians however, Karzai has nonetheless had to contend 
with various degrees of factional nepotism and corruption in the interest of maintaining 
accord.  Thus, many of his prominent cabinet and gubernatorial appointments have been 
as much to appease internal interest groups and preserve domestic harmony, as they have 
been to satisfy external audiences, leverage bureaucratic expertise or provide meaningful 
institutional reform.  Yet, despite strong U.S. support, President Karzai himself is not 
without controversy or fault.   
                                                 
210 “Afghan ‘blasphemy’ death sentence.” 23 January 2008. BBC News on the web: http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/7204341.stm (accessed 19 August 2008); “European Parliament Resolution 
on the Case of the Afghan Journalist Perwiz Kambakhsh.”  European Parliament, 12 March 2008.  
Document ID: B6-0112/2008.  On the web: http://guengl.org/ upload/docs/P6_RC(2008)0112_EN.doc 
(accessed 19 August 2008); Frances Harrison.  “Karzai Reassurance on Journalist,” 7 February 2008.  BBC 
News on the web: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/7233402.stm (accessed 19 August 2008). 
211 The Ministries of Defense, the Interior and Foreign Affairs are viewed as three of the most 
prominent and powerful positions in the Afghan cabinet.  During the Interim Government (2001-2001), 
these Ministerial positions were each held by prominent Tajik Northern Alliance figures Mohammad 
Qaseem Fahim, Younis Qanooni, and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, respectively. Although the three maintained 
their positions during the Afghan Transitional Authority (2002-2005), Karzai dismissed Younis Qanooni in 
2004 and none currently hold Ministerial-level positions, although Qanooni is Speaker of the Lower House.  
See: “Members of the Current Cabinet.” (Kabul: Office of the President, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan).  
On the web: http://www.president.gov.af/english/cabinet.mspx (accessed 19 August 2008). 
212 Katzman, Government Formation and Performance [RS21922], 4.  An ethnic Uzbek, General 
Dostum commands a sizeable militia in Afghanistan’s Uzbek dominated northern provinces where Mazar-i 
Sharif, one of the country’s largest commercial centers, is located.  Ismail Khan is an ethnic Tajik and 
former long-time governor of Herat in western Afghanistan.  Together, Dostum and Khan control all 
commercial routes north into Central Asia and west into Iran, maintain sizeable regional militias, and 
mobilize ethnic and regionally based opposition to Karzai’s regime. 
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Abdul Jabbar Sabit was fired from his position as Attorney General in July 2008, 
allegedly for his intention to run against Karzai in the 2009 presidential elections. There 
have been similar politically motivated moves by President Karzai, such as the December 
2004 dismissal of Education Minister Younis Qanooni,213 who had challenged Karzai 
during the October 2004 presidential elections.214  However, the dismissal of Sabit is of 
particular intrigue, because of his alleged knowledge and investigation of widespread 
corruption within the Karzai government.  According to Sabit, he was ordered (by 
President Karzai) not to pursue the prosecution of more than 20 allegedly corrupt 
politicians, many of whom he suggested were tied to Afghanistan’s lucrative narcotics 
trade.215  President Karzai has also been linked to the drug trade.  His brother, Ahmed 
Wali Karzai has long been accused of trafficking narcotics and Shaida Mohammad, one 
of President Karzai’s aides, has also been implicated in counter-narcotics 
investigations.216   
Widely corrupt by ‘Western’ standards of political accountability and public 
toleration of its officials, such practices barely raise alarms in Afghan domestic politics 
are can be viewed as necessary practices for conducting business and politics in post-war 
Afghanistan, where civil government has been largely non-existent for over 35 years.  
Viewed in a different light, Afghanistan’s government can been regarded as an example 
of democratic freedom and transparent governance compared to its northern Central 
Asian neighbors, who have enjoyed independence and relative internal stability (the Tajik 
civil war not withstanding) for 17 years. 
                                                 
213 Younis Qanooni (Alt. Yunus Qanuni) is an ethnic Tajik from the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul.  
Politically active during the mujahedeen’s jihad against the Soviet occupation, Qanooni briefly served as 
Defense Minister in the mujahedeen dominated Islamic State of Afghanistan following the Afghan civil 
war. He has since served as Interior Minister and Education Minister in the Karzai government.  Elected to 
Parliament in 2005, Qanooni is currently Speaker of the Lower House (Wolesi Jirga).  See: “Profile: Yunus 
Qanuni.”  BBC News, 10 September 2004.  On the web: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1695218.stm 
(accessed 19 August 2008). 
214 Following his dismissal, Qanooni formed the Hezb-e Afghanistan Naween (New Afghanistan 
Party) as the official opposition bloc to President Karzai.  See: Primary Political Parties: Hezb-e 
Afghanistan Naween (New Afghanistan Party/Qanuni).  (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School 
Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, 27 October 2008).  On the web: 
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215 Thomas Schweich, “Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?”  New York Times, 27 July 2008.  On the web: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/27/magazine/27AFGHAN-t.html (accessed 28 July 2008). 
216 James Risen, “Reports Link Karzai's Brother to Heroin Trade,”  International Herald Tribune, 4 
October 2008.  On the web: http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=16689186 (accessed 12 
November 2008). 
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As a result of the internal jockeying for power during the 2004-2005 electoral 
process that oversaw the evolution of the appointed Transitional Authority to a fully 
representative elected government, factions actually aided in the creation of democratic 
pluralism through the creation of official opposition parties.  Through their initial 
marginalization, prominent political figures including Younis Qanooni and Burhanuddin 
Rabbani successfully created an opposition bloc that now boasts the membership of each 
of President Karzai’s Vice President’s, Ahmad Zia Massoud and Mohammad Karim 
Khalili.217  The opposition bloc has been successful in challenging Karzai’s executive 
power since 2006, compelling the President to overhaul the composition of the Supreme 
Court and forcing individual confirmation of his cabinet appointees.  The bloc also seeks 
to check executive power through a constitutional amendment that would allow 
provincial election of provincial governors, vice presidential appointment.218 
E. EXTRACTION 
The extraction of resources, particularly of capital, has proven a significant 
challenge to the Karzai government.  As Barnett Rubin noted as recently as 2006, 
“economic resources from public services in Afghanistan have almost entirely come from 
international assistance, rather than from domestic capital accumulation and resource 
mobilization.”219  Such international aid, while certainly desperately needed, helped 
create what former Afghan Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani described as a ‘beggar 
state.’220  However, the massive influx and expenditure of donor aid outside the control 
and direction of the Afghan government has diminished both the authority and capacity 
of the Karzai regime.  Because the central government has been unable to both generate 
legitimate and robust sources of capital and apportion donor expenditures, the Ministry of 
Finance initially had little capacity to manage a national budget.  Current international 
expenditures in Afghanistan, of which the United States is the largest donor, far exceed 
                                                 
217 Katzman, Government Formation and Performance [RS21922], 2.   
218 Ibid. 
219 Rubin, Peace Building and State-Building, 179. 
220 Not a direct quote of Ashraf Ghani.  Simon Chesterman paraphrased Ghani’s determination “not to 
allow Afghanistan to become a beggar state, dependent on international aid,” in Walking Softly in 
Afghanistan: the Future of UN State-Building, 41. 
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the nation’s current capacity for capital accumulation through taxation, customs revenue, 
or from the country’s devastated agricultural, industrial and service sectors. Figure 15 
depicts the shortfall between Afghanistan’s domestic revenue and operating expenditures 
as a percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
 
 
Figure 15.   Afghanistan Domestic Revenue and Operating Budget (% GDP)221 
There is a plan, however, to address this shortfall. 
1. The Budget and Fiscal Reform 
In the short-to-mid-term, the Karzai government realizes the need for continued 
donor assistance if it is to complete the structural reforms and meet the development 
goals of the Afghanistan Compact, Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) 
and Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)222 of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).223 
Facing these self-imposed (internal) and international (external) constraints, 
budget and revenue projections over the next five years illustrate a concerted endeavor to 
                                                 
221 From Fact Sheet: 1386.  (Kabul: General Budget Directorate, Ministry of Finance, Government of 
Afghanistan).  On the web: http://www.budgetmof.gov.af/units/Budget_Policy_Coord_Reporting/Fact 
_Sheet/Fact_sheet_final_1386.pdf (accessed 19 November 2008). 
222 The PRGF provides aid and structural guidance in the areas of public participation and ownership, 
macroeconomic stability and poverty reduction, and strengthening governance through spending and 
resource management.  See: A Factsheet: The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF).  
(International Monetary Fund, October 2008).  On the web: http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/ 
prgf.htm (accessed 12 November 2008). 
223 Afghanistan National Budget: Fiscal Year 1386, in English.  (Kabul: General Budget Directorate, 
Ministry of Finance, Government of Afghanistan), 5.  On the web: http://www.budgetmof.gov.af/Budget_ 
Resources/1386/1386BudgetDecreeEnglish.pdf (accessed 19 November 2008). 
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boost domestic revenues to cover recurring operating expenditures.  As illustrated in 
Figure 16, the Afghan government aims to cover its operating costs through domestic 
capital accumulation by the year 2012, where the lines converge.  Although no strategic 
economic plan is forecast past 2013, it is evident that Afghanistan will need to maintain 
an upward trajectory for domestic revenue accumulation if it is to wean itself off foreign 
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Figure 16.   Operating Budget versus Domestic Revenue, FY 2004-2013224 
In an effort to address the majority of donor aid outside the direct control of the 
government, Afghanistan’s National Budget is divided into two parts: the Core 
(Operating) Budget and the External Budget.  The Core Budget captures all monies 
flowing through government s accounts, such as revenues and external grants and loans.  
The External Budget accounts for all funds that do not pass through government 
accounts, such as Non-Governmental Organization and private foreign direct investment.  
Illustrative of the scale of foreign investment in Afghanistan that falls outside 
                                                 
224 From “Ops vs. Revenue Graph,” in Budget of Afghanistan.  (Kabul: General Budget Directorate, 
Ministry of Finance, Government of Afghanistan). On the web: http://www.budgetmof.gov.af/units/ 
Budget_Policy_Coord_Reporting/Prioritization/English/MTBF_English_May_13th.xls (accessed 12 
November 2008). 
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government control, the External Budget overshadowed the Core Budget almost ten to 
one for Fiscal Year (FY) 1386225 (2008).  (See Table 7). 
 
Budget Total 
External Budget Total US$ 10,221,000,000 
Operating Budget Total US$ 1,096,000,000 
Table 7.   External Budget versus Core Budget, FY 1386 (2008)226 
 
Government spending is classified as either Operating or Development 
Expenditures.  Operating Expenditures are primarily recurrent costs necessary for 
government operations such as wages and pensions.  Development Expenditures are 
primarily for public works projects and capital goods but includes provisions for 
technical assistance, training and health services.  Government grants such as those for 
the National Solidarity Program are also included in the Development Expenditures 
budget.227 
The Total Budget is the sum of the Core and External Budgets.  The Total Budget 
for FY 2008, just over $13 billion USD, is depicted in Table 8.228  
                                                 
225 Afghanistan follows the Iranian Solar Hejri calendar year for its fiscal cycle.  As the Hejri year 
usually begins on March 21 of the Gregorian calendar, Afghanistan’s fiscal year runs from 21 March to 20 
March.  Thus the current Afghan fiscal year, 1386, corresponds with 21 March 2008 through 20 March 
2009 on the Gregorian calendar. 
226 From Mid Term Budget Framework – English, Op. Cit. 
227 “Reforming the Fiscal System and Achieving Fiscal Sustainability: Draft for Discussion at 
Afghanistan Development Forum (ADF) 2005,” p. 2.  Afghanistan National Development Strategy.  On the 
web: http://www.ands.gov.af/admin/ands/documents/upload/UploadFolder//NDF%202005%20-
%20Theme%204%20-%20Fiscal%20sustainability%20and%20public%20administration%20reform.pdf 
(accessed 19 August 2008). 
228 The total budget for was $13,114,000,000 USD.  Source: Total Budget (Core & External), Op. Cit.  
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Years Total Budget (Millions US$)
1382 (2004) 2,829 
1383 (2005) 4,202 
1384 (2006) 3,894 
1385 (2007) 3,640 
1386 (2008) 13,114 
1387 (2009)* 7,903 
1388 (2010)* 9,201 
1389 (2011)* 10,241 
1390 (2012)* 11,043 
1391 (2013)* 116,442 
* Projected Budget years 2009 to 2013 
Table 8.   Total Budget 2004-2013229 
2. Revenue and Capital Accumulation  
While Afghanistan’s total domestic revenues as a percent of GDP rose between 
2004 and 2008, the government’s domestic income still needs to more than double over 
the next three years if it is to fully finance its Operating Budget by 2012 as depicted in 
Figure 3.  Table 9 depicts Afghanistan’s domestic revenue from 2004 through 2008, and 
projected revenue accumulation through 2013.  
 
Years Domestic Revenue (Millions US$) Domestic Revenue (% GDP)230 
1382 (2004) 207 4.5 
1383 (2005) 350 4.5 
1384 (2006) 486 5.5 
1385 (2007) 536 6.2 
1386 (2008) 715 8.2 
1387 (2009)* 887 -- 
1388 (2010)* 1,104 -- 
1389 (2011)* 1,351 -- 
1390 (2012)* 1,611 -- 
1391 (2013)* 1,911 -- 
* Projected Revenue years 2009 to 2013 
Table 9.   Afghanistan Domestic Revenue 2004-2013231 
                                                 
229 From Ops vs. Revenue Graph, Op. Cit. 
230 From Fact Sheet: 1386, Op. Cit. 
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To this end, the GoA is undertaking a comprehensive campaign to raise capital 
through taxation and customs duties as well as trying to boost its agricultural and 
industrial sectors.   
The Ministry of Finance’s Revenue Department is charged with generating 
income in each of two primary areas: customs levied on the import and export of 
commodity goods, and domestic taxation.232  Of these, the Revenue Department has 
primarily concerned itself with the collection of customs revenue, and left the 
enforcement of taxation to the Ministry. 
The Ministry of Finance has implemented a broad taxation scheme that seeks to 
collect revenue from numerous sources ranging from income taxes and vehicle 
registration to a physician’s tax, Miller’s tax (the operation of sawmills), toll roads and an 
airport departure fee.233 
Seemingly substantial on paper, enforcement of income and other personal taxes 
will bear the true litmus test of the Ministry’s revenue scheme and prove to be the major 
obstacle in meeting projected budgetary needs.  Afghans have historically resisted 
taxation from the center and imposing a universal income tax and business taxes would 
necessarily require a national census to register all prospective taxpayers.234 Such an 
endeavor would be politically sensitive itself, as the current Pashtun population could see 
its majority challenged by a significant rise in ethnic Tajik registration. 
Pakistan and India represent the most common destinations for Afghan exports in 
terms of customs value, accounting for just over 55 percent of all commercial goods.  
                                                 
231 From Ops vs. Revenue Graph, Op. Cit. 
232 Revenue Department: Introduction  (Kabul: Ministry of Finance, Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan).  On the web: http://www.mof.gov.af/english/revenue.html (accessed 12 November 2008).  
233 Ministry of Finance Charges as of 1 January 2008  (Kabul: Ministry of Finance, Islamic Republic 
of Afghanistan).  On the web: http://www.mof.gov.af/download/en/1203150284.pdf (accessed 19 
November 2008). 
234 The last population census in Afghanistan was incomplete and dates from 1979.  There is currently 
a United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) project underway to conduct a National Population and 
Housing Census in Afghanistan.  See: “UNFPA Projects in Afghanistan.”  United Nations Population 
Fund.  On the web: http://afghanistan.unfpa.org/projects.html#rhs (accessed 7 August 2008).  According to 
the CIA World Factbook, the approximate ethnic composition of Afghanistan is Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, 
Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, other 4%.  See: "CIA World Factbook: 
Afghanistan."  Central Intelligence Agency.  On the web: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/af.html (accessed 3 February 2008). 
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Tajikistan and Iran each share around 4-5 percent of Afghanistan’s export market with 
the remainder equally divided among nearby regional markets.  Pakistan and China are 
Afghanistan’s largest import markets, claiming a 22 percent and 21 percent share 
respectively.  Regional markets make up the rest of the top ten import markets, with the 
exception of Japan, which comes in at number 5, accounting for nearly 6 percent of 
imports.  The United States is Afghanistan’s seventeenth largest import market in terms 
of customs value.235 
3. Commercial Sector Reform 
While posing a challenging task, rebuilding Afghanistan’s agricultural and 
industrial commercial sectors also offers a lucrative and sustainable source of 
government revenue while combining the added benefits of generating employment, 
poverty reduction and expanding government support to the periphery.  
With the assistance of the United States Agency for International Development’s 
(USAID) Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Program (completed in 2006), the Ministry of 
Agriculture has reclaimed much of Afghanistan’s arable land and has reestablished 
regional export markets.  These developments have positioned Afghanistan’s return as a 
potential net exporter of food.236  By 2006, cash crops such as fruits and vegetables had 
already accounted for as much as 42 percent of Afghanistan’s agricultural output.  Road 
repairs and the installation of refrigeration stations along transportation corridors further 
increased access to markets while reducing spoilage as goods awaited shipment.237  
Agriculture and rural development also share a significant proportion of the budget (9 
                                                 
235 Afghanistan 1386 Imports & Exports by Country.  (Kabul: Afghanistan Customs Department).  On 
the web: http://www.customs.gov.af/Documents/Trade-statistics/cranking1386.pdf (accessed 7 August 
2008).  Customs revenue data is denominated in the Afghani vice U.S. dollars, making the extrapolation of 
customs revenue collection as a percent of total revenue collection, annual GDP or Total Budget, 
impossible. 
236 Afghanistan was a net exporter of food prior to the 1979 Soviet invasion.  See: Ghani and 
Lockhart, Fixing Failed States, 76. 
237 “USAID and Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation Increase Agricultural Exports,” Press Release, 
United States Agency for International Development, 27 June 2006.  On the web: http://afghanistan.usaid. 
gov/en/Article.92.aspx (accessed 19 February 2009).  
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percent, or 1182.8 million USD), although the Ministry of Agriculture and Food itself 
only receives about 1.7 percent of the budget, or 220 million USD.238 
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MoCI) oversees International Trade and 
Transportation as well as Private Sector Development (PSD) and Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI).239  In addition to working to reduce international barriers to trade, the 
Ministry’s PSD Directorate is tasked with reducing domestic barriers for foreign 
investment, streamlining the regulatory process, formalization of the market economy 
and creating an environment for the establishment of competitive business opportunities 
and investment.  The Afghanistan Investment Support Agency is a subdivision of the 
MoCI that encourages FDI in six priority areas: agriculture, manufacturing, 
telecommunications, transportation, construction, and the energy sector (mining, power 
and water).240  Despite partnership with international organizations including the United 
Nations Development Program, few relevant figures are available to estimate the extent 
of FDI in Afghanistan’s private economic and commercial sectors.  According to one 
World Bank report from 2005, investment accounted for nearly 22 percent of GDP, 
although it conceded that as high as 90 percent may have been financed as international 
aid.241  These numbers appear a little exaggerated, but offer the only insight into private 
sector investment.  The report also cites informal business practices, access to land and 
electricity, corruption, access to transportation and security as the primary obstacles to 
courting private investment in Afghanistan.242  However, review of Afghanistan’s budget 




                                                 
238 Mid Term Budget Framework - English. 
239 Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.  On the web: http://www. 
commerce.gov.af/ default.asp. (accessed 19 February 2009). 
240 Afghanistan Investment Support Agency, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan.  On the web: http://www.aisa.org.af/ (accessed 19 February 2009). 
241 The Investment Climate in Afghanistan: Exploiting Opportunities in an Uncertain Environment, 
Official Draft.  (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, December 2005), 5.  On the web: http://www. 
aisa.org.af/ Downloads/reports/Afghanistan%20ICA-Official%20Draft.pdf. (accessed 12 November 2008). 
242 Ibid., 6-10. 
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for only 1.3 percent (166.6 million USD) of the FY 2008 Total Budget.  Of this, the 
MoCI was allotted 57 million USD, the Ministry of Economy 5 million USD, and the 
Ministry of Finance 105 million USD.243 
F. RESISTANCE 
Resistance to the current government in Kabul is expressed in two main forms, 
political and insurgent.  Of these, political resistance to the Karzai government as 
primarily expressed through an official opposition party lead by former Northern 
Alliance members, particularly Younis Qanooni and other prominent Tajiks, has already 
been presented.  The second domain is that of the armed insurgency, which poses a vastly 
more dire, urgent, and widespread concern for three main reasons. First, is the 
insurgency’s violent nature, the use of terror and guerilla tactics to target and undermine 
the government’s legitimacy and ability to provide basic security and services.  The 
second reason is that it operates outside the domain of political recourse.  By adopting 
armed insurgent tactics, the Taliban and other insurgent groups have placed themselves 
outside the realm of meaningful political discourse, conflict resolution and reconciliation.  
This may be in part due to an Islamist view of the current government as illegitimate or 
that of a defensive jihad against foreign occupation.  However, armed revolt has 
historically been the form of resistance adopted by Afghan resistance groups.  The third 
reason why the insurgency poses a more dire and urgent threat to the Afghan government 
and coalition forces is its widespread appeal amongst various, mostly Pashtun, elements.  
With the exception of foreign fighters and criminal elements, the majority of resistance 
groups are bound on the basis of ethnic, regional and tribal affiliation. 
Thus the insurgent opposition more closely resembles the kind of armed 
resistance to the government examined in previous chapters.  According to Seth Jones of 
RAND, the insurgency is largely composed of six main groups: the Taliban, Hezb-i-
Islami Gulbuddin, the Haqqani network, foreign fighters including Al Qaeda, tribal 
elements and criminal groups.244  Of these, the first four are the most prominent, 
                                                 243 Mid Term Budget Framework - English. 
244 Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 37. 
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although the latter two still represent significant challenges to the state’s ability to 
provide security and justice, cornerstones of the government’s capacity building efforts.  
Moreover, with the exception of foreign fighters, each group is generally ethnically and 
tribally homogenous, but even groups such as Al Qaeda rely on extensive social and kin-
based relationships, as well as tribal customary law, as a means of protection, 
organization and mobilization.  Figure 17 depicts the insurgency’s “three fronts.”245  
 
Figure 17.   The Afghan Insurgent Front.246 
As illustrated on the map, a resurgent Taliban poses the largest threat to the 
current government in Kabul.   
1. The Taliban 
The Taliban insurgency started about 18 months after its ouster by U.S.-led 
coalition forces with the aid of the Northern Alliance.  Fleeing across the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border, the Taliban settled in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province and among the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that are home Pakistan’s Pashtun tribes.  
                                                 
245 Both Seth Jones and Ahmed Rashid depict the insurgency as being waged along a Northern, 
Central, and Southern front.  See: Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 38; Ahmed Rashid, Descent 
into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central 
Asia  (New York: Viking Press, 2008), XXII. 
246 Jones, “Figure 4.1. The Afghan Insurgent Front,” in Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 39. 
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Reconstituted within Pakistan, the Taliban then launched a successful insurgent campaign 
against the government, which it saw as being a puppet of the west dominated by ethnic 
minorities, especially the Tajiks, and in which they had no representation.  Since 2003, 
the Taliban has increasingly exerted its influence to most areas with no or little 
government and coalition presence.  
 
Figure 18.   The Extent of Taliban Control, November 2008247 
Although the exact area of Taliban influence and control is the subject of debate, 
mostly between politicians and nonpartisan academics and government observers, it is 
widely acknowledged that at least Southern and Eastern Afghanistan, the traditional 
Pashtun homelands, are under Taliban control.248  At least one think tank estimates that 
of the extent of Taliban control is even greater, directly controlling as much as 72 percent 
of the Afghan landmass and a substantial presence in another 21 percent.  (See Figure 
                                                 
247 From “Map 45.  Areas of Taliban Presence in Afghanistan Plus Fatal Violent Incidents in 2008 - 
November 2008.”  International Council on Security and Development.  On the web: http://www. 
icosmaps.net/ (accessed 17 January 2009). 
248 See for example: Johnson, the Big Muddy, 97-98. 
 107
18).  If accurate, then the Taliban already control the same amount of territory, if not 
more, than during their tenure as ruler of Afghanistan in the 1990s. 
However, today’s Taliban is not the same organization as the Islamist theocratic 
regime examined in Chapter V.  To be sure, while Taliban leader Mullah Omar still 
remains at large and administers the movement through a shura in Quetta, Pakistan, the 
Taliban en-mass is not as ideologically fervent as it once was.  While the core leadership 
of the Taliban may still subscribe to its Islamic fundamentalist ideology, the movement 
has relied on other “local grievances…from poppy eradication…to civilian casualties, to 
high levels of unemployment and chronic underdevelopment” as a means of gaining 
widespread influence and “sympathy beyond its traditional support base.”249  The extent 
to which the Taliban has successfully leveraged these grievances is illustrated in 
Canadian journalist Graeme Smith’s interviews of 42 Taliban.250  Of those interviewed, 
the majority expressed little understanding of Afghanistan’s geostrategic situation or 
Mullah Omar’s ideological ambitions, while most cited other reasons, such as poverty or 
coalition bombing campaigns, as the main reason for joining the Taliban.  Viewed in this 
regard, the Taliban are much more representative of a far-reaching indigenous insurgent 
movement, based on the government’s inability to deliver basic security and services and 
an overly kinetic COIN strategy on the part of coalition forces, than an overall 
ideological struggle.  This is good news for the coalition’s COIN strategy, as it supposes 
the ability to quell the insurgency through the provision of these basic, but essential, 
government services.  If an ideological struggle, then there are deeper implications for the 
Afghan government and coalition forces that draw a more inextricable link to the war on 
terror and jihadist groups such as Al Qaeda. 
Haji Omar, the Taliban’s military leader in Southern Waziristan, draws such a 
link.  Omar has called the insurgency a jihad.251  It is unknown whether this terminology 
is used in order to stir up anti-coalition sentiment among the wildly independent Waziris 
                                                 
249 Struggle for Kabul: The Taliban Advance  (London: International Council on Security and 
Development, 2008), 15. 
250 Graeme Smith, “Talking to the Taliban,”  Toronto Globe and Mail, 2008.  On the web: 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/talkingtothetaliban (accessed 22 December 2008). 
251 Public Broadcasting Station, “Frontline: Interview of Haji Omar,”  August 2006.  On the web: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/militants/omar.html (accessed 11 November 2008). 
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in Pakistan’s FATA, gain currency with foreign fighters operating out of neighboring 
Northern Waziristan, or whether the declaration of jihad has actually been made by 
Taliban leader Mullah Omar.  If so, then the labeling of the conflict as a jihad could align 
the strategic goals of the Taliban (re-conquest of Afghanistan) and Al Qaeda (establish a 
pan-Islamic caliphate) beyond mere operational objectives (target Afghan and coalition 
forces).  Such a declaration could win broader support within the Muslim community and 
cause a swell in the ranks of foreign jihadists on the Afghan battlefield, analogous to the 
anti-Soviet jihad.  That there is not a larger contingent of foreign fighters in Afghanistan 
speaks to the probability that such an appeal has not been made, and that Haji Omar’s 
rhetoric is intended to whip up support among local audiences rather than be 
representative of official Taliban ideology. 
2. Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)  
Islamist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s mujahedeen Hezb-i-Islami party remains a major 
insurgent threat to the Afghan government and coalition COIN and CT operations.  
Operating a ‘northern front’ in the northeastern Afghan provinces of Badakhshan, 
Nurestan, Kunar, Nangarhar and Laghman, Hekmatyar has openly expressed support for 
the Taliban and Al Qaeda,252 but denied direct links to them.253 Like the Taliban and 
other Afghan Islamist and insurgent groups, HIG was at least initially based on Ghilzai 
Pashtun solidarity and a shared Islamist ideology (see Table 3, Chapter IV).  Hekmatyar 
is himself a Ghilzai Pashtun from the northern province of Kunduz, although from a less 
politically powerful subtribe than other groups that dominate his area of operations, such 
as Hezb-i-Islami Khalis (HIK).254  HIG’s northeast area of operations is a mixture 
Nuristanis, Safi Pashtuns, Mohmand Pashtuns, Shinwari Pashtuns, Ghilzai Pashtuns and 
Pashai.255  Thus, HIG must necessarily appeal to and mobilize wider Pashtun ethnic 
                                                 
252 Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 41. 
253 Candace Rondeaux, “Afghan Rebel Positioned for Key Role,”  The Washington Post, 5 November 
2008.  On the web: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/04/ 
AR2008110403604.html (accessed 6 November 2008).  
254 Naval Postgraduate School Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, Kunar Province: Hezb-e 
Islami Gulbuddin (HiG), Monterey, CA,15 July 2008. On the web: http://www.nps.edu/programs 
/ccs/Kunar.html (accessed 12 November 2008). 
255 Ibid. Eastern Afghanistan: Tribal Map. On the web: 
http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/ExecSumm.html (accessed 12 November 2008). 
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sentiment in order to achieve freedom of movement to conduct operations in the 
northeast.  Finally, although placed on the U.S. terrorist list in 2003 and widely disruptive 
of coalition CT operations in the east, Hekmatyar’s group does not affect an area of 
operations on the scale as that of Jalaluddin Haqqani or the Taliban. 
3. The Haqqani Network 
Jalaluddin Haqqani and his oldest son, Sirajuddin, have emerged as one of the 
most brutal and audacious challengers to the Karzai regime and coalition CT operations 
in Afghanistan’s contested eastern provinces.  A former mujahedeen commander, 
Jalaluddin Haqqani is one of the main ties linking Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda to the 
Taliban, and uniting the eastern and southern Pashtun tribes.256  Having received 
significant assistance from the CIA and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence during the 
anti-Soviet jihad, Haqqani hosted bin Laden’s first Al Qaeda camps in the late 1980s.257  
Haqqani later served as Minister of Tribal Affairs for the Taliban in the 1990s and is now 
head of the Taliban in North Waziristan province in Pakistan’s FATA, an area host to 
many foreign jihadists including Al Qaeda.  Under the military direction of his son, the 
Haqqani Network has launched fierce operations into Khost, Paktika, Paktia and 
Nangarhar provinces, is credited with introducing suicide bombing to Afghanistan,258 
and has claimed responsibility for the April 2008 assassination attempt on President 






                                                 
256 Matt Dupee, “The Haqqani Network: Rein of Terror,”  The Long War Journal, 2 August 2008.  On 
the web: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/08/the_haqqani_network.php (accessed 3 August 
2008). 
257 Martin Smith, “Frontline: Return of the Taliban,” Public Broadcasting Station.  Aired: October 3, 
2006.  Exclusive web content titled “Jalaluddin Haqqani.” On the web: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ 
frontline/taliban/militants/haqqani.html (accessed 19 November 2008). 
258 Ibid. 
259 Dupee, The Haqqani Network. 
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which is accused of providing intelligence and material assistance to Haqqani operatives 
in support of a July 2008 attack against the Indian embassy in Kabul that killed 41 and 
wounded 150.260 
4. Foreign Fighters Including Al Qaeda 
Afghanistan’s foreign fighters are mostly Central Asian and Arab Islamists who 
settled along the Afghan-Pakistan border following the jihad against the Soviets or 
sought refuge from their own regimes during the 1990s.  Of these, prominent Arabs such 
as Saudi Arabia’s Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri from Egypt form the core of 
Al Qaeda’s leadership and pose the greatest terrorist threat to the United States and 
international community, if not directly targeting the Afghan government.  This fact had 
initially relegated the task of rebuilding Afghan governing capacity a distant second to 
the immediate post-9/11 task of waging direct action CT operations against Al Qaeda, 
whose objectives were broader than HIG and the Taliban.261 
5. Tribal Elements and Criminal Groups 
As noted previously, each armed insurgent group, including Al Qaeda’s foreign 
jihadists, rely on an extensive network of socio-political connections based on ethnic, 
regional and tribal kin-based identities and local customary law.  Forged during the anti-
Soviet jihad in the 1980s, foreign fighters and criminal groups have relied on this 
extensive patronage system as both a source of protection and as a conduit for directing 
insurgent, terrorist and criminal operations against the Karzai government and coalition 
forces.  
G. SUMMARY 
If anything, the current nation-building exercise in Afghanistan has shown that it 
can take several years for a state to even create the technical expertise, institutions and 
                                                 
260 Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmidtt, “C.I.A. Outlines Pakistan Links With Militants,”  New York 
Times, 30 July 2008.  On the web: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/30/world/asia/30pstan.html?_r=1 
&pagewanted=all (accessed 30 July 2008). 
261 Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 44. 
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revenues required for governance and on which to develop state capacity.  Comparative 
analysis of other governments has the added benefit of time, often decades or even 
centuries, in which the state slowly expanded its capacity through trial and error, often 
with significant or even disastrous setbacks.  The impatience with which the international 
community monitors and prods Afghanistan’s development should not be overlooked.  
After decades of mal-governance and internecine warfare, and seven years after the 
toppling of the Taliban regime, the GoA has only recently completed a comprehensive 
strategy for creating good governance and developing capacity for war making, state-
making and extraction. 
Overall, the Afghan National Development Strategy, the Independent Directorate 
for Local Governance (IDLG) and the National Solidarity Program (NSP) aim to build 
the kinds of institutional capacities the international community expects as well as to 
reestablish the basic security and rule of law that local Afghans demand.  Although 
development and training of the ANP lags behind the ANA by perhaps as much as two 
years, there is still reasonable expectation that the police can be every-bit as non-partisan, 
professional and well-trained as the army.  Moreover, for the first time in Afghan history 
national initiatives such as IDLG and NSP actually seek to bridge, rather than co-opt, 
crush or circumvent the conventional divide between the central government in Kabul 
and traditional sub-national tribal and clan-based governance through Village, Municipal, 
District and Provincial Councils.  However, expectation is not reality. 
Widespread corruption, nepotism, warlordism and Afghanistan’s rampant illicit 
narcotics trade all still need to be effectively combated and eliminated.  In each of these 
areas, the international community must bring solutions and resources in addition to 
political pressure.  Anti-narcotics efforts have not been adequately or effectively 
addressed or funded for fear of political backlash.  Poppy eradication must be combined 
with resources and training to provide alternate-livelihoods for farmers or provide crop 
substitution and subsidies until farmers can bring new crops to market.  Warlords such as 
General Rashid Dostum and Ismail Khan must be forced to relinquish their hold on 
regional politics and dismantle age-old patronage networks, war economies and local 
militias.  Failure to do so should risk losing all, including imprisonment.  The creation of 
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an official government opposition party by former Northern Alliance leaders including 
Rabbani, Qanooni, Fahim and Dr. Abdullah illustrate the opportunity for equal and 
representative democratic political participation and a means of holding the government 
accountable, but more must be done than the mere pledge of donor resources or drafting 
of lofty strategies.  Significant investment must be made in Afghanistan’s private and 
public sectors to restore and develop markets, encourage FDI and generate a sustainable 
domestic economy that can lift Afghans out of poverty and provide a source of revenue 
for Afghanistan’s continued development and post-conflict reconstruction. 
In my final analysis, the current GoA has developed basic institutional structures 
for war making, state-making, protection and extraction, but has failed to develop any 
real capacity in any of these areas.   
 
State Activity Structure Capacity Grading Criteria 
War making + - 
State-making + - 
Protection + - 
Extraction + - 
(+)  Structure present 
(-)   Structures absent 
(+)  Some capacity 
(-)   No capacity 
Table 10.   State Capacity under President Hamid Karzai 
While blame may be placed on the initial subordination of governance to the 
U.S.-led CT campaign, the inadequacy of international funding for Afghanistan’s 
reconstruction and development, or shortsightedness in the inability to foresee, stave-off 
and combat the insurgency while in its infancy, the real challenge now is how best to 
prioritize and target each of these seemingly competing challenges. 
The Taliban, aided by Al Qaeda and former mujahedeen Islamist parties, has 
already established a significant presence throughout most of Afghanistan, entrenched in 
local communities based on traditional solidarity networks and social grievances.  The 
inability of the Afghan government and coalition forces to mount a successful COIN and 
CT strategy based on these historical and sociological facts has rendered the prospect of 
achieving any of the government’s development objectives outlined in the ANDS or 
Millennium Development Goals a vacant illusion.  The fact is that each of these 
dimensions, increasing state capacity and combating the insurgency, must be met 
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immediately and simultaneously, with overwhelming resources committed to each task.  
To do any less would be to condemn the Afghan people to another era of violent misrule 
and be tantamount to granting our enemy’s victory. 
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VII. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Having presented each case in isolation in Chapters III - VI, this chapter 
endeavors to conduct a comparative analysis of Tilly's four state activities, as well as the 
basis of resistance and solidarity, across all four regimes.  This analysis is conducted on 
two levels.  First, the cases are compared based on their form of government and nature 
of their rule.  This macro-level of analysis follows a more traditional comparative 
political methodology, and is intended to develop general typologies and trends that are 
characteristic of successful Afghan rule.  The second level of analysis is intended to 
provide a more in-depth understanding of each regime's relative degree of capacity 
attained in each of the four state activities, as well as the basis of resistance encountered 
by each regime.  A major task of this level of analysis, conducted under the subheading 
"Grading State Capacity," is the assignment of a number grade ranking the relative level 
of capacity developed by each regime, in each of the four state activities.   
This comparative analysis is conducted in an effort to identify key distinctions 
and trends that may yield insight into how best to extend the reach of the government in 
Kabul and increase state capacity without alienating the fundamental basis of rural 
Afghan solidarity or inciting further revolt.  The findings of this analysis are presented 
later in this chapter. 
A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CASES 
The cases presented in Chapters II–VI span almost 130 years in which 
Afghanistan saw a period of absolute monarchy under Amir Abdur Rahman, a decade of 
communist rule under the PDPA and Soviet occupation, a totalitarian Islamist theocracy 
under the Taliban, as well as the current democratic Republic presided by Hamid Karzai.   
From the perspective of a political scientist, these four regimes represent a diverse 
basis for comparison that appears unwieldy.  However, as each of these regimes helped 
shape Afghanistan's rich political and cultural landscape, they represent a rich milieu 
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from which the examination of an Afghan's basis of identity, relationship to the state, and 
reason for political mobilization cannot be divorced. 
When compared, a cursory analysis of all four cases yields information about the 
regime type, the nature of their rule, the role of Islam in each regime, whether the regime 
had a peaceful or abrupt and violent transition, and the basis of resistance in each regime 
(see Table 11).    
Form of Government Nature of Rule Role of Islam Regime Transition Basis of Resistance 
Indigenous Foreign  Authoritarian Democratic Islamic† Secular Ousted Peaceful Tribal Ethnic 
Monarchy Communist Monarchy Democracy Monarchy Communists Communists Monarchy* Monarchy Communists 
Taliban Democracy Communists  Taliban Democracy‡ Taliban Democracy Democracy Taliban 
  Taliban       Democracy 
Table 11.   Comparative Analysis of Four Afghan Regimes262 
As noted in the very introduction of this thesis, an intriguing element of 
Afghanistan's political history has been its setting for four very diverse forms of 
government over the past 120 years.  These regimes span the political spectrum.  Starting 
from the political Left is the more moderate democratic Islamic Republic, followed by 
Communism espoused by the PDPA and Soviets, while Abdur Rahman's illiberal 
monarchy and the Taliban's Islamic Theocracy are to the radical and revolutionary Right 
of the political spectrum.   
                                                 
262 (*) Although the monarchy underwent a peaceful transition from Abdur Rahman Khan to his son 
and heir, Habibullah Khan (r. 1901-1919), the dynasty came to an end after his grandson, Amanullah Khan 
(r. 1919-1929), was deposed by tribal revolt in 1929 following his attempted introduction of modernizing 
reforms that offended conservative Islamic and tribal customs.  Although another dynastic monarchy 
replaced the usurpers by the end of the year, the monarchy as an institution was itself finally ended through 
a coup in 1973.   
(†) Both Amir Abdur Rahman and the Taliban's Mullah Omar used Islam as a means of legitimating 
their rule.  Amir Rahman gained the implicit support of the ulema (religious scholars) and umma (Islamic 
community) by imposing himself as leader of the Islamic community (in Afghanistan), a mandate imposed 
by the will of Allah. Mullah Omar gained similar legitimacy by symbolically donning the ‘cloak of the 
Prophet’ in front of a tribal jirgah.  A key distinction between the two however is that Amir Rahman still 
enjoyed traditional legitimacy based upon the monarchy as an institution and his clan-based lineage, 
whereas Mullah Omar was mot of prominent or 'noble' hereditary stock.  However, both leaders also 
enjoyed charismatic legitimacy. 
‡ Although President Hamid Karzai is viewed by the west as a secular leader, the current government 
of Afghanistan is officially an Islamic Republic, and many prominent members of parliament are former 
mujahedeen commanders and Islamists.   The government must still find a way to balance Islamic Shari'a 
law with modern western civil and criminal laws and human rights.  Afghanistan's current leaders do not 
claim divine legitimacy, but instead represent a secular government within an Islamic society. 
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Although three of the four regimes were authoritarian by nature, the Monarchy, 
Communists and Taliban, only two were entirely home-grown forms of government, the 
monarchy and Taliban, while the Communist and democratic Islamic Republic are of 
external origin, and relied on significant foreign intervention to sustain their rule.  
These same regime pairs, the monarchy and Taliban and the Communists and the 
democratic Republic, also share common relations to Islam, whose position as a 
guarantor of political legitimacy or source of mobilization and resistance in Afghanistan 
is well documented.263   
In summary, this initial cursory analysis of the four Afghan regimes suggests only 
a nuanced correlation between the form of government and the role of Islam, with each 
indigenous form of government, the monarchy and the Taliban, each using Islam as a 
means of legitimating their rule.  Alternatively, Islam was also used as a source of 
political mobilization and resistance against the foreign, non-Islamic governments 
imposed by the Communists and current democratic Islamic Republic. 
B. GRADING STATE CAPACITY 
The following section is a comparative analysis of state capacity across all four 
cases.  Table 12 summarizes each regime's development of governing structures and 
relative state capacity based on the nominal scale employed in Chapters III-VI.   
 
 Monarchy Communists Islamists Democracy 
State Activity Structure Capacity Structure Capacity Structure Capacity Structure Capacity 
War making + + + + + - + - 
State-making + + + - + + + - 
Protection + + + + + + + - 
Extraction + + - - - - + - 
Key:         (+)  Structure present            (-)  Structures absent 
                 (+)  Some capacity                  (-)  No capacity 
Table 12.   Comparative Analysis of State Capacity Under Four Afghan Regimes 
                                                 
263 The two most definitive works on the subject are: Olivier Roy.  Islam and Resistance in 
Afghanistan.  (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990) and Olesen, Islam and Politics in 
Afghanistan, Op. Cit. 
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However, in order to produce more gradated results, I will now apply a simple 
ordinal scale to each regime, in each of Charles Tilly's four state activities presented.  The 
objective of this endeavor is to increase analytical nuance by ranking the different 
regimes' ability to develop governing capacity.  The following scale is used to rank each 
regime's relative state capacity on a scale of one to five: 
 
Grade Capacity 
1 No capacity 
2 Little capacity 
3 Some capacity 
4 Much capacity 
5 High capacity 
Table 13.   Ordinal Scale Used to Grade State Activities 
1. War Making 
Comparative analysis of each regime suggests that War Making, the capability to 
neutralize enemies outside one's national borders, is not a historically necessary state 
activity for the development and consolidation of the Afghan state.  With the exception of 
threatened Iranian action against the Taliban, Afghanistan has not faced the prospect of 
war from its neighbors during the modern era.  Thus, the development of a national army 
has not historically been a state necessity based on the need to defend against an external 
threat, but rather been used as a key security apparatus of the central government in the 
state-making process. 
Abdur Rahman created a national army for the internal pacification of 
Afghanistan, while tribal armies (lashkar) and militias (arbokai) were left to defend 
against Russian encroachment to the north.  Having successfully broken tribal resistance 
by 1896, the army was subsequently restructured over the next several decades, although 
largely as an example of Afghanistan's relative modernity more than military necessity.  
Having become a Soviet patron during the Cold War, the Afghan National Army was 
organized and equipped for the purpose of Afghanistan's defense against foreign 
aggression by the 1970s.   
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As it turned out, the force structure and capability of the Soviet force, (the 
overreliance on mechanized infantry, armor and airpower) was ill suited for the kind of 
unconventional guerilla warfare mounted by the mujahedeen resistance following the 
Soviet invasion. I.e. a national army had historically been used only in support of state-
making, not war making activities. Until such a time as state-making is attained, as it was 
by the end of Abdur Rahman's rule, the requirement for a modern Afghan conventional 
army need not be a priority, except as required for internal pacification.  As the nature 
and tactics of Afghan resistance has not changed, the capability requirement of a national 
army force structure connotes the need to be able to fight a counter-insurgent style of 
guerilla warfare in uneven an often inaccessible terrain, and the ability to politically as 
well as physically isolate the insurgent from his traditional support base, the qawm.  This 
last task itself connotes a strong state mechanism that has sufficient capacity to penetrate 
levels of local solidarity.   
Of each regime's war making capacity, the monarchy under Amir Rahman and the 
Soviet's achieved some capacity to wage war outside Afghanistan's external borders.  The 
distinction is that they had the capacity, not an overwhelming force by which to conquer 
neighboring lands.  While the Afghans had fought wars along its northern and eastern 
frontiers for decades before Abdur Rahman became Amir, local tribes spanning the areas 
of foreign encroachment had largely fought such wars.  By both subduing and nominally 
uniting the tribes under his divine leadership, Amir Rahman amassed a national army 
capable of campaigning outside traditional tribal boundaries.   
The Afghan National Army had a similar capability by the 1970s, having begun 
the process of modernization with Soviet equipment and training since the 1950s.  The 
combined arms of the ANA and Soviet Army were certainly sufficient to have fought 
conventional wars throughout the region, which might have been preferred to the 
insurgent guerilla warfare encountered in Afghanistan. 
In contrast, the current Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, like the Taliban, has 
neither sufficient troop strength nor weapons to conduct a military campaign against 
Afghanistan's neighbors, principally Iran or Pakistan, who have substantial standing 
armies and sophisticated military hardware.  Thus, while the following grades are 
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ascribed to each regime's relative capacity for war making, (see Table 14), the principal 
use of the military in each case examined has been for the internal consolidation of the 
state, i.e., state-making. 
 
 Monarchy Communists Islamists Democracy 
War making 3 3 1 1 
Table 14.   Grading Relative Capacity for War Making 
2. State-making 
In real terms, each successive Afghan regime has necessarily had to concern itself 
with state-making as its primary task, predicated on the need to eliminate or neutralize 
enemies within its territory that challenge state authority or threaten regime survival.  The 
singular exception in the modern era is the monarchy under Amir Abdur Rahman, whose 
lengthy and brutal campaigns to subdue the tribes succeeded in not only establishing the 
modern state of Afghanistan, but in fundamentally eradicating the means of tribal 
resistance for a generation.  The peace that the Amir created lasted for seventy years, 
although shortly interrupted by the Tajik revolt against King Amanullah in 1929.  Despite 
this momentary lapse, the monarchy's security apparatus, including the army, were never 
mobilized for internal pacification to the degree under the 'Iron Amir's' rule, or prior to 
the communist coup and Soviet invasion.  In addition, the governing structures and 
institutions created by Abdur Rahman were so effective that they have been largely 
replicated (or the attempted replication) by successive regimes.   
Unable to advance their revolution beyond the vanguard party and rife with 
internal ethnically based partisan conflict (a hallmark of Afghan rule), the Soviet invasion 
was intended to bolster the PDPA and prevent an Islamist revolution in Afghanistan.264  
While the PDPA was never able to ignite a grassroots revolution, the Soviet invasion 
itself ignited widespread insurgency predicated on their foreign intervention, whose un-
Islamic banner only further alienated the regime from a historically key source of state 
legitimacy, Islam.  This fact was only further exacerbated by the call of jihad against the 
                                                 
264 An Islamist regime had come to power in neighboring Iran earlier that year, in April 1979. 
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Soviets, a necessary political strategy by which: (1) religious figures (mullah's and other 
mujahedeen commanders) could obtain political authority, and (2) lashkar (tribal armies) 
could operate beyond their traditional boundaries.265  Ultimately, the communists were 
unable to translate their centralized executive and administrative apparatchik into any 
meaningful source of popular control and authority.  Moreover, the misuse of military 
and security apparatuses led to the state's defeat on two fronts.  Militarily and numerically 
superior, the Soviet Red Army and ANA were never able to adapt to the kind of 
asymmetrical insurgent warfare waged by the mujahedeen.  Meanwhile the expenditure 
of vast resources on internal security services such as the KhAD, led to the purge and 
elimination of as many party members as mujahedeen fighters killed in battle.  Fueled by 
ethnic and ideological differences, this fundamental misdirection of effort directly 
facilitated in the erosion and collapse of the PDPA from within. 
Alternatively, the Taliban, who did derive political legitimacy from Islam, still 
alienated the majority of Afghans with the strict enforcement of their radical 
fundamentalist dogma.  However, the Taliban's decentralized bottom-up approach to 
state-making and extensive use of existing local kin-based tribal, ethnic and regional 
political structures enabled them to establish a significant presence at the district and 
village levels.  In the majority of areas where Islamic belief was not enough to subjugate 
and rule the population, the Taliban relied on familial relationships or resorted to 
intimidation and coercion to implement their decentralized rule. 
In contrast, the current Afghan regime under President Hamid Karzai has not been 
adept at all in either establishing centralized authority or decentralized control of 
Afghanistan.  While much media attention is paid to the blame-game, citing either the 
International Community or President Karzai as the chief bearer of fault for the failure to 
extend the reach of Kabul, the fact is that both are responsible.  However, whatever the 
reasons for the bureaucratic ineptitude and Taliban resurgence, the challenge now rests 
squarely on the shoulders of Afghanistan's elected representatives, particularly Karzai.   
                                                 
265 It is no coincidence that each of the seven major mujahedeen parties were commanded by a 
religious figure that boasted Islamist credentials. 
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Although a Durrani Pashtun of the Popalzai tribe, President Karzai never held the 
kind of legitimacy predicated upon by previous Afghan regimes.  Karzai holds neither the 
traditional legitimacy of previous monarchs, including Abdur Rahman and the late Zahir 
Shah, or legitimacy derived from Islam.  Nor has he turned out to be a particularly 
charismatic leader, able to circumvent other sources of legitimacy based on his own 
character and ability.  Instead, President Karzai lies at the center of blame for the current 
state of affairs in Afghanistan, characterized by either his undesirability or inability to 
act.  On the one hand is the personal nepotism bestowed upon his brother and other 
members of the regime he has created, while he has demonstrated time and again a 
negligent inability to counteract against regional warlords such as Rashid Dostum, Ismail 
Khan and Gul Agha Shirzai who command regional lashkar, divert state resources, and 
generally undermine the authority of the center.  
Although the Government of Afghanistan has attained many accomplishments 
over the past seven years, from the creation of a constitution to the holding of presidential 
and provincial elections, the fact remains that previous regimes were able to achieve 
more with less.  State-making was the principal activity of both Abdur Rahman and the 
Taliban, but remains only a secondary objective of the current government, whose 
primary motive appears to be the protection of those in power and the privileged.   
Table 15 depicts each regime's relative capacity for state-making. 
 
 Monarchy Communists Islamists Democracy 
State-making 5 1 4 1 
Table 15.   Grading Relative Capacity for State-making 
As presented, Amir Rahman and the Taliban developed sufficient capacity for 
state-making.  This is in contrast to the communists and current regime, whose authority 
is not felt beyond the capital or regional strongholds from which security forces operate.  
Although presented in a little greater detail later in this chapter, a key distinction between 
the Amir and the Taliban regime was the nature of their rule, the Amir favoring a state-
centric top-down approach while the Taliban was more of a bottom-up phenomenon. 
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3. Protection 
As noted in Table 12, protection appears to be a necessary condition for achieving 
a relatively high degree of state capacity, as the efficacy of networks intended to inform 
and protect the state are an integral component of regime survival.  To this end, the co-
option (coercion, bribing) of local solidarity groups is a necessary means of obtaining 
local support without committing forces necessary to crush local solidarity groups which 
would likely only generate more resistance against the state.  This passive penetration of 
and use of solidarity groups, helps to neutralize or isolate potential state adversaries and 
allow effective consolidation of forces toward state-making.   
Having neutralized the tribes, Abdur Rahman relied on a vast network of spies 
and informants intended to apprise the monarch of any intrigue directed against him, 
while the Soviet's over reliance on state security agencies actually undermined 
consolidation of the state.  Instead of focusing on creating divisions within the 
mujahedeen parties, who were equally eager to fight each other as fight Soviets, the rival 
PDPA factions relied on an over abundance of secret police and intelligence services 
which not only culled the ranks of potential adversaries and usurpers but also able-bodied 
technocrats and intelligentsia who compose the core of any bureaucracy.  Thus, the 
diligence and exuberance with which these services carried out their primary task 
undercut the very ability of the Party and Politbureau to develop lasting and meaningful 
institutions. 
With the exception of Al Qaeda, and outside the observation of some Pashtun 
tribal customary laws codified in Pashtunwali, the Taliban offered little formal protection 
to anyone who did not share their same fundamentalist beliefs.  However, the 
decentralized nature of Taliban rule, in part due to the increasing reclusiveness of Mullah 
Omar from direct administration, allowed the various shura who oversaw the 
government's administration and the local foot soldiers who implemented the Taliban's 
harsh edicts to offer a form of local protection akin to that implemented by the mafia. 
Perhaps a legacy of the ethnic and political fragmentation that occurred under the 
Soviets, protection under the Karzai regime is possibly at its worst more than at any other 
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time in Afghanistan's political history.  Although the state-directed security and 
intelligence services are not as vast as under communist rule, the level of state protection 
afforded corrupt officials and other prominent persons is at a historical high, and has just 
as readily undermined the credibility and capacity of the center as under the Soviets.  The 
reason for this is that the current Karzai regime is dominated by powerful individuals and 
groups in competition for state resources and positions of relative absolute power and 
authority.  In other words, the state is dominated by strongmen, whose extensive personal 
patronage and protection hinders and undermines the very writ of the state they purport to 
represent and serve. However, unlike the extensive protection and patronage network 
employed by Abdur Rahman, which earns a higher grade based on its semi-formal status 
as a state institution, extensive protectionism under the Soviets and Karzai regime 
undermined the state's capacity for state-making, whereas they complemented it during 
the Amir's reign. 
 
 Monarchy Communists Islamists Democracy 
Protection 4 3 2 3 
Table 16.   Grading Relative Capacity for Protection 
4. Extraction 
Of the cases examined, only the monarchy developed sufficient structures and 
capacity for the extraction of resources required to sustain and expand the state.  
Developed under Abdur Rahman, these mechanisms went largely unchanged until the 
monarchy was abolished in 1973.  Reasons for subsequent regimes' inability to establish 
structures adequate for the extraction of human resources and capital may be in part or 
combination due to their short-lived nature or heavy reliance on foreign patronage.   
The communist PDPA never had a large indigenous support base as evidenced by 
their inability to spread their communist revolution beyond the vanguard party down to 
the grassroots level.  (This may be largely in part to the inability to operationalize Marxist 
ideology, whose call for a proletariat revolution was incompatible with the largely rural 
and agrarian Afghan population).  Moreover, the subsequent Soviet invasion led to the 
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prompt subordination of the government in Kabul and the ANA under Moscow's 
direction, negating the former's ability to extract resources from the Afghan masses while 
making the Soviet Union (especially the Central Asian Republics) the primary source of 
recruits, labor, capital, food and other materiel required to sustain the war effort.  The 
Soviets destroyed Afghanistan's agricultural and commercial infrastructure, a legacy that 
the current regime is still trying to fix. 
Although the Taliban never established formal means of extraction beyond local 
recruitment and a crackdown on some forms of banditry, their diffuse and local level of 
operations did not require the kind of resources needed by larger bureaucracies.  There 
were ample arms left over from the Soviet occupation and civil war, while the daily 
pattern of Afghan life had returned to means of local subsistence in the absence of central 
governance and a national economy.  Moreover, the Taliban was able to subsidize its 
operations largely through funds obtained from madrassas throughout the Muslim world, 
but mostly from neighboring Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, as well as the personal coffers of 
Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network. 
Finally, the challenge of extraction is especially salient for the current regime, as 
the Democratic form of government connotes a deep and layered bureaucracy requiring 
vast resources for combating the insurgency and the establishment of governance at the 
federal, provincial and district levels.  This task is especially difficult following three 
decades of civil warfare in which the means and mechanisms of extraction were all 
obliterated.   
 
 Monarchy Communists Islamists Democracy 
Extraction 4 1 2 1 
Table 17.   Grading Relative Capacity for Extraction 
C  RESISTANCE AND SOLIDARITY 
The basis of resistance is re-examined in the next section in order to determine 
any historical patterns and linkages between the state and solidarity groups that could 
yield important insight into how best extend the writ of the state.  This approach seeks to 
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determine key indicators and trends relative to the state's ability to create necessary 
institutions and develop sufficient governing capacity.   
With the exception of the monarchy under Abdur Rahman, who successfully 
eliminated tribal resistance by the end of his reign, each major resistance group 
succeeded in toppling the regime it opposed, albeit with external help. 
With the establishment of the PDPA in 1964, the communists quickly established 
themselves in political opposition to the monarchy.  Although the coup that would 
eventually topple the monarchy a decade later came from within the royal family, Prince 
Daoud, the PDPA aspired to be the vanguard of their own communist revolution, finally 
deposing the Daoud regime in 1978.  Had the communists (who commanded major 
elements of the military) not struck, Daoud might have been ousted by any number of the 
Islamist parties, such as Hizb-e Islami, who were unsuccessful in their earlier attempts to 
secure his removal and had taken up residence in Pakistan.  These same Islamist parties 
constituted the bulk of the mujahedeen resistance to the subsequent Soviet invasion that 
bolstered the communist regime.  Failing to reconcile their ideological and ethnic 
sectarian differences in the U.N.-brokered Afghan Interim Government following the 
Soviet withdrawal and fall of the Najibullah government in 1992, the mujahedeen parties 
then allowed the Taliban to sweep to power four years later.   
Militarily weakened but undefeated, former mujahedeen parties still constituted 
the major political and military resistance to the Taliban with the United Islamic Front 
(UIF) promptly occupying Kabul following the U.S.-led invasion in October 2001, and 
UIF leadership taking key posts in the new interim government.  In a fateful (but not 
unprecedented) reversal of fortune, an undefeated Taliban now mount the largest 
opposition against the incumbent regime of President Hamid Karzai. 
Although not every successive Afghan regime since Abdur Rahman is presented 
in this thesis, a basic pattern of rule and resistance has none-the-less emerged.  Unless 




been largely successful in deposing the incumbent government and establishing a new 
Afghan regime.  The cyclical pattern between regime and resistance is depicted in Table 
18. 
Regime Resistance 
Monarchy (1880-1901) Tribal – successfully defeated 
Monarchy (After 1964) Communist & Islamists 
Communist (1978-1992) Islamist mujahedeen factions 
Islamist mujahedeen factions (1992-1996) Other Islamist Factions; Taliban after 1994 
Taliban (1996-2001) Former mujahedeen Islamists (mostly UIF) and some Pashtuns 
UIF/Pashtun (2001 – Present) Taliban; former mujahedeen Islamists 
Table 18.   Afghanistan's Regime-Resistance Historical Cycle 
Another salient point of this analysis therefore is to determine the basis for 
resistance so that this cycle may be broken, allowing for the establishment of a stable and 
lasting central government to reestablish the writ of the state to the local level. 
As advanced in Chapter I, the basic unit of Afghan identity and interaction with 
the state is through local solidarity groups, known as qawm.  The basis of a qawm is 
based on common tribal (kin), ethnic, or regional relations.   Throughout Afghanistan's 
history, the qawm has remained the fundamental basis of local solidarity and state 
interaction. 
In all four of the cases examined, the core constituency of each major challenger 
to the state has consolidated around tribal, ethnic or regional ties, despite the adoption of 
a universal political ideology.  
This is especially true when comparing the three most recent cases, in which an 
espoused Islamist ideology has been both the basis for resistance and for governance.  
That the major mujahedeen parties were, and remain largely divided along ethnic and 
regional lines is testament to the strength of the qawm over an ideology as a basis for 
solidarity.  For the government, this connotes the proposition that no universal set of 
principles, whether based on Islamic law or rooted in western democratic ideals, will 
appeal to everyone.  In contrary, a better way to look at ideology as a mobilizing factor in 
Afghanistan is not to promote some foreign creed around which you inspire to rally the 
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masses to the government (such as communism or Deobandism), but to instead avoid the 
official adoption of a creed around which normally divisive groups find common cause to 
resist.  By doing so, there will be no ideological grounds on which to mount resistance. 
In addition, the government needs to be inclusive and representative of tribal, 
ethnic and regional elements.  As Table 19 indicates, the primary basis of resistance to 
the central government during each regime has been based on identification with a qawm, 
whether tribal, ethnic or regional solidarity. 
 
Qawm identity Monarchy Communists Islamists Democracy 
Tribal +  + + 
Ethnic + + + + 
Regional  + + + 
Table 19.   Comparative Analysis of Resistance Group's Basis of Solidarity 
Thus the success of each regime, as measured by its relative ability to develop 
state capacity, is directly related to that regime's ability to penetrate or dismantle local 
traditional governing structures, undermine the basis of individual Afghan solidarity, and 
redirect an individual's fealty toward the state instead toward the qawm.  
Employing the same simple Likert scale used to grade state capacity, Table 20 
depicts each regime's relative ability to penetrate local solidarity groups in effort to 
extend the reach of the state. 
 
Monarchy Communists Islamists Democracy 
5 1 4 1 
Table 20.   Regimes’ Ability to Penetrate Local Solidarity Groups266 
As previous analysis and discussion has proven, Amir Rahman and the Taliban 
were both successful in penetrating local solidarity groups as a means of extending the 
writ of the state to the local level.  The 'Iron Amir' achieved the highest level of local 
penetration, crushing existing tribal institutions and replacing traditional networks with 
his own state apparatus.  As evidenced in Chapter III, his rule was both ruthless and 
                                                 
266 Here, the term “penetrate” refers to any means by which the government uses, crushes, coerces, co-
opts, disrupts, or otherwise replaces local level governance with the writ of the central state. 
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absolute, and resulted in the eventual pacification of all Afghan tribes under his rule by 
1896.  So effective was the totality of the Amir's endeavor that tribal dynamics played 
little historical political significance for nearly seven decades.  Only during the intra-
faction squabbles of the communist PDPA in the 1960s did tribal dynamics carry a 
modicum of weight on the political stage.  It took another full decade of brutal civil war 
under the Soviets to fragment Afghan society, driving some of the remains to realign 
along their traditional tribal basis of solidarity. 
In my final analysis, there appears to be some direct correlation between a 
regime's ability to develop a high degree of state capacity with that regime's ability to 
penetrate or co-opt local governing structures that are the basis of individual Afghan 
solidarity.  Ultimately, this task has been proven to be achieved through the establishment 
of sufficient governing institutions and structures in Tilly's 'state-making' activity, 
necessarily requiring the singular task of eliminating threats within the state's borders.   
In all cases examined, the state's institutions for war making, principally a large 
standing army, have been primarily employed for the exclusive purpose of state-making 
and regime consolidation.  This historical fact suggests that the Government of 
Afghanistan need not field an army with sufficient capacity for combating external 
adversaries, but must instead organize, equip and field a force that is capable of 
maintaining the state's monopoly on violence and the prevention of armed revolt.   
The Soviets were conventionally militarily superior to the forces of Afghanistan 
and its neighbors, but failed to subdue the Afghans.  Alternatively, the Taliban were 
militarily inferior to both Iran and Pakistan, but fielded a light and responsive guerilla 
force that was largely successful in pacifying 90 percent of the Afghan countryside.   
D. SUMMARY: STATE CAPCITY AND RESISTANCE 
Table 21 summarizes each regime's relative capacity in each of Tilly's four state 
activities, as well as its ability to penetrate local solidarity groups that pose the primary 




state capacity is provided, representing the sum of individual grades awarded each regime 
in each area of the four state activities analyzed, as well as its ability to penetrate local 
solidarity groups. 
 
 Monarchy Communists Islamists Democracy 
State Activity Capacity Capacity Capacity Capacity 
War making 3 3 1 1 
State-making 5 1 4 1 
Protection 4 3 2 3 
Extraction 4 1 2 1 
Penetrate Local Solidarity 5 1 4 1 
Overall Grade 21 9 13 7 
Degree of State Capacity High Little Some Little 
Table 21.   Relative State Capacity of Four Afghan Regimes 
The basis for the overall grade is as follows: 
Grade Capacity 
1 – 5 No capacity 
6 – 10 Little capacity 
11 – 15 Some capacity 
16 – 20 Much capacity 
21 – 25 High capacity 
Table 22.   Ordinal Scale Used to Grade Overall State Capacity 
As Table 21 notes, the monarchy under Amir Abdur Rahman developed a 
relatively high degree of state capacity, while the Taliban's Islamist theocracy achieved a 
degree of state capacity in the median of the scale.  The Communists and the current 
Islamic Republic generated only little overall capacity.   
In these two latter cases, the Soviet's war machine accounted for a significant 
portion of the Communist regime's score, owing to the potential war making capacity that 
the Soviets could have brought to bear against Afghanistan's neighbors.  Similarly, the 
Communists and the current GoA both have extensive protection networks, although the 
Soviet's tended to be more formal and the Karzai regimes' informal.  Although they both 
scored relatively heavily on the individual scale for the 'protection' state activity, the 
protectionism observed in both cases worked to extensively undermine, delegitimize, and 
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fracture the state from within, instead of working to consolidate and centralize its rule.  
Requiring an increasing amount of time and resources to manage, these protection 
networks detracted from what should have been the primary task of eliminating state 
enemies.  Moreover, given the overall inability of both regimes to expand its rule beyond 
the immediate capital and a handful of large urban centers and operating bases, the 
overall capacity grade awarded each regime should have appeared much lower, indicating 
'No capacity' instead of 'Little capacity.'   
Apart from this analysis of the protection state activity, not other major 
correlation is apparent, apart from the overwhelming correlation between the state-
making activity, which is the ultimate task of each regime analyzed, and each regimes' 
ability to penetrate local solidarity groups.  This result is hardly surprising if viewed 
simplistically: that the more successful regimes were more successful in their ability to 
crush their opposition.  This is hardly surprising, recalling Max Weber's axiom regarding 
a state's monopoly on violence.  However, what is of utmost interest to this thesis is how 
this was achieved.  After all, neither the Soviets nor a U.S.-led coalition of international 
military and security forces, with all their military and technological might, has been 
successful in routing and defeating an Afghan insurgency.  Therefore, the means by 
which Abdur Rahman and the Taliban both ruled and dealt with their foes are the seminal 
findings of this thesis from which broader implications for state building are derived. 
E. FINDINGS 
Based on the previous analysis of state capacity and resistance among the four 
Afghan regimes examined, several key findings emerge.  The task, however, is not 
merely to offer superficial evidence as to why the regimes of Abdur Rahman and the 
Taliban achieved a higher degree of state capacity and why the Soviets and current 
Karzai regime did not, but to uncover a deeper understanding of Afghan rule, challenges 
to that rule, and how different Afghan regimes met those challenges.  These findings are 
largely divisible into characteristics of successful Afghan regimes (those that achieved 
relatively high state capacity) and characteristics of Afghan resistance (that impede state 
capacity). 
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1. Characteristics of Successful Afghan Regimes 
a. External Support 
In each case examined, all relied on external support either to come to 
power or in attempt to remain in power.   
With the exception of the PDPA, who deposed the authoritarian regime of 
Mohammad Daoud without immediate external support, all of the other regimes came to 
power with either direct or indirect support from a major regional power.  The British 
helped secure Amir Rahman's claim to the Afghan monarchy, ending years of internecine 
struggle for the throne, while the Taliban received logistical support in the way of money, 
arms and vehicles from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.  The current embattled regime would 
also not have obviously come to power without the will and support of the U.S. to 
overthrow the Taliban.  Returning to the PDPA, the Soviet's December 1979 intervention 
in Afghanistan was an obvious - if not fatal – effort to sustain the communist revolution 
and prop up the regime.  
A key distinction of the external support afforded each regime, however, 
is that in cases where the regime was more successful in establishing rule and generating 
state capacity, namely under Abdur Rahman and the Taliban, external support generally 
ended with monies (and other military support in the case of the Taliban), and did not 
devolve in an attempt to influence or take over direct administration of rule as was the 
case of the Soviet intervention or is the view of Afghans alienated by the Karzai regime. 
Both Abdur Rahman and the Taliban were able to maintain independent 
rule with external support while the PDPA and current Government of Afghanistan are 
perceived to be the puppets of their foreign patrons, and therefore derive no legitimacy 
for their rule. 
b. Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is important to any ruler, for without it, they would quickly be 
deposed by the masses they claim to govern.  The Afghan state has historically centered 
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around a single charismatic leader in whom absolute power is consolidated, and who has 
derived legitimacy based on traditional, charismatic or legal authority.267 
Of the regimes presented, each regime was characterized by one, or more, 
charismatic leaders whose legitimacy was based on personal ability.  Abdur Rahman's 
rule was rooted in all three sources of legitimacy.  He had traditional legitimacy based on 
kin-based clan relations to previous Afghan monarchs, while his charismatic legitimacy 
was based largely on his personal ability, but also his claim to divine rule.  Finally, the 
'Iron Amir' established a legal basis for his authority, as well as the hereditary succession 
of the monarchy, through public and written proclamations.  No other Afghan rule 
obtained legitimacy based on all three sources.  The only other legitimate ruler of 
Afghanistan, presented in this thesis, was the Taliban's Mullah Omar, who was ordained 
with divine charismatic legitimacy when he donned the Cloak of Mohammed.   
Alternatively, none of the communist leaders (Nur Mohammad Taraki, 
Babrak Karmal, Hafizullah Amin or Mohammad Najibullah) or President Karzai rule 
based on any sources of legitimacy.  While it was widely expected by the international 
community, particularly the U.S., that Karzai's Popalzai Durrani heritage could be 
translated into a source of traditional authority, such assumptions proved ill-conceived, 
especially given that the last Afghan monarch, Zahir Shah, was still alive at the time268 
and there was a substantial Afghan contingent that pushed for his restoration, even if only 
ceremonial. 
Following the establishment of legitimacy, another key finding based on 
the comparative analysis of regimes is that indigenous rule is necessary to maintain 
legitimacy.  Legitimacy could have theoretically been lost if rule was conferred to an 
external power.  Although this proposition can only be inferred from the discussion of 
 
 
                                                 
267 Max Weber advanced three sources of legitimate authority: traditional, charismatic and rational 
(legal).  See:  "The Types of Legitimate Domination,” in Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive 
Sociology, Vol. 1, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Translated by Ephraim Fischoff. (New 
York: Bedminster, 1968), 215-216. 
268 King Zahir Shah died in 2007. 
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external support and legitimacy, the fact that indigenous systems of rule prevailed in 
Afghanistan speaks to the dichotomy between foreign support, foreign rule and 
legitimacy. 
c.  Indigenous Rule 
As implied in the previous section, regimes whose government is based on 
indigenous forms administration, whether monarch or Islamist, have been perceived as 
more legitimate and therefore more adept at developing state capacity than regimes 
whose rule is perceived as alien.  Both the Soviets in the 1980s and the United States 
presently are perceived to have installed puppet governments in Kabul whose rule was 
founded upon a non-Islamic ideology, external legitimacy, and whose statute was 
administered by an alien form of bureaucracy.   
The changes brought by these western powers were radical and abrupt, 
attempting to bring sweeping reform on the heels of foreign invasion and occupation.  
Thus, the promotion of human rights and the equality of women were anathema to the 
Afghan people as much for their rapid top-down mandate from the center, as for their 
liberal ideals, that alienated Afghans traditionally conservative customs and values, as 
well as sought to abolish historically patriarchal (and exclusivistic) local governing 
structures.   
In addition, the Afghan National Army and police forces were styled after 
their foreign benefactors, relying on western chains' of command, armaments and tactics 
for use against their own fellow citizens.  Alternatively, Abdur Rahman built his national 
army out of conquered tribes while the Taliban relied on local, mostly Pashtun, tribal 
militias.  That the Amir and the Taliban's "armies" were largely drawn from-, organized 
around-, and fought as tribal arbokai and lashkar is of importance also, connoting a 
composition that was largely of the same solidarity group and not of as mixed allegiance 
as the western-stylized ANA. 
The indigenous nature of rule, as well as the organization and composition 
of security forces, helped legitimize the Amir and the Taliban's rule.  Rooted in legitimate 
forms of Afghan rule, and without overt external support to subvert their authority, these 
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same regimes were then free to employ totalitarian means to further subjugate and control 
the Afghan population in effort to stay in power and prevent a reversion to pre-modern 
forms of tribal rule.  
d. Totalitarian Rule 
Afghans have historically respected and looked toward a strong leader.  It 
is therefore of little surprise that the most successful rulers of the Afghan state, Amir 
Rahman and the Taliban, have ruled by relatively brutal means over often inaccessible 
and inhospitable terrain, and over a warrior culture that has devoured many of the 
greatest armies amassed since antiquity.   
In each successful case, both the 'Iron Amir' and the Taliban employed 
extensive intelligence and patronage networks as a means of both keeping informed, but 
in also promulgating edicts that sought to direct the totality of Afghan life.  The Iron 
Amir associated crime with direct disobedience to his divine and direct rule, while the 
Taliban directed everything from beard length to the banning of music and kite flying. 
While Abdur Rahman and the Taliban achieved the highest relative degree 
of state capacity through often-despotic totalitarian rule, another key component of their 
success was their relative ability to defeat major opponents who directly challenged their 
authority and rule. Thus, totalitarian rule can be seen as a political application necessary 
to subdue the passive majority while the major state-making effort was focused on 
campaigns against minority challengers to the regime. 
e. Defeat Opponents 
The total military defeat of the regime's chief political opposition is an 
historical imperative of the Afghan regimes presented in this thesis.  As noted in Table 
17, the inability of an incumbent regime to annihilate its opposition eventually led to that 
regime's downfall. I.e. In all cases where the opposition was not defeated, it was 
eventually able to challenge and depose the incumbent regime, and establish itself as the 
basis of a new government.  Only the 'Iron Amir' succeeded in overcoming all of his 
challengers.   
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Achieving total peace five years prior to his death, Amir Rahman 
established an environment that allowed him to pass the monarchy on to his son, 
Habibullah, who reigned in relative domestic peace. 
In addition to military superiority, successful Afghan regimes have been 
able to achieve a relative monopoly on violence through the direct control or subversion 
of traditional means of administration at the local level. 
f. Centralized Control, Decentralized Authority 
Since Afghan resistance is historically a primarily bottom-up, grass-roots 
phenomenon, regimes that have successfully met this resistance and gone on to create a 
relatively high degree of state capacity, were those in which absolute control was vested 
in the center, historically a charismatic autocrat, but whose authority was decentralized 
and executed at the lowest possible level. 
While this is the primary objective to be achieved by all regimes, and the 
primary challenge facing the present Afghan government and its international backers, 
the ability to utilize, usurp or co-opt existing local governing structures has been a 
particular hallmark of successful Afghan regimes, and one to be emulated. 
Although Amir Rahman set out to crush and decapitate tribal resistance, 
he left in its place a contrived but sophisticated administrative structure that essentially 
replaced local governing bodies with loyal functionaries and civil servants who 
transmitted and executed the Amir's authority down to the peasantry.  Similarly, the 
Taliban initially centralized control under Mullah Omar, who retained 'spiritual' control 
of the movement, but later delegated political and military control to various shura in 
Kandahar and Kabul.  However, the Taliban still relied on an extensive network of foot 
soldiers and local level officials, including uluswal (district officials first employed by 
Amir Rahman).  The very fact that local tribal forms of governance were eradicated and 
displaced connoted the need for the establishment of a strong provincial and district 
presence in their stead of national solidarity was to be maintained.  Henceforth, the 
vestiges of local government, as manifested in tribal, ethnic and regional solidarity 
groups, have reappeared during times of political weakness and upheaval at the center. 
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Such is the present case, where marginalized solidarity groups, principally 
represented in an undefeated Taliban, tribal and criminal groups, have re-established 
traditional kin-based ties as a basis of providing rudimentary local governance in the 
absence of a strong center whose authority is dominant at the local level. 
g. Local Administration is Key 
The ability to control and project authority at the local level has been a 
hallmark of successful Afghan regimes and is the desired end state for the current 
Government of Afghanistan and its international backers.  Ultimately, with the exception 
of legitimacy, each of the previous characteristics of successful Afghan regimes who 
achieved relatively high degrees of state capacity, external support, indigenous 
totalitarian rule, the defeat of opponents and centralized control, decentralized authority, 
were all an ends to the fundamental task of placing local peoples and structures within the 
writ of the central state.  I.e. Afghanistan's historical political narrative has necessarily 
been one of the competition for local control between the modern central state and 
solidarity groups who held sway over pre-modern local institutions. Thus, control and 
administration at the local level has been critical to preventing the reconstitution of these 
traditional governing structures that are the historical basis for Afghan resistance.   
While Abdur Rahman and the Taliban were both largely able to administer 
at the local level, they employed different means to achieve this end.  
Abdur Rahman replaced traditional tribal bodies with new executive and 
administrative structures that bridged the historic divide between the central state and 
local level governance.  This was particularly evidenced at the district level, where the 
Amir appointed district governors ('alaqadar) and other officials (uluswal; hakim) as 
direct conduits for his centralized administration.  These new district level posts 
facilitated the transmission of the Amir's writ down to the tribal level.   
While the Taliban were more apt to use existing vestigial tribal structures 
as a means for promulgating their rule and denying the expression of dissent and freedom 
of movement for opposition forces at the local level, they still relied on permanent 
district-level structures to maintain a local governing presence.  Instead of district 
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governors, the Taliban instead relied on regional shura as administrative and executive 
intermediary between the central state and provincial governors, and district officials and 
local foot soldiers. 
Although the Taliban's authority was more diffuse relative than that of the 
Amir, the result was the same in that each used executive, administrative, judicial and 
military arms of government to exert control and implement their authority at the local 
level.  Although the Amir employed local level tax collectors, district-level officials were 
common to both regimes, and, combined with other means of separating and controlling 
the population, allowed for the successful administration at the local level.   
The Soviets recognized the need for district-level development, a key 
component for the expansion of their communist manifesto and COIN strategy.269  So 
too, the Karzai regime and the United States have recognized the need for an increased 
local presence, but current resources are insufficient.270   
The critical failure of the current state-building effort in Afghanistan has 
not been one of insufficient resources, although the commitment of additional 
international security forces and monies would surely help, but one of priorities.  Getting 
off to a slow start following almost two years of relative subordination to the U.S. 
counterterrorism effort, the central aim of the current state-building effort is focused on 
buttressing the central government in Kabul and to develop and maintain a primarily 
military foothold at the provincial level.  This strategy is derived from a fundamental lack 
of understanding of the nature of the conflict and Afghanistan's political history, as well 
as ill-conceived donor priorities whose funds are directed by international public interest 
on often-wasteful projects instead of the critical task of creating institutional capacity and 
establishing security at the district and local level.  Nowhere else has this chief 
incompetence been illustrated than in a reluctance to: (1) eliminate corruption and 
nepotism within the central government, (2) remove regional warlords and other wielders 
of authority, (3) establish a permanent civil government and security presence at the 
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107. 
 139
district level, such as the establishment of District Reconstruction Teams, (4) hold 
district-level elections, (5) fund initiatives that seek to establish and develop grassroots 
democratic ideals and institutions at the local level, such as the National Solidarity 
Program. 
In closing, it is remarkable how similar the maps of Amir Rahman's nation 
(Figure 3) and the extent of Taliban control (Figure 12) look, when compared to maps 
illustrating the extent of Soviets military control (Figure 8) and that of the present 
Government of Afghanistan (Figure 18).271 
2. Characteristics of Afghan Resistance 
a. Insurgent, Guerilla Warfare 
Afghan history is replete with examples of Afghan tribes' dismemberment 
of 'superior' invading armies through guerilla warfare and insurgent tactics.  From 
Alexander the Great to the British Empire and Soviet Red Army, the Afghan tribes, 
particularly the Pashtun hill tribes that inhabit the Bolan and Khyber passes, have 
defended their ancestral homeland (watan) with unmatched fervor. 
Rudyard Kipling encapsulated the British experience in Afghanistan, 
common among all foreign forages into 'the Land of Bones,' in his oft-quoted poem, The 
Young British Soldier. 
When you're wounded an' left on Afghanistan's plains, 
An' the women come out to cut up your remains, 
Just roll to your rifle an' blow out your brains, 
An' go to your Gawd like a soldier.272 
Although this thesis reveals a significant ethnic and religious component 
to Afghan  resistance, factors whose propensity for insurgency are discounted by James 
D. Fearon and David D. Laitin's 2003 analysis of “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 
                                                 
271 Although Figure 18 is a map depicting the extent of Taliban control in November 2008, it is by 
implication a graphical depiction of the lack of control by the current government. 
272 Rudyard Kipling, “The Young British Soldier,” in Barrack-Room Ballads  (New York: Penguin, 
2003), 40. 
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Afghanistan is still historically saturated in three of the four conditions the same authors 
conclude favor insurgency, namely: poverty, political instability, and rough terrain.273   
However, despite the seeming disparity between Kipling's lament of the 
horrors of war and Fearon and Laitin's clinical analysis of insurgency, warfare in 
Afghanistan has been historically fought on a local basis, although the scale has often 
engulfed the entire nation.  In this, solidarity groups have consistently been the basis 
around which local tribal armies (lashkar) and militias (arbokai) have mobilized in 
defense of their homeland (watan). 
b.   Prime Importance of Solidarity Groups 
In all cases examined, the composition of Afghan resistance has 
repeatedly been divided along traditional sources of Afghan identity: kin, tribe, clan, 
ethnicity and region, despite any ideological association of different resistance groups. 
Even after Afghanistan's unification and emergence as a modern nation-
state, solidarity groups have remained the prevalent basis of Afghan unity and identity, 
more so than any nationalistic identification as an Afghan, which is a term historically 
synonymous with the Pashtun tribes.  
During the time of Abdur Rahman, kin-based tribal and clan identity was 
the very basis of resistance to the Amir's rule and the target of extensive campaigns to 
consolidate his empire.  As noted in Table 1, the majority of his campaigns were directed 
against the tribes themselves, resulting in the decapitation of traditional tribal political 
and organization hierarchy.  However, although subdued, these basic structures continued 
to be the basis for identity, mobilization, and resistance under subsequent regimes, 
indicating their endemic centrality to Afghan ethos. 
Thus, although resurgent tribal identities were again 'fractured' during the 
anti-Soviet jihad, wider ethnic and regional solidarity became the principal basis for 
resistance, even when the overarching ideological struggle and operational objectives 
were the same and connoted a cry for Afghan nationalism.  What was seen instead was 
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primarily a surge in ethnic Pashtun nationalism, sparking irredentist claims to a wider 
Pashtun homeland, Pashtunistan, on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border. 
This claim has largely been abandoned, although ethnicity and regional 
identity continued to be the non-ideological basis of identity and resistance during 
Taliban rule.  Even now, tribe, ethnicity, and regional solidarity remain central to the 
various factions both within, and external to, the Afghan government, as well as the 
composition of both political and insurgent resistance to the current Afghan regime.  Yet, 
the role of Islam in Afghan society and politics is another important element of Afghan 
resistance. 
c. Role of Islam 
As noted earlier, Islam has historically provided a source of political 
legitimacy for successful Afghan rulers.  Yet, Islam need not be of the radical, puritanical 
ilk prescribed by the Taliban or mandate a strict adherence to Islamic Shari’a law out of 
some Islamic compulsion.  In contrast, legitimate governments must embody and 
preserve the kind of conservative Islamic traditions practiced throughout Afghanistan.  
Therefore, a leader needs to be an upright Muslim, but need not be devout or a learned 
member of the ulema (community of religious scholars). 
This is an important point, because as noted throughout my analysis, 
mullahs have not historically wielded political power either within the traditional Afghan 
tribal structure or as supreme heads of state.  Instead, Islam, particularly the invocation of 
jihad, has provided the primary mechanism for mobilizing armed forces beyond their 
immediate traditional tribal borders.  Thus it is of little surprise that major insurgent 
revolts against successive Afghan rulers and foreign invaders, including British forages 
into the Afghan frontiers in the 18th to 20th centuries and the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan in the 1980s, were mostly inspired by the declaration of jihad and led by 
mullahs and other pious religious figures. 
Consequently, the threat of foreign invasion has accordingly been a 
common factor in facilitating the call for jihad, inciting wider tribal mobilization and 
insurgency. 
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d. Unite Around Foreign Threat 
Historically, the threat of foreign invasion has galvanized Afghan 
resistance into temporarily sidelining domestic factional feuds and uniting against the 
singular common enemy.  Although this tendency has been attributed to a kind of Afghan 
cultural xenophobia, it is a natural tendency to defend one's homeland against foreign 
aggression, whether embodied as a western foreign power or a rival tribe or ethnic group.  
The key distinction to be made here is on use of the term "foreign," which has a widely 
used nation-centric connotation.  However, taken at its most basic meaning, the term 
'foreign' can be conferred on anything different from oneself.  Thus, Afghan xenophobia 
or resistance to foreign rule or invasion is easily ascribed to the basis of Afghanistan's 
traditional solidarity groups;  i.e., Not of one's own kin, tribe, clan, ethnic group or 
region. 
However, the Soviets & current democratic government of Hamid Karzai 
have historically experienced the most widespread, virulent and systemic resistance.  
While this is in part owed to the foreign (exogenous; external to national borders) nature 
of the threat, it may also be in part to the aforementioned perceived threat these non-
Muslim invaders pose toward Islam.  Both are salient factors for mobilization. 
Ultimately, however, the primary reason for mobilization and resistance 
against what constitutes the Afghan state, whether of exogenous or indigenous origin, is 
the threat that the central state poses, by virtue of a nationalist agenda, toward the unity 
and historic self-determination of solidarity groups. 
Thus, despite the dismemberment of tribal political institutions and the 
establishment of a modern nation-state under Amir Rahman, the basis of individual 
Afghan identity, predominantly in rural areas, has remained deeply rooted in pre-modern 
conceptions of group association and loyalty.  These ideas are antithetical to the very idea 
of a modern nation-state attributed to the kind enlightened political ideals stemming from 
the American and French Revolutions from which the very idea of nationalism were 
borne. 
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e. Will Reconstitute, Unless Defeated 
A final note on the nature of Afghan political opposition and resistance is 
not only its aptitude for guerilla warfare, but also its willingness to wage a protracted 
tactical campaign, able to withstand considerable state pressure and readiness to 
reconstitute unless totally defeated. 
The critical importance of Pakistan's Pashtun tribes, who have maintained 
unbroken and unchallenged political autonomy and ethnic sovereignty relative to their 
Afghan neighbors, is of utmost import to the Taliban resurgence, reconstitution of Al 
Qaeda, and overall Afghan resistance.  As noted, with the exception of Abdur Rahman, 
the incumbent regimes' governing structure and institutions did not survive the ouster of 
the regime’s leader, which historically marked the regime's defeat.  The political space 
for political opposition created during the last decade of the monarchy contributed to the 
regime's fall and the ultimate ouster of the Daoud regime by the communist factions. 
Similarly, the Soviet's inability to vanquish the Islamist parties led to their own departure 
in 1989, as well as the fall of the communist government in 1992.  The United Front, 
although weakened by the Taliban, was instrumental in the latter's ouster, but not their 
defeat.  Unless the current U.S.-led CT and ISAF effort succeeds in definitively routing 
and defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan, as well as the Pakistan Taliban, the Haqqani 
Network, Hisb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, Al Qaeda and various criminal networks, the regime-
resistance cycle is set to repeat itself.   
Routed but undefeated, the Taliban have relied on the same traditional kin-
based tribal relationships, local governing structures and basis of group identity and 
solidarity within Pakistan's NWFP and FATA as had existed in Afghanistan prior to 
decades of internecine warfare and civil strife.  These relationships enabled the Taliban to 
reestablish a parallel governing structure within Pakistan, working within an 
impenetrable kin-based network that provides freedom of movement for operations 
against the Government of Afghanistan from within the sovereign sanctity of Pakistan.  
The environment in which the Taliban and other insurgent groups now operate is both 
politically and operationally ideal for a sustained campaign against the Karzai regime. 
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VIII. IMPLICATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Based on the findings of the historical analysis and research conducted in the 
previous five chapters, this chapter endeavors to draw some key implications for the 
current Government of Afghanistan and its coalition partners in their attempt to expand 
the reach of Kabul to the local level.  These implications will not only bear significance 
for the current state-building effort, but also yield important insight into how to best 
counteract the Taliban insurgency, as well as deal with future state-building endeavors.  
Although I make candid recommendations for state building in Afghanistan in my 
concluding remarks, I completely acknowledge that the ultimate the task of building state 
and institutional capacity is up to the Afghan government, through the strategies it 
formulates, tasks it prioritizes, policies it implements and goals it realizes. 
While implications for expanding state capacity are necessarily drawn from the 
historical analysis presented in the preceding chapters, any policy recommendations 
contained herein are guided by relevant discourse from the study of Post Conflict 
Reconstruction.   
Synonymous with post-Cold War state-building experiences in Somalia, East 
Timor, Kosovo, and most recently, Afghanistan, Post Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) 
seeks to establish a sustainable civil government through concerted development efforts 
in four overlapping areas.   These “Four Pillars” of Post Conflict Reconstruction are 
security, justice and reconciliation, social and economic well-being, and governance and 
participation.274   
Each of these pillars is critical to the development of state capacity in 
Afghanistan, and represents the main areas where the GoA and international community 
are focusing their development efforts as reflected in the ANDS.  However, the 
inequitable distribution of resources assigned each of these pillars, with security 
consuming the overwhelming majority of development spending, is illustrative of a 
flawed development strategy. Justice, economic development and governance, arguably 
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more important for the development of state capacity and long term viability of the 
government, receive less than 40 percent of total budget expenditures combined.275  If 
anything this historical analysis has proven, it’s that security alone was not enough to 
overcome Afghan insurgent forces or build state capacity.  Successful regimes have 
relied on a combination of all of these pillars, particularly governance and social justice 
being the key to breaking traditional sources of Afghan resistance at the local.  Thus, the 
cornerstone of my policy recommendations urge a return to a more equitable strategy for 
Afghanistan’s development aimed at creating a viable and sustainable government and 
not solely aimed at ineffectively combating a rural insurgency.   
These recommendations are guided by the “Nine Principles of Reconstruction and 
Development”: 
1. Ownership. Afghanistan must set its own development needs and priorities. 
2. Capacity building.  Involves the transfer of technical knowledge and skills to 
individuals and institutions so that they acquire the long-term ability to 
establish effective policies and deliver competent public services. 
3. Sustainability.  A program’s impact should be designed to endure beyond the 
end of the project. 
4. Selectivity. Resource allocation based on need and policy goals. 
5. Assessment. Based on careful research, design reconstruction plans for local 
conditions.  
6. Results. Direct resources to achieve clearly defined, measurable, and 
strategically focused objectives. 
7. Partnership. Collaborate with governments, communities, donors and others. 
8. Flexibility. Adapt to changing conditions and take advantage of opportunities. 
9. Accountability.  Fight corruption. Ensure programs are transparent and 
accountable.276 
Although not individually addressed in-turn, these principles inform the basis of 
the following implications and recommendations for how to best extend the reach of the 
government of Kabul.   
                                                 
275 Mid Term Budget Framework – English. 
276 Andrew S. Natsios, “The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development,”  Parameters, 35, 
No. 3 (2005): 4-20. 
 147
A.   IMPLICATIONS 
The current Afghan government under the leadership of Hamid Karzai faces the 
same obstacles in establishing effective control and governing capacity today as that 
faced by the other regimes examined.  The rule of past regimes that were largely 
successful in subduing insurgency and generating a relative degree of state capacity, the 
monarchy under Amir Rahman and the Taliban, were predicated on legitimate authority, 
even though their rule was totalitarian and brutal.  This historical trend poses a major 
problem for the current Government of Afghanistan, whose rule is based on rational 
(legal) sources of legitimacy, which has no historical basis for singularly legitimizing 
Afghan rule. 
President Karzai could go a long way to exercise his executive authority in 
attempt to obtain the loyalty and obedience of his parliament and provincial governors.  
His government is in need of reform into order to end the widespread corruption and 
nepotism that dominate Afghan politics.  President Karzai’s own brother is alleged to be 
one of Afghanistan’s biggest drug warlords.  Moreover, some provincial governors and 
influential members of parliament, including Cabinet Ministers, are criminals, warlords 
and military commanders from former regimes, many of whom still maintain strong 
private armies and who rule their provinces like their own personal fiefdoms, using their 
government position to protect them in their illicit activities.  
The authority of the current government in Kabul is additionally undermined by 
foreign military forces and advisers, whose mere presence serves to delegitimize the 
government and provide a strong source for political mobilization and resistance.  Yet, 
overcoming the fundamental issue of political legitimacy is just one facet of the many 
challenges facing this government and coalition forces.  The central task remains one of 
extending the government's reach to the local level, amidst an insurgency that has not 
only engulfed over ninety percent of the countryside, but has exponentially escalated in 
the number and severity of attacks against coalition forces and government 
representatives over the past three years.  
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Backed by the external power of the British, the 'Iron Amir' was faced with 
establishing his own legitimacy and authority over an occupied territory populated by the 
ethnically diverse and independent tribes within his borders.  This situation is analogous 
to the conditions under which Hamid Karzai assumed Presidency of the interim Afghan 
government in December 2001, following the U.S.-led military coalition that toppled the 
Islamist Taliban regime.  American and NATO forces continue to conduct security, 
reconstruction and counter-terrorism operations within Afghanistan’s borders, effectively 
performing many of the state-making tasks undertaken by the Amir over century ago.  
These military operations should alleviate some of the logistical burden on the Karzai 
regime, who should place increased focus on extending bureaucratic and administrative 
consolidation and control of the government. 
As Afghanistan's last monarch, Zahir Shah, died in 2007, the opportunity is past 
for reviving the monarchy under his eldest surviving son, Crown Prince Ahmad Shah.  
However, even the ceremonial re-establishment of the monarchy may prove an important 
source of legitimacy and nationalism reconciliation for the Afghan people, who hold a 
nostalgic view of the monarchy.  In this way, a new Afghan monarch could potentially 
confer some political legitimacy upon an elected ruler, and provide a legitimate source of 
stability and inspiration, such as how England and Japan's monarchs are still revered.  
The symbolic value of the monarchy as a source of political legitimacy should not be 
discounted out-of-hand, as the current regime faces a terrible crisis of legitimacy, and is 
unlikely to develop such authority on its own, without significant changes in behavior, 
policy and composition. 
Judicial reform provides another avenue by which the current democratic 
government can gain inroads toward the development of legitimate authority.  The 
government needs to be perceived as amenable toward, and not in opposition against 
traditional conservative Islamic customs.  Judicial reform that integrates aspects of 
Islamic Shari'a law with modern criminal and civil law could go a long way toward 
promoting a virtuous image for the secular government, who could translate such a move 
into political capital as both the defender of Islamic values and dispenser of Islamic 
justice, claims that have resided for too long in the domain of radical Islamists and 
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terrorists, instead of the government.  This last aspect is key, as the application of the 
Shari'a would be respectful of human rights and largely compatible with international 
law, as long as no strict or puritanical interpretation of the Shari'a or adoption of the 
Hadith (punishments) are adopted.  Judicial reform may look something like the 
Integrated Model for a District-level Justice System depicted in Figure 14, or take on 
different structure.  The critical importance is to restore public confidence in the justice 
system, based on the equitable implementation of a legal code amenable to Islam, tribal 
customary law and international norms and laws concerning human rights.  
National reconciliation must be another critical component of any strategy 
intended to extend the writ of the state to the local level.  Only after grievances held by 
the losing side, in this case the Taliban, are reconciled, can the nation move forward.  
While this author concedes that the radical Islamist worldviews of many insurgent 
elements, particularly Taliban hard-liners and members of HIG, are irreconcilable with 
the idea of a democratic and secular Afghan state, moderate elements of all insurgent 
factions must be brought into the political process.  
Such an endeavor, as with all political reforms and military campaigns, connotes 
the need for a comprehensive and targeted information operations campaign.  Such a 
campaign need not come from the U.S. or NATO, or ISAF Headquarters, but from the 
government of Afghanistan itself, ideally from the Office of the President in coordination 
with the responsible ministry (Justice, Interior, etc.).  This campaign must not focus on 
the efforts of coalition forces attempt to win 'hearts and minds,' but present a single, 
consistent and recurring message aimed at discrediting the Islamists heretical worldviews 
and undermining the very basis of civil disenfranchisement, alienation and insurgent 
mobilization that provides the permissive environment in which these elements operate. 
That Taliban insurgents and criminal elements now have freedom of movement in parts 
of Kabul is indicative of the magnitude of the insurgency and the urgency with which 
Afghan and coalition forces must move to re-liberate besieged provinces, districts, urban 
centers and rural villages.   
Thus, the establishment of a permanent government presence at the local level is 
imperative. This can be achieved through the inclusion and participation, not exclusion or 
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direction, of local solidarity groups in local civic decisions of governance.  This endeavor 
connotes the need for massive assistance and protection from the center, as well from the 
international community, that has been want to direct development spending on its own 
parochial objectives. 
An increased security and government presence is also conducive to 
counterinsurgent strategy aimed at separating insurgent activities from the civilian 
populace, thereby aiding in their elimination.  For this to work, the central state and its 
security apparatus must be the single guarantor of peace, security and relative economic 
prosperity, wielding not only a Weberian monopoly on violence, but equally important, a 
monopoly on social livelihood and welfare. 
B.   RECOMMENDATIONS 
To gain legitimacy, develop local governance, curb the insurgency, and ultimately 
extend the reach of Kabul, I advocate the establishment of something akin to District 
Reconstruction Teams (DRTs), replicating the Provincial Reconstruction Team construct 
at the district level.  Advocating this idea is not something new or unique, but it is rooted 
firmly in the historical dichotomy between Afghan State and tribe.277  In addition, the 
establishment of DRTs offers a construct for combining local level security and civic 
governance based on something both familiar and in wide use, thereby making it easy to 
replicate. Finally, DRTs offer the same marriage between Afghan civilian government 
and security forces and international military forces and advisers that has been the model 
for Provincial level development, to the district level where it is woefully missing and 
most urgently (and historically) needed.   
These DRTs need not be large, but they do need to be visible, providing basic 
security and public services while communicating and implementing the government’s 
National Development Plan.  Key departments and programs, such as the Independent 
Directorate of Local Governance and the National Solidarity Program, whose sole task is 
the establishment and strengthening of local governing structures such as Community 
                                                 
277 Thomas H. Johnson, research professor at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey, 
California, has advocated the need for a DRT construct in many of his seminars and lectures.  Professor 
Johnson is also Senior Research Associate for NPS’ Center for Contemporary Conflict. 
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Development Councils, need to be integrated into the DRT construct, whose information 
campaign should be to put an overwhelmingly Afghan face on security operations, 
reconstruction, and local governance.  In addition, these local government programs need 
as much exposure, funding and support from the central government and international 
community security, which currently monopolizes political discourse and media 
attention, but only to the profit of the Taliban.   
Established in the immediate278 wake of a counterinsurgent offensive to recapture 
district capitals and villages, DRTs need to be created in combination with a massive 
information operations campaign, not only aimed at discrediting the Taliban, but on 
promoting national values, common ideals, and on strengthening the central 
government’s support and commitment to local government and development.   
Once in place, DRTs need to facilitate district elections as soon as feasible, 
preferably within weeks of set up.   District elections need not immediately occur nation-
wide, but must be held as individual districts are liberated and DRTs are put in place.  
Electoral terms may initially be short, such as only six months, until such a time as all 
districts in a province have been liberated and elections can be held province-wide.   
This approach may be analogous to the attempted creation of “strategic hamlets” 
in the southern Republic of Vietnam in the 1960s, with the primary distinction being the 
forced relocation of government to the people, not the other way around.  The desired 
result; decreased insurgent violence, the establishment of local governance, and creation 
of civil-political and economic ties between the central government and local populace, 
should be achievable as part of this all-encompassing framework. 
In this last task, reclaiming local territory and sources of livelihood from 
insurgent and criminal groups, security forces and government officials must not be risk 
averse.  The establishment of district and local level presence must be centrally 
coordinated and implemented in unison by international security forces and the civilian 
government.  In areas of heavy insurgent, terrorist and criminal activity, the 
establishment of district reconstruction centers and district elections may not come at the 
                                                 
278 District Reconstruction Teams and relief supplies should be imbedded in second echelon forces, 
establishing government presence as part of COIN security operations, and not arrive days or weeks later.  
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same time for the entire country or even the same province.  The territory lost to the 
Taliban and other insurgent forces, illustrated in Figure 18, is indicative of the amount of 
territory that needs to be retaken, by force, so that governance and security can be 
restored in these areas.  The risk assumed by military and civilian personnel in COIN 
operations aimed at the restoration of district-level governance must not limit or prevent 
these objectives.  However, national strategy and operational prudence should of course 
dictate the timing and coordination of such operations. 
In much of the south and east, the systematic retaking of insurgent strongholds 
must be accompanied with universal poppy eradication, but not before sufficient 
economic means are provided the civilian populace to lift them out of immediate 
subsistence living or indentured farming and service to criminal organizations.  This 
endeavor in itself connotes massive expenditure, and a plan for immediate but sustained 
agricultural development that would educate, supervise and subsidize farmer’s transition 
to alternative crops, and facilitate their delivery to market.  An alternative strategy aimed 
at undermining Afghanistan’s illicit drug trade may be to legalize and regulate poppy 
production for the international medicinal market, as Turkey does.  Although 
controversial, this avenue may create the opportunity for pharmaceutical companies' 
investment in Afghanistan, and a source of employment and the future development of a 
science and technology industry. 
As with the composition of DRTs themselves, the monies and supplies needed for 
the immediate humanitarian relief of the local populace must be acquired and staged 
before the commencement of operations so that they can flow into district centers as part 
of the liberation campaign, once the main thrust of military forces have routed the 
insurgents.  In all cases, the 'liberation' of district centers, towns and villages must be met 
with direct, overwhelming and permanent state institutions.  In many places, this may 
only connote a small constabulary, or the re-armament and utilization of traditional tribal 
militias such as arbokai, which are akin to a neighborhood watch.  In all cases, the free-
flow of information between the center, provincial capitals, district centers and villages is 
critical to both maintaining vigilance (as village elders can point out who the insurgents 
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are, and more importantly, where they are) as well as meeting the provision of local 
needs, whether it be food subsidies, water, roads or other basic services and public works 
projects.   
Part of the tragedy of Afghanistan is that many of these recommendations and 
development goals are already outlined in the Afghanistan National Development 
Strategy (ANDS), and targeted for implementation over the next five years.  However, 
there appears to be no concerted effort on the part of the international community to 
either adequately fund these development projects or align greater COIN strategy and 
ISAF military operations in cooperation with the ANDS.  The two are still not largely 
viewed as mutually inclusive, although many top military leaders in Afghanistan have 
made the realization that military means alone is not going to win the war.  Only by 
coordinating the GoA’s development strategy with the international community’s COIN 
strategy would the government be able to achieve a relative capacity for state-making, the 
historical imperative of each Afghan regime.  That these two strategies are not being 
implemented in concert, and are being attempted on the cheap, at the wrong level of 
government (provincial), and with risk adversity dictating the scope, scale and area of 
operations, there is little basis for hoping that the development goals outlined in the 35 
Provincial-, 22 Sector-, and 37 Sector Annexes of the ANDS will be met.  Therefore, the 
direction and scope of the coalition’s COIN campaign and international development 
effort must be met with the same responsiveness toward the achievement of deliberate 
government development goals that the ANDS aims to accomplish on an ambitious, but 
not unachievable, timeline. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Past attempts to extend the reach of Kabul outward have all been met with heavy 
resistance.  A primary reason for this is the existence of solidarity groups, which are the 
root cause of Afghan political mobilization and resistance.  Known as a qawm, these local 
tribal-, ethnic-, and regional social relationships remain the fundamental basis of 
individual Afghan identification and relations with the central state.  Afghan political 
power and legitimate authority resides in these solidarity groups, at the local level.   
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In order to extend the reach of government to the local level, a fundamental shift 
in thinking is required, although not by leaders in Kabul, but by leaders in the west, who 
continue to view the creation of government as a top-down phenomenon.  What this 
historical analysis has shown, and of what Afghan leaders must already certainly be 
keenly aware, is that governance, political power and legitimacy in Afghanistan are a 
bottom-up phenomenon.279  The desired methodology then, is the establishment of strong 
representative and participatory civic local municipal and district governance, as a means 
of extending government upward to the center, not the other way around.   
This will require the difficult, but necessary, reprioritization of international 
developmental assistance and its subordination to the Government of Afghanistan, in 
order to distribute more equitably, resources based on the development goals outlined in 
the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS).  The ANDS is, after all, the 
embodiment of the very kind of prioritized master development plan that the international 
community sought, reconciling the United Nation's Millennium Development Goals 
under the development priorities and capabilities of the Afghan government.  However, 
such a shift in focus and commitment has not been realized, and the international 
community continues to place security at the forefront of any development strategy, as 
evidenced by the overwhelming preponderance of spending on security, vice governance 
and infrastructure.  While an obviously essential component of state-making, the 
provision of security, as history has shown, should not be the only, or even primary, 
means of combating rural Afghan insurgency.   
While each Afghan regime has had to contend with substantial armed resistance 
and tribal revolt, successful rulers, those who achieved a relatively high degree of state 
capacity, each did so not solely by militarily eliminating state opponents, but also by 
establishing effective government rule at the local level.  Therefore, for an Afghan 
government to be effective it needs to establish strong centralized control at the center, 
but decentralize its authority down to the local level where solidarity groups reside.  
Historically, the establishment of local governing structures, whether eliminating, 
                                                 
279 Hence, the Government of Afghanistan's focus on the creation of District and Municipal-level 
governance through programs such as the Independent Directorate for Local Governance and National 
Solidarity Program. 
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displacing, co-opting, or using pre-existing structures, has been synonymous with Afghan 
counterinsurgency efforts and the creation of a strong central government.  Only this way 
can the central government in Kabul hope to quell the insurgency and expand governing 
capacity. 
 156
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 157
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Adamec, Ludwig W.  Afghanistan’s Foreign Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century:  
Relations With the USSR, Germany, and Britain. Tucson, AZ: University of  
Arizona Press, 1974. 
 
“Afghan 'blasphemy' death sentence.” BBC News, January 12, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.  
uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/7204341.stm (accessed August 19, 2008). 
 
Afghanistan 1386 Imports & Exports by Country.  Kabul: Afghanistan Customs  
Department, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. http://www.customs.gov.af/  
Documents/Trade-statistics/cranking1386.pdf (accessed August 7, 2008). 
 
The Afghanistan Compact.  London: The London Conference on Afghanistan, January 31  
– February 1, 2006.  http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/Afghanistan  
_compact.pdf (accessed November 11, 2008). 
 
Afghanistan Investment Support Agency, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Islamic  
Republic of Afghanistan.  http://www.aisa.org.af/ (accessed February 19, 2009). 
 
Afghanistan National Budget: Fiscal Year 1386, in English.  Kabul: General Budget  
Directorate, Ministry of Finance, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.  
http://www.budgetmof.gov.af/Budget_Resources/1386/1386BudgetDecreeEnglis 
h.pdf (accessed November 19, 2008).  
 
Afghan National Development Strategy Documents.  http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/ands_  
docs/index.asp (accessed August 19, 2008). 
 
Afghan-led Operation Maiwand Model for Future.  International Security Assistance  
Force, Press Release 2007-471, June 25, 2007.  http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/  
pressreleases/2007/06-june/pr070625-471.html (accessed November 12, 2008). 
 
Afsar, Shahid A., and Christopher A. Samples. The Evolution of the Taliban.  Master's  
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008. 
 
Arnold, Anthony. Afghanistan: the Soviet Invasion in Perspective, rev. ed. Stanford, CA:  
Hoover Institution Press, 1985.  
 
Ayoob, Mohammed. The Third World Security Predicament: State-making, Regional  
 Conflict, and the International System.  Boulder, CA: Lynne Rienner, 1995.  
 
Ayub, Fatima, and Sari Kouvo.  “Righting the Course? Humanitarian Intervention, the  
War on Terror and the Future of Afghanistan.”  International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 
4 (2008): 641-657. 
 158
Azimi,  Prof. Abdul Salaam.  Draft Strategy of the Supreme Court.  Kabul: Chief Justice  
of the Supreme Court, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, April 15, 2007. 
 
Babrak Karmal’s GRU Dossier. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,  
Cold War International History Project.  http://wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_  
id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034E06B-96B6-175C- 
68F8CE2919B933E&sort=Collection&item= Soviet%20Invasion%20of  
%20Afghanistan (accessed April 19, 2008).  
 
Banuazizi, Ali, and Myron Weiner, eds. The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics:  
 Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1988.  
 
Benard, Cheryl, Ole Kvaerno, Peter Dahl Thruelsen and Kristen Cordell, eds.  
Afghanistan: State and Society, Great Power Politics, and the Way Ahead:  
Findings from an International Conference, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2007.  Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Center for Middle East Public Policy, 2008.   
 
Burns, John F.  “Afghan President, Pressured, Reshuffles Cabinet.”  New York Times.  
October 11, 2008.  http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/12/world/asia/  
12afghan.html (accessed October 12, 2008). 
 
Chesterman, Simon.  “Walking Softly in Afghanistan: the Future of UN State-Building.”  
Survival, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Autumn 2002): 37-46. 
 
CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos  
/af.html (accessed March 16, 2008).  
 
Coll, Steve.  Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden,  
 From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: Penguin, 2004.  
 
Cramer, Christopher, and Jonathan Goodhand.  “Try Again, Fail Again, Fail Better? War,  
the State, and the ‘Post-Conflict’ Challenge in Afghanistan.”  Development and  
Change, Vol. 33, No. 5 (2002): 885-909. 
 
Dobbins, James F.  After the Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan.  Washington,  
D.C.: Potomac Books, 2008.   
 
Danish, H.E. Sawar.  Draft Strategy of Ministry of Justice for the Afghan National  
Development Strategy.  Kabul: Ministry of Justice, Islamic Republic of  
Afghanistan, April 2007. 
 
Dorronsoro, Gilles. Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present. Translated  




Doyle, Michael W.  “Liberalism and World Politics.” The American Political Science  
 Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986): 1151-1169.  
 
Dupee, Matt.  “The Haqqani Network: Rein of Terror.”  The Long War Journal. August  
2, 2008.  http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/08/the_haqqani_network  
.php (accessed August 3, 2008). 
 
Dupree, Louis. Afghanistan, 3rd ed. Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
 
Eastern Afghanistan: Tribal Map.  Monterey, CA: Program for Culture and Conflict  
Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007.  http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/  
ExecSumm.html (accessed November 12, 2008). 
 
Edwards, David B.  Heroes of the Age: Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan Frontier.  
 Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996.  
 
Emadi, Hafizullah.  State, Revolution, and Superpowers in Afghanistan.  New York: 
 Praeger, 1990. 
 
European Parliament.  European Parliament Resolution on the Case of the Afghan  
Journalist Perwiz Kambakhsh.  European Parliament, March 12, 2008.  Document  
ID: B6-0112/2008.  http://guengl.org/upload/docs/P6_RC(2008)0112 _EN.doc.   
(accessed August 19, 2008). 
 
Ewans, Martin. Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics. New York: 
 Harper Collins, 2002. 
 
Fact Sheet: 1386.  Kabul: General Budget Directorate, Ministry of Finance, Government  
of Afghanistan.  http://www.budgetmof.gov.af/units/Budget_Policy_ Coord_    
Reporting/Fact_Sheet/Fact_sheet_final_1386.pdf (accessed November 19, 2008). 
 
International Monetary Fund.  A Factsheet: The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility  
(PRGF).  Washington D.C.: IMF, October 2008.  http://www.imf.org/external/np/  
exr/facts/prgf.htm (accessed November 12, 2008). 
  
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin.  “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War.”   
American Political Science Review, Vol.  97, No. 1 (February 2003): 75-90.  
 
Fukuyama, Francis. State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century.  
 Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004.  
 
The Fund for Peace.  Failed State Index 2008.  Washington D.C.: The Fund for Peace.   
http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&i 
d= 99&Itemid=323 (accessed February 19, 2009). 
 
 160
Ghani, Ashraf, and Clare Lockhart.  Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a  
Fractured World.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
 
Giustozzi, Antonio.  War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan: 1978-1992. Washington, 
 D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2000.  
 
Graff, George B., Lt. Col., USA.  “Operation Maiwand – The ANA 203rd Effects Cell is  
Born.”  Fires, (January –February 2008): 38-39.  http://sillwww.army.mil/  
firesbulletin/2008/jan_feb_2008/Jan_Feb_2008_pages_38_39.pdf (accessed  
December 22, 2008). 
 
Griffin, Michael. Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan.  
London: Pluto Press, 2001.  
 
Groh, Ty L.  Ungoverned Spaces: The Challenges of Governing Tribal Societies.  
Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006. 
 
Gupta, Bhabani Sen.  Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society. Boulder, CO: Lynne  
 Rienner, 1986.  
 
Hammond, Thomas T.  Red Flag Over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet 
 Invasion, and the Consequences.  Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984.  
 
Hamre, John J., and Gordon R. Sullivan.  “Toward Postconflict Reconstruction.”  The  
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Autumn 2002): 85–96. 
 
Harrison, Frances.  “Karzai Reassurance on Journalist.” BBC News, February 7, 2008.   
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/7233402.stm (accessed August  
19, 2008). 
 
Hauner, Milan. The Soviet War in Afghanistan: Patterns of Russian Imperialism. 
 Philadelphia: University Press of America, 1991.  
 
Herbst, Jeffrey. “War and the State in Africa.” International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4  
(Spring 1990): 117-139.  
 
Hussein, Raja G.  Badal: A Culture of Revenge: The Impact of Collateral Damage on  
Taliban Insurgency.  Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008. 
 
International Council on Security and Development.  Map 45 - Areas of Taliban  
Presence in Afghanistan Plus Fatal Violent Incidents in 2008 - November 2008.   
London: ICOS, 2008.  http://www.icosmaps.net/ (accessed January 17, 2009). 
 
———.  Struggle for Kabul: The Taliban Advance. London: ICOS, 2008.   
 
 161
Johnson, Thomas H.  “Afghanistan’s Post-Taliban Transition: the State of State-building  
After War.”  Central Asian Survey, Vol. 25, No.1-2 (Mar-Jun 2006): 1-26. 
 
———.  “On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan.”   
China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2007): 93-129. 
 
Johnson, Thomas H., and Chris M. Mason. “Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in  
 Afghanistan.”  Orbis, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 2007): 71-89.  
 
Johnson, Thomas H., and M. Chris Mason.  “All Counterinsurgency is Local.”  The  
Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 302, No. 3 (October 2008): 36-38. 
 
Jones, Seth G.  Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.  Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008. 
 
Jones, Seth G.  “How to Save Karzai.”  Foreign Policy, July 21, 2008.  http://www.  
foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4392 (accessed July 21, 2008). 
 
Katzman, Kenneth.  Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance.   
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, October 14, 2008.  
(RS21922). 
 
———.   Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy.  Washington,  
D.C.: Congressional Research Service, October 15, 2008. (RL30588). 
 
Kakar, M. Hasan.  Government and Society in Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir ‘Abd al-
 Rahman Khan.  Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1979. 
 
Kaufmann, Daniel, and Aart Kraay.  “Governance Indicators: Where Are We, Where  
Should We Be Going?”  The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 23, No. 1  
(Spring 2008): 1-30.   
 
Kipling, Rudyard.  "The Young British Soldier," in Barrack-Room Ballads.  New York:  
Penguin, 2003. 
 
Kunar Province: Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HiG).  Monterey, CA: Program for Culture  
and Conflict Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008.  http://www.nps.edu/ 
programs/ccs/Kunar.html (accessed November 12, 2008). 
 
Magnus, Ralph H., and Eden Naby.  Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid, revised.  
 Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002.  
 
Maley, William.  Stabilizing Afghanistan: Threats and Challenges: Policy Brief No. 68:   
Foreign Policy for the Next President.  Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment  
for International Peace, 2008.  http://www. carnegieendowment.org/files/  
stabilizing_afghanistan.pdf (accessed February 19, 2009). 
 162
Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder.  “Democratization and War.”  Foreign Affairs  
 Vol. 74, No. 3 (May/June 1995): 79-97. 
———.  Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies go to War. Cambridge, MA:  
The MIT Press, 2005.  
 
Marten, Kimberly.  “Warlordism in Comparative Perspective.”  International Security,  
Vol. 31, No. 3 (Winter 2006/07): 41–73. 
 
Matinuddin, Kamal.  The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994-1997.  Oxford: Oxford  
 University Press, 1999.  
 
Mazzetti, Mark, and Eric Schmidtt.  "C.I.A. Outlines Pakistan Links With Militants."   
New York Times, July 30, 2008.  http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/30/world/asia/  
30pstan.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all (accessed July 30, 2008). 
 
Members of the Current Cabinet.  Kabul: Office of the President, Islamic Republic of  
Afghanistan.  http://www.president.gov.af/english/cabinet.mspx (accessed August  
19, 2008). 
 
Mid Term Budget Framework - English.  Kabul: General Budget Directorate, Ministry of  
Finance, Government of Afghanistan, May 13, 2008.  http://www.budgetmof.gov  
.af/units/Budget_Policy_Coord_Reporting/Prioritization/English/MTBF_English_ 
May_13th.xls (accessed August 19, 2008). 
 
Midgal, Joe. “Strong Societies, Weak States: Power and Accommodation,” in  
Understanding Political Development, by Myron Weiner. Edited by Samuel 
 Huntington. Chicago, IL: Scott Foresman & Co, 1986. 
 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.  http://www.  
commerce.gov.af/default.asp (accessed February 19, 2008). 
 
Ministry of Finance Charges as of 1 January 2008.  Ministry of Finance, Islamic  
Republic of Afghanistan.  http://www.mof.gov.af/download/en/1203150284.pdf 
(accessed November 19, 2008). 
 
Naithani, Saurabh.  ACBAR’S Guide to the ANDS: A Comprehensive Guide to the  
Afghanistan National Development Strategy.  Kabul: Agency Coordinating Body 
for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), 2007.  http://www.ands.gov.af/ands /ands_guide/ 
ands_guide/The%20Ands%20Guide%20Eng.pdf (accessed August 19, 2008). 
 
Natsios, Andrew S.  “The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development.”   
Parameters, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Autumn 2005): 4-20. 
 
Newell, Richard S.  The Politics of Afghanistan.  Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,  
1972. 
 163
Norchi, Charles.  “From Real Estate to Nation-State: Who Will Lead Afghanistan.”  
Dissent, Vol. 53, Issue 1 (Winter 2006): 24-29.  
 
Olesen, Asta.  Islam and Politics in Afghanistan.  Surrey, UK: Curzon Press, 1995. 
 
Ops vs. Revenue Graph.  Kabul: Budget of Afghanistan, General Budget Directorate,  
Ministry of Finance, Government of Afghanistan. http://www.budgetmof.gov.af 
/units/Budget_Policy_Coord_Reporting/Prioritization/English/MTBF_English_M
ay_13th.xls (accessed November 12, 2008). 
 
Owen, John M. IV.  “Iraq and the Democratic Peace.”  Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 6  
 (November/December 2005): 122-127.  
 
Primary Political Parties: Hezb-e Afghanistan Naween (New Afghanistan Party/Qanuni).   
Monterey, CA: Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, Naval Postgraduate  
School, 2008.  http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/MaydenWardak.html (accessed  
November 12, 2008). 
 
“Profile: Abdullah Abdullah.”  BBC News, March 22, 2006.  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/  
south_asia/1672882.stm (accessed August 19, 2008). 
 
“Profile: Yunus Qanuni.”  BBC News, September 10, 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr  
/-/2/hi/south_asia/1695218.stm (accessed August 19, 2008). 
 
Rashid, Ahmed.  Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation  
Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia.  New York, NY: Viking  
Press, 2008. 
 
———.  Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia.  New Haven,  
CT: Yale Nota Bene, 2001.  
 
Rasler, Karen A., and William R. Thompson.  War and State-making: The Shaping of the  
 Global Powers.  Winchester, MA: Unwin Hymann Inc., 1989.  
 
Reforming the Fiscal System and Achieving Fiscal Sustainability: Draft for Discussion at  
Afghanistan Development Forum (ADF) 2005.  Kabul: Afghanistan National  
Development Strategy, 2005.  http://www.ands.gov.af/admin/ands/documents/  
upload/UploadFolder//NDF%202005%20-%20Theme%204%20-%20Fiscal%  
20sustainability%20and%20public%20administration%20reform.pdf (accessed  
August 19, 2008). 
 
Revenue Department: Introduction.  Kabul: Ministry of Finance, Islamic Republic of  




Risen, James.  “Reports Link Karzai's Brother to Heroin Trade.”  International Herald  
Tribune, October 4, 2008.  http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=  
16689186 (accessed November 12, 2008). 
 
Rondeaux, Candace.  “Afghan Rebel Positioned for Key Role.”  The Washington Post,  
November 5, 2008.  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/article 
/2008/11/04/AR2008110403604.html (accessed November 6, 2008). 
 
Roy, Olivier. Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan. Cambridge: Cambridge University  
Press, 1990. 
 
———.  "The Lessons of the Soviet/Afghan War."  The International Institute for  
Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 259.  London: Brassey’s, 1991.  
 
———.  The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations. New York: New York 
 University Press, 2005. 
 
Rubin, Barnett R.  The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in  
 the International System, 2nd ed.  New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002.  
 
———.  “Peace Building and State-Building in Afghanistan: Constructing Sovereignty  
for Whose Security?”  Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2006): 175-185. 
 
Russian General Staff. The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost.  
 Translated and edited by Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress.  Lawrence, KS:  
University Press of Kansas, 2002.  
 
Schwartz, Herman. “The Rise of the Modern State: From Street Gangs to Mafias,” in  
 States Versus Markets. New York: St. Martins, 1994.  
 
Schweich, Thomas.  “Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?”  New York Times.  July 27, 2008.  
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/27/magazine/27AFGHAN-t.html (accessed  
July 28, 2008). 
 
Security: Five-Year Strategic Benchmarks: Program 1: National Defense.  Kabul: Office  
of the President, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.  http://www.president.gov.af/  
english/np/security.mspx#NatDef (accessed November 12, 2008). 
 
Strategy Paper On Launching Of The Independent Directorate For Local Governance   
(IDLG).  Kabul: Independent Directorate for Local Governance, Afghan National  
Development Strategy Documents, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2008. 




Shahrani, M. Nazif.  “State Building and Social Fragmentation in Afghanistan: A 
 Historical Perspective,” in The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, 
 Iran, and Pakistan. Edited by Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner. New York: 
 Syracuse University Press, 1986. 
 
Simonsen, Sven Gunnar.  “Ethicizing Afghanistan? Inclusion and Exclusion in Post-Bonn  
Institution Building.”  Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2004): 707-729. 
 
Smith, Martin.  “Frontline: Interview of Haji Omar.” Public Broadcasting Station,  
August 2006.  http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/militants/omar.  
html (accessed November 11, 2008). 
 
———.  “Frontline: Return of the Taliban.”  Public Broadcasting Station.  Aired  
October 3, 2006.  Content on the web: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline  
/taliban (accessed November 19, 2008). 
 
Tilly, Charles. "War Making and State-making as Organized Crime." CRSO Working  
 Paper No. 256.  Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 1982.  
 
———. “War Making and State-making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the  
 State Back In.  Edited by Peter B. Evans, D. Reischemeyer and Theda Skocpol.  
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.  
 
United Nations Development Programme.  Millennium Development Goals in  
Afghanistan.  New York, NY: UNDP.  http://www.undp.org.af/MDGs/index.htm  
(accessed December 22, 2008). 
 
United Nations Population Fund.  UNFPA Projects in Afghanistan.  New York, NY:  
UNPF.  http://afghanistan.unfpa.org/projects.html#rhs (accessed August 7, 2008). 
 
United Nations Security Council.  “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in  
Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government  
Institutions.”  New York, NY: UNSC, December 5, 2001.  S/2001/1154. 
 
United States Agency for International Development.  USAID and Ministry of  
Agriculture and Irrigation Increase Agricultural Exports. Washington, D.C.:  
USAID, June 27, 2006.  http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Article.92.aspx (accessed  
February 19, 2009). 
 
United States Government Accountability Office.  Securing, Stabilizing, and  
Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight.   
Washington D.C.: USGAO, Report to Congressional Committees, May 2007.   
GAO-07-801SP.  http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07801sp.pdf (accessed  
February 19, 2009). 
 
 166
Varshney, Ashutosh.  “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond.”  World  
 Politics, Vol. 53, No. 3 (April 2001): 362-398.  
 
Wardak, Ali.  “Building a Post-War Justice System in Afghanistan.”  Crime, Law &  
Social Change, Vol. 41, Issue 4 (May 2004): 319-341. 
 
Wardak, H.E. Abdul Rahim.  Draft Defense Strategy for the Afghanistan National  
Development Strategy.  Kabul: Ministry of Defense, Islamic Republic of  
Afghanistan, March 2007. 
 
Weber, Max.  “Politics as a Vocation,” in Essential Readings in Comparative Politics.  
 2nd Ed., edited by Patric H. O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski.  New York: W.W.  
 Norton, 2006.  
 
———.  “The Types of Legitimate Domination,” in Economy and Society: An Outline of  
Interpretive Sociology, Vol. 1, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich.  
Translated by Ephraim Fischoff.  New York: Bedminster, 1968. 
 
Wilber, Donald N.  Afghanistan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture.  New Haven, CT:  
Hraf Press, 1962. 
 
The World Bank.  The Investment Climate in Afghanistan: Exploiting Opportunities in an  
Uncertain Environment, Official Draft.  Washington, D.C.: The World Bank,  
December 2005.  http://www.aisa.org.af/Downloads/reports/Afghanistan%20ICA  
-Official%20Draft.pdf  (accessed November 12, 2008). 
 
The World Bank.  Worldwide Governance Indicators: Afghanistan.  Washington, D.C.:  
The World Bank, 2008.  http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.asp  
(accessed December 22, 2008). 
 167
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1.  Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Thomas H. Johnson 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4. Michael S. Malley 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
5. Feroz Khan 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
6. S. Paul Kapur 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
7. Jon C. Rice 
Presidio of Monterey 
Monterey, California 
 
8. John J. Deeney, IV 
19th Weapons Squadron 
Nellis AFB, Nevada 
 
9. Abraham Salomon 
United States Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency 
Lackland AFB, Texas 
 
10. Christopher R. Mullins 
United States Air Force Special Operations School 
Hurlburt Field, Florida 
 
